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Abstract
Three Essays on the Effects of Product Recall on Decision Making
Arka Mukherjee, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2019
The effects of product recalls can be utterly disastrous for the firm responsible for the recall. A
recalling firm may bear substantial external failure costs along with sales loss due to a tarnished
goodwill. Deciding the pre-recall and post-recall advertising, price and quality are crucial for both
the recalling firm and its rivals. Using a differential game theoretic modelling approach, we de-
velop and analyze theoretical models associated with a product recall and study the effect of the
same on supply chain decision making. In our first essay, we analyze a scenario with two manu-
facturers under goodwill-advertising competition. Either one firm or both firms can be susceptible
to recall a product, and both are aware of the recall likelihood ex-ante. We examine the pre-crisis
and post-crisis equilibrium advertising efforts and effect of recall on firms’ profits when firms are
farsighted or “hazard myopic. We show that the variance of advertising in the two periods and the
profits of the firms depend on crisis likelihood and impact. The trade-off between the likelihood
of crisis and its impact explains the previous conflicting findings of the literature. In our second
essay, we investigate joint decisions of pricing and advertising for mitigating the harmful effects
of a product recall on a firm and the negative spillover effect on a rival firm. We recommend the
equilibrium pricing and advertising policies of the two competing firms under product recalls of
different impact and likelihood. We compare the case when the focal firm is a market leader to
the case when both firms are similar. In the third essay, we define two contracts for managing
“collateral damage” during a product recall. We show that adopting a cost-sharing contract can
be beneficial for suppliers and manufacturers. We found that cost-sharing decisions, advertising
efforts and quality efforts vary under different scenarios. There may be individual motivation for
the firms to move against a contract under different crisis likelihood and impact. Nevertheless, the
supply chain profit is always higher under a contract.
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A product recall is an undesirable event that may disrupt a supply chain severely. The recalled
items could be dangerous for life and may damage the environment. Consequently, recalls are
detrimental to the image of a firm and could threaten the existence of the associated firm. For ex-
ample, the recall of airbags in 2016 by the Japanese manufacturer, "Takata", has been described by
NHTSA (The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) as "the largest and most complex
safety recall in U.S. history". The impact was 11 deaths and approximately 180 injuries. Con-
sequently recalls of about 42 million vehicles from 19 manufacturers were issued. The damage
enforced Takata, an 80-year-old company, to file for bankruptcy in 2017.
Despite the numerous product recalls in industries such as food, pharmaceutical, automobile,
and consumer goods. not much research is available to understand the recall events (Wowak and
Boone 2015). Nevertheless, few empirical studies have covered various recall events and, some
papers used mathematical modelling methodology to investigate the effect of product recalls on
supply chains. In the proposed research, our goal is to understand the recall phenomena and its
repercussion on decision making in a supply chain.
The existing literature on product recalls cover various recall contexts and touch various re-
lated issues such as supply chain traceability (Dai, Tseng, and Zipkin 2015), brand image (Dawar
and Pillutla 2000), spillover effects (Borah and Tellis 2016), quality (Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan
2009) and timing of a product recall (Yao and Parlar 2019). The extant literature which investigates
decision making during product recall encompasses different areas like marketing, operations man-
agement and financial implications. A comprehensive literature review on product recall (Wowak
and Boone 2015) compiled the opinion of industry experts and researchers to provide the four
key aspects of product recalls that needs to be researched/studied in detail. These key aspects of
product-recall are product recall precursors, product recall processes, product recall impacts and
mitigation approaches. The authors highlighted that the literature is lacking analytical research
with regards to the above four phases of product recalls. Motivated by the paucity of research in
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this important area, we investigate the impacts of a product recall on decisions like advertising,
pricing and quality. Our work also validates if the decisions mentioned above can mitigate the
negative effects of a product recall. We address three key themes in this dissertation:
• Impact of a product recall on firm goodwill and the mitigating effects of advertising decisions
• Spillover effect of product recall and its effect on pricing and advertising in a supply chain
• Quality cost-sharing contracts in a supply chain to mitigate the effects of product recalls.
Research Design and Methodology: To analyze our research themes proposed above section, we
choose mathematical modelling, especially differential game theory as our research methodology.
The temporal dimension of decision making in dynamic games makes our models realistic. As-
suming random recall time, we derive the equilibrium decisions and policies to answer our various
research questions. We develop and analyze three models to deal with the different scenarios of
product recalls, separately. The modelling involves the following steps –
1. Review literature or industry reports to generate supply chain involvement scenarios in a
product recall.
2. Develop a model for each scenario. Once we select the appropriate modelling technique, we
abide by certain assumptions
3. We develop analytical solutions for the model problems and conduct numerical experiments
to gain further insights.
In the following section, we highlight the positioning of our research with respect to the present
literature. We briefly discuss the contribution of our research.
1.1. Product Recall and Advertising
When a manufacturer issues a recall, there is a damaging effect on the manufacturer’s brand. The
damaging effect, however, depends on the firm’s existing brand image and the magnitude of the
recall (H. Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008). Brand
advertising can potentially help in overcoming this harmful impact of a product recall. Using
the extension of Vidale-Wolfe model by Sethi 1983, Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011 finds the
optimal advertising decisions while product harm crisis may occur. The analytical model, under
the framework of dynamic game, shows that managers discount the present more if they anticipate
the recall compared to when they do not expect it. The paper also throws light on the effect of
damage and crisis likelihood on the optimal decisions. The authors finally test their model by the
sales from the automobile industry.
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Our first essay (Chapter 2) is closely related to the study of Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011.
In Chapter 2, we construct a model where demand functions of two manufacturers are affected by
goodwill and show how the advertising decisions of the two firms in a duopoly market are affected
by product recalls of variable impacts. We primarily re-examine the validity of some of the results
presented in (Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011) under a different model. Besides, we introduce the
concept of "hazard myopia" and also extend the literature to investigate the advertising decisions
when two firms, with individual risks of recall, compete for goodwill. (Rubel 2018) studied such
a model with pricing competition, but the model assumes a monopoly market after a recall. We
relax this assumption to extend the finding in case of partial recalls.
1.2. Spillover Effect of Product Recall
Empirical research shows that when a recall happens for one product, the ramification of the oc-
currence felt across categories or even by competitors (Freedman, Kearney, and Lederman 2012;
Borah and Tellis 2016). As an aftermath of a recall, consumer reaction can affect a brand which
has not recalled the product but sells similar products. This reaction of consumers diffusing to rival
brands is the so-called spillover effect of a product recall. For instance, frozen food recall of one
brand may negatively affect the demands of other brands producing similar items as well as other
frozen food items. The impact is, in general, more severe in high valued complex items such as
car where recall is due to one critical component and the demand for competing brands reduced
just because competition shared some similarities such as common supplier, existing brand image
and country of origin. On the other hand, competitors based in other countries can invest more in
advertising or sales to boost their profit. A most cited example is very recent, Toyota recalls. When
Toyota recalled few models, demand for Honda cars also declined, but GM was able to make more
profit by demand shift.
In the second essay (Chapter 3), we model the spillover effect of a product recall when two
manufacturers compete for goodwill and price. To the best of our knowledge, the extant empir-
ical literature has studied the spillover effect, but there is a paucity of research in the modelling
literature. While the focus of most of the empirical studied is the event of spillover, we contribute
by investigating the advertising and pricing decisions when spillover occurs. Moreover, our model
incorporates both positive and negative spillover under the scope of a single framework.
1.3. Collateral Damage of Product Recall in a Supply Chain
A product recall can have a rippling effect on a supply chain. When a recall is issued, not only
the firm at fault but also the other supply chain members can suffer alike. For example, when
a supplier’s faulty parts lead to a recall, the manufacturer, retailer and possibly other involved
3
members of the supply chain may face drastic consequences. Samsung issued a recall for the
Galaxy Note 7 due to the fault of the battery suppliers resulting in considerable financial damage
to Samsung. In such cases, contractual agreements between a manufacturer and a supplier may
help to overcome the deterring effect of recall.
In the third essay (Chapter 4), we study cooperation instead of competition. We propose two
cost-sharing contracts offered by a manufacturer to her suppliers. We examine how the cost-
sharing mechanisms vary before and after a recall. The extant literature has scarcely focused on
the viability of such contracts during product recalls. We fulfil this gap by analyzing the proposed
contracts and show that partial cost-sharing might be a better option when crisis likelihood is low.
In terms of the research focus, our paper is close to that of (Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan 2009),
who also discuss two different cost-sharing contracts in the wake of product harm crisis.




The Impact of Product Recall on
Advertising Decisions While Envisioning
Crisis or Being Hazard Myopic
2.1. Introduction
Product recalls are common occurrences in industries like consumer products, vehicles, food prod-
ucts and health products. The Transport Canada database shows that there have been 10402 recalls
issued only in the automobile industry starting from 2010 till January 2018. In a contemporary
competitive market, rival firms strive for quality excellence. However, the data from Transport
Canada shows that despite firms’ best efforts to ensure quality, product-recalls occur often and
therefore, should be anticipated during a management’s decision making. The impact of product-
recalls depends on the harm caused by the products under recall. While small product-recalls,
causing little media attention and customer awareness may go unnoticed, the major recalls often
result in huge losses for the firms at fault as consumers lose confidence in the brand, supplier rela-
tionships get affected negatively, or competitors take advantage of the situation (Craig and Thomas
1996; A. M. Eilert 2013). The anticipation of product harm crisis is important from a manage-
rial point of view because it can affect decisions like advertising, pricing or quality investments
and largely impact the firm’s reputation and financial performance (Rubel 2018; Rubel, Naik, and
Srinivasan 2011; Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan 2009; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008; Gao
et al. 2015; Y. Chen, Ganesan, and Yong Liu 2009; M. Eilert et al. 2017). Examples of strate-
gic decision making to alleviate recall impacts are abundant. Salmonella contamination led to the
recall of some Cadbury chocolate flavours from the UK market. After the recall, Cadbury’s mar-
keting efforts increased substantially resulting in an increase in advertising and the launch of new
products (Walsh 2006). The increased efforts of marketing or advertising were in the expectation
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of regaining lost market. In a more recent incident, Samsung globally recalled Note 7. The impact
was huge, and it wiped off $16 billion of the company’s market value initially (Reuters 2016).
Following the recall, Samsung made extensive advertising campaigns to regain customers’ trust.
The advertising went to the extent of showing the new eight-point battery check that exceeded the
industry quality standards (Fenech 2017) demonstrating how Samsung signalled quality improve-
ment via advertising.
Most of the marketing literature uses the words product-recall and product harm crisis synony-
mously. The strict meaning of the two words is not the same(Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Heerde 2017).
While a product harm crisis is an antecedent, a product recall is a consequence. However, for the
sake of this paper, we use the words "product recall", "crisis" or product harm crisis" to mean the
same thing - product recall.
The motivation of our paper stems out from the dilemma that the previous literature and the
various industry reports yield about a firm’s advertising efforts after a recall. Furthermore, there
is a relative lack of research in the area of decision making in marketing channels to mitigate
recall impacts (Wowak and Boone 2015). We refer to a firm issuing a recall as a focal firm. We
investigate the equilibrium advertising policies of two competing firms when one firm anticipates
a recall (one focal firm) or both firms (two focal firms) predict recalls. Additionally, we analyze
the situation where a firm ignores the crisis likelihood. Moreover, we examine the effects of crisis
likelihood and damage on the firm profit for both the cases: competition with one focal firm and
competition with two focal firms.
High pre-crisis brand equity can protect a firm from the recall crisis and therefore, a firm, in an-
ticipation of a recall, can advertise more during pre-crisis regime to build its brand image (Cleeren,
Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008). Alternatively, management might have an urge to make more adver-
tising efforts in the post-crisis regime in order to gain back its image and lost market share. An
increase in the advertising can be a lost effort if the consumers are unforgiving towards the firm at
fault. Consequently, the competitor might also exhibit opportunistic behaviour, thereby increasing
its advertising (Cleeren, H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Craig and Thomas 1996). Both
the arguments, favouring increased advertisement spending before or after a recall are valid. Ev-
ery firm has a certain likelihood and damage rate for a particular product recall. Managers of a
firm should envision the risk of recall in their advertising decisions throughout the planning hori-
zon because crisis anticipation increases managers’ time preference (Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan
2011).
Uncertain occurrence, substantial damage which incurs additional costs like costs for manag-
ing reverse logistics, customer compensations, litigation costs and above all an erosion of brand
value or goodwill are the characteristics of a product recall. Our paper focuses mainly on ana-
lyzing optimal advertising decision when firms compete with respect to brand image or goodwill.
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Product recall affects the baseline sales of the recalling firm (H. Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe
2007). Very severe damage due to quality failure and subsequent recall can jeopardize the im-
age of the firm at fault. The car airbags recall by Takata Corporation of Japan cost the company
in billions. Consequently, Takata filed bankruptcy in 2016 (Tajitsu 2017). In another incident,
the Westland/Hallmark Meatpacking company, accused of improper cattle handling, recalled more
than 143 million pounds of beef in 2008 due to an intervention by the FDA. The company, under a
$ 500 million settlement with various plaintiffs, had to file bankruptcy in 2012. A highly publicized
and costly recall caused swift goodwill erosion thereby accelerating the firm’s downfall.
High goodwill results in better market share and hence, better performance. A firm’s good-
will is often linked with advertising. Advertising is a major factor in maximizing brand equity
(Meenaghan 1995; Achenbaum 1989; Lindsay 1990). Meenaghan 1995 observes - “at all levels of
marketing imagery advertising is identified as one of the principal components of image creation”.
For example, Nike’s famous "Just do it" campaign not only boosted the company’s brand image
but also increased the sales from $877 million to $9.2 billion within a decade. A high brand image
has a positive impact on the market share or sales of a firm. Numerous goodwill based demand
models assume the positive effect of goodwill on demand (Dockner et al. 2000; Karray and Zac-
cour 2005). If consumers’ perceived brand image is congruent with a consumer’s social, actual,
ideal images, the brand is purchased, and the sales of the brand are impacted positively (Ataman
and Ülengin 2003).
We wish to validate the findings related to optimal advertising during recall (Rubel, Naik, and
Srinivasan 2011; Cleeren, H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen
2008). Firms fear the goodwill loss as a result of a recall. To the best of our knowledge, the extant
literature, related to the effect of product recalls, did not shed light on the optimal advertising
policies when goodwill of the competing firms affect their demands. We develop a dynamic game-
theoretic model where demand is a function of the firms’ goodwills. In our model, a product
recall affects goodwill, and consequently demand. Thus our model investigates optimal advertising
decisions while envisioning three significant aspects of a product recall – uncertain recall time, the
effect of advertising on goodwill and impact of the recall risk and damage on the optimal policies.
The previous literature, based on mathematical modelling framework, has stressed the impor-
tance of envisioning the impending product recall while making decisions (Rubel 2018; Rubel,
Naik, and Srinivasan 2011). We believe that the assumption that firms have perfect information
about the hazard rate might not always be applicable. For example, a firm can be a new entrant in
the market. In such cases, the entrant or the incumbent might not predict or consider the crisis pos-
sibility of the entrant. If a firm has no recall history, and it maintains a high quality or brand value,
the firm itself or the competitor can also possibly ignore the possibility of a recall hazard. In this
context, we propose the term "hazard myopic" for a firm if it ignores the chances of a recall. In the
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marketing literature, "managerial myopia" is used in a different sense with respect to advertising.
Marketing myopia with respect to advertising refers to the strategy where the focus is promoting
a product rather than building the brand or paying attention towards the customers needs (H. H.
Friedman and L. Friedman 1976; Sharma 2015; Levitt 1960). The models under the dynamic game
framework in the marketing literature have used the term myopia to signify that a player ignores
the state evolution of the system, e.g. (Taboubi and Zaccour 2002; Benchekroun, Martín-Herrán,
and Taboubi 2009; Zu and L. Chen 2017). We consider another form of myopia - overlooking
hazard possibility while determining the long-term profit (hazard myopic). In a situation where we
have this type of myopia, a viable case of interest is to examine the firms’ equilibrium advertising
policies and profits. When firms are not "hazard myopic" we call them farsighted in this paper.
Thus, farsighted firms envision their respective hazard rates.
By analyzing our model, we answer the following research questions:
1. What are the equilibrium advertising policies of the individual players before product recall
and after product recall?
2. How are the equilibrium advertisings of the competing firms affected by the intensity of the
recall and the hazard rate of the recall?
3. Under the model assumptions, is post recall advertising always higher than the pre-recall
advertising?
4. What is the impact of the impending recall on the performance of the competing firms?
5. What is the impact of hazard myopia on advertising and performance of the competing firms?
In this paper, we have developed a brand image based demand function and a dynamic model
which captures advertising competition and uncertain recall time. The recall is also "precise," i.e.
the firms know the exact items to be recalled and can observe the "drop" in goodwill as a result
of the damage caused by the recall (Ketchen Jr, Wowak, and Craighead 2014). Besides, the recall
is partial, and non-defective products remain in the market after the recall. We have analyzed the
advertising decisions and the impact of a recall in two scenarios -
(i) A focal firm and a non-focal firm compete
(ii) Two focal firms compete.
Our results augment or support those of the previous literature (Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011;
Rubel 2018; Cleeren, H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Gao et al. 2015). We find that a firm’s
profit margin and sensitivity to competition affect its equilibrium advertising policies. Whether
a firm should increase or decrease advertising in the post-recall regime depends on what profit
margin the firm wants to attain, how sensitive the market is towards the firms’ goodwills and, most
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importantly on the (χ,η) pair, where χ in the recalling firm’s hazard rate and η ∈ (0,1) is the
damage to goodwill caused by the recall. Crisis intensity and hazard rate are major determining
factors for firms’ profits. A low impact low recall hazard rate can positively affect the performance
of a firm. High competition can increase profit for a firm. High recall probability or intensity
negatively affects a firm’s profit. We have not considered price as a decision variable. However,
some of our results point towards the importance of pricing before and after a product recall. The
findings from the model also highlight that a brand having high initial goodwill suffers from less
profit loss by a recall. However, we found that a high-intensity recall can substantially erode firm
profit irrespective of its initial goodwill. We summarize our contribution to the existing literature
in the following paragraph.
First, we have investigated the equilibrium advertising policies, and long-term expected profits
of the competing firms under a dynamic goodwill based game theoretic duopoly model when prod-
uct recall can strike at an uncertain time. While the previous studies (Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan
2011; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008; Gao et al. 2015) considered advertising decisions and
the impact of the impending recall on the same, our study articulates the effect of a recall on a focal
as well a non-focal firms’ advertising strategies and the resulting long-term expected profits.
Second, we have considered another form of myopia, different from the concept of the existing
literature - overlooking hazard possibility while determining the long-term profit (hazard myopic).
In a situation where we have this type of myopia, a viable case of interest is to examine the firms’
equilibrium advertising policies and profits. When firms are not "hazard myopic" we call them
farsighted in this paper. Thus, farsighted firms envision their respective hazard rates.
Third, in contrast with the previous studies (Rubel 2018), we believe that this paper is the
first to have developed the feedback (closed loop) strategies in the case when two focal firms with
different crisis likelihoods exist and the duopoly competition continues even after both the crises
occur. The analysis of the above model provides us with some useful managerial implications.
Table 0 presents the details of our contribution and the comparison of the same with the related
literature. The table is partly adapted from a literature review in the area of marketing and product
harm crisis (Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Heerde 2017), but is modified to highlight our contribution.
The rest of the paper is arranged in the following manner. In section 2, we present a detailed
description of the model. We show how uncertain recall time, the damaging effect of recall can be
incorporated into the model and propose the solution procedure. Section 3 gives a comprehensive
analysis of the model and illustrates how the advertising policies differ for a single focal firm,
myopic firms or two focal firms. Section 4 supports the analysis done in Section 3 by numerical
experiments and elucidate the significance of our analytical findings. Finally, in section 5, we
conclude with managerial implications of our research and future research directions.
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2.2. Model Formulation
In this section, we define the model comprising of the demand functions, the process of recall
occurrence, the effect of recall and the manufacturers’ profit-maximizing problems in the different
scenarios. We consider a market structure involving two manufacturers, competing for goodwill.
We will refer the manufacturers as M1 and M2. Consumers are sensitive towards the difference in
the goodwill of the manufacturers. While a manufacturer’s goodwill positively affects its demand,
the competitor’s goodwill negatively affects its demand. The manufacturers try to maintain high
brand goodwill by continuous advertising efforts. Product-recall can occur at an uncertain time
within the planning horizon, [0,∞). A recall dampens the goodwill of the focal firm and conse-
quently decreases the firm’s demand, thereby affecting the firm’s profit. Therefore, advertising, a
commonly used weapon for maintaining or increasing goodwill, can be a viable strategy to counter
the adverse effects of the product recall. The main objective of our model is to find the equilib-
rium advertising in pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes and analyze the effect of recall probability
and intensity on the equilibrium strategies and firms’ profits. We assume that the players take the
advertising decisions simultaneously and the equilibrium strategies are, therefore, solutions of the
Nash game described later.
Table 2.1 shows the equilibrium advertising decisions A∗i j in different cases. We consider two
different scenarios depending on the number of focal firms. First, we investigate the case when
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Table 2.1: Firm decisions and regimes
there is one focal firm, i.e., one of the manufacturers is prone to a product recall. Second, we
extend our model to the situation where there are two focal firms, i.e., both the manufacturers are
prone to recall. We analyze these two cases separately. For each of the above
Model Parameter Description
θi(t) Goodwill of manufacturer i at time t. θi(t) ∈ [0,∞)
Ai j(t)
Advertising effort by the manufacturer i
in regime j (Measured in monetary values)
A∗i j(t)
Equilibrium advertising effort of the
manufacturer i in regime j
αi Market demand (for firm i) in the absence of goodwill. αi ∈ [0,∞)
βi Consumer sensitivity of brand image difference. βi ∈ [0,∞)
ki j Advertising effectiveness of firm i in regime j. ki j ∈ [0,∞)
δi j Absorption of goodwill for manufacturer i in regime j. δi j ∈ [0,1]
r Discounting factor. r ∈ [0,1]
ηi Damage to goodwill caused by the recall ηi ∈ [0,1]
χ Hazard rate
Di(θ1,θ2) Demand for manufacturer i in regime j
mi j Unit profit margin for manufacturer i in regime j
Vi j Value function for manufacturer i in regime j
µi Proportionality constant for advertising cost of Manufacturer i
Table 2.2: Model Parameters
two scenarios, we consider that the firms are farsighted, i.e., they perfectly predict the hazard rate
at the beginning of the planning horizon. We further extend the one focal firm model to the case
when the firms are "hazard myopic". We define hazard myopia for a firm as the behaviour of
not foreseeing the chance of a recall. A firm, when myopic, will become aware of a recall when
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it is issued because of the widespread media attention. It is plausible that the firms reconsider
their advertising decisions at the time when the firm itself or the rival issues a recall. Table 2.1
summarizes the different scenarios and decisions, while Table 2.2 summarizes the model notations.
2.2.1. The Recall Occurrence:
The planning horizon in our study is [0,∞). We also assume that during this infinite planning
horizon, recall occurs only once by any manufacturer. In our subsequent description, we call the
manufacturer subjected to product recall as a focal firm and the other without the occurrence of
product recall as a non-focal firm. When we consider only one focal firm, let tr be the random
time of the recall. Consider χ to be the hazard rate. While χ is not necessarily between (0,1),
for our numerical computations we consider variations of χ in the range of (0,1). We define
the probabilistic switching of the pre-crisis and the post-crisis regime by means of the stochastic
process [R(t) : t ≥ 0] defined below:
lim
dt→0





P[R(t +dt) = 1|R(t) = 2]
dt
= 0. (2.1)
R(t) = 1 signifies the pre-crisis regime and R(t) = 2 signifies the post-crisis regime. When both
the firms are prone to recall, tr1 and tr2 are the random times of recall. The firms do not know ex
ante if tr1 > tr2 or tr1 < tr2. We exclude the case of tr1 = tr2. Each firm i has its own hazard rate χi









P[Ri(t +dt) = 1|Ri(t) = 2]
dt
= 0. (2.2)
Applications of such regime switching and piecewise deterministic games can be found in the
closely related studies (Boukas, Haurie, and Michel 1990; Haurie and Moresino 2006; Rubel,
Naik, and Srinivasan 2011). The above definition assumes a constant hazard rate. However, this
does not mean that the probability of the crisis is fixed. In many major recall events, the likelihood
of crisis is predetermined by a number of factors related to product failure (Thirumalai and Sinha
2011). Hence use of a fixed likelihood is justified. For a more generic analysis, one can use a time
dependent hazard rate. But the analysis of the problem becomes more complex.
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The random timings of a recall essentially split the planning horizon into different decision
epochs or regimes. When there is one focal firm, there are two possible decision epochs. When
there are two focal firms, there are three possible decision epochs. Figure (2.1) and Figure (2.2)
depicts the recall occurrence and the regimes for decision making.
Figure 2.1: Advertising decisions - one focal firm
Figure 2.2: Advertising decisions -two focal firms
2.2.2. Demand Functions
We consider dynamic linear demand functions for the manufacturers M1 and M2. One underlying
assumption is that the manufacturers have no restrictions or capacity issues and are able to meet
demand if it is high. Since decisions are taken in pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes, and decisions
affect the state trajectory, ideally we need a time index j for the demand functions, state variables
and the decision variables. However, to avoid notational complexity and confusion we drop the
time index from the notation of demand and state variables. We use the indices i, j for the decision
variables (Ai j), profit margins (mi j) and value functions (Vi j). Di(θ1(t),θ2(t)(t)) is the demand for
manufacturer Mi where i ∈ {1,2}. Thus, the demands for the two manufacturers M1 and M2 are
respectively:
D1(t) = α1 +β1(θ1(t)−θ2(t)), (2.3)
D2(t) = α2 +β2(θ2(t)−θ1(t)).
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The relatively simple nature of the demand function assures tractability of our model. Morover,
some studies in the previous literature adopt a structurally similar price-dependent demand model
(Balasubramanian and Bhardwaj 2004). In the above demand functions, θi(t) is the goodwill of the
manufacturer i, α is the initial market size , βi is the consumer sensitivity towards difference of the
goodwills of Mi and M j. While the positivity of the demand functions might not be guaranteed if we
consider θi(t) ∈ [0,∞), we assume that αi is large enough and demand will remain positive for the
solutions of our games. The states evolve according to the following differential equations:
θ̇1(t) = k1 jA1 j(t)−δ1 jθ1(t), ∀ t ∈ [0,∞),θ1(0) = θ̃1, (2.4)
θ̇2(t) = k2 jA2 j(t)−δ2 jθ2(t), ∀ t ∈ [0,∞),θ2(0) = θ̃2.
Ai j is the advertising effort of Mi in regime j and δi is the decay parameter (Nerlove and Arrow
1962). θ̃1 ≥ 0, θ̃2 ≥ 0 are the initial values of the brand images at the beginning of the planning
horizon. ki j are the advertising effectiveness.
The demand functions (2.3) and the state variables (2.4) of our model are based on the following
assumptions:
1. The demand for a firm is positively affected by its own goodwill and negatively by the
goodwill of its rival. This represents the competition in the duopoly.
2. We do not incorporate any negative effect of a firm’s advertising directly in the state evolution
of its rival. This is consistent with some of the literature (Erickson 1995).
3. A firm’s marginal goodwill is positively affected by its own advertising efforts.
While our assumption 1 is captured by the demand functions, the assumptions 2 is reflected in the
evolution of the states of our dynamic system, the states being - the brand images θ1(t), θ2(t).
Assumptions 1 and 2 comport with some of the models discussed in the previous literature (Dock-
ner et al. 2000; Karray and Zaccour 2005; Nair and Narasimhan 2006) . While Dockner et al.
2000 proposed a multiplicative dynamic demand model with linear state equations, Karray and
Zaccour 2005 considers a linear demand function which is affected positively by the brand image
and the efforts (investments) a firm makes to maintain its brand image. C. K. Kim and Chung 1997
showed that brand image is positively related to market share. Using the Lanchester model, one
study found that the closed-loop strategies of firms depend on the realized market share (Chinta-
gunta and Vilcassim 1992). We also investigate the closed loop strategies. However, in our case,
the advertising strategies will be degenerate stationary Markov strategies.
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2.2.3. Capturing the effect of recall as a jump state:
In the case of a product recall, there is a damaging effect of the recall on the recalling firm’s
baseline sales (H. Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007; Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011).
The damaging effect, however, depends on the firm’s existing goodwill and the magnitude of the
recall. Product recall causes erosion of brand goodwill (A. M. Eilert 2013; Fenech 2017). In
our model the damage due to product recall is captured by the diminishing goodwill of the focal
firm after the recall. If, in general, the manufacturer Mi recalls, We express the jump state by
θi2(t+r ) = (1−ηi)θi1(t−r )), where tr is the time of the recall for Mi. Similar applications of jump
states have been considered in the related literature (Kamien and Schwartz 2012). The focal firm’s
demand function increases with its own goodwill. So a loss in goodwill lowers its demand. The
solution procedure of our model is given in section 2.4. In the following section, we illustrate how
to incorporate the jump state using state equations (2.8).
After a product recall, advertising effectiveness can reduce (Yan Liu and Shankar 2015; Yi
Zhao, Ying Zhao, and Helsen 2011) and this reduction of effectiveness again depends on the brand
equity (H. Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). We capture this by the parameter ki j. We
assume that after a recall which causes a significant damage to the goodwill of a firm i, ki1 > ki2,
loss of advertising effectiveness occurs. The absorption parameter of the Nerlove-Arrow model
can be used to capture the ineffectiveness of advertisement or brand forgetting. The marginal
brand image is negatively affected by the absorption factor, δi j. Thus, after a recall of substantial
intensity by a firm i, δi2 > δi1. Thus the damage to the recalling firm can occur by damage to
goodwill, loss of advertising effectiveness and increase in brand forgetting.
2.2.4. The Manufacturers’ Decision Problems in presence of one focal firm
2.2.4.1. Farsighted Firms
Without the loss of generality, we assume that M1 is the focal firm. Both M1 and M2 anticipate the
hazard rate, χ at the beginning of the planning horizon. The manufacturers face their individual
profit maximizing problems. We have considered the quadratic costs of advertising efforts. Such




i j has been widely used in the literature (e.g. (Karray and
Zaccour 2005)). µi is the proportionality constant of the quadratic cost. Since, in case of one focal
firm, a product-recall splits the decision horizon into two regimes - pre-crisis and post-crisis, in
general the decisions made by the firms will differ in those two regimes. The time of recall is
stochastic. Therefore, the long-term profit is an expected sum of the profits in the post-crisis and
pre-crisis regimes. Let Ai j be the advertising effort and πi j be the profit for manufacturer Mi in
regime j.
For Manufacturer i, the profits in each regime are given by:
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Now, tr, the time of recall, is a random time which is not known in advance. This implies that
the profits in the two periods are random variables. So the long-term expected profit is given
by, Πi(Ai1,Ai2) = E[πi1 + e−rtrπi2] where the expectation E[.] is taken with respect to the crisis
occurrence process. The discount factor e−rtr appears because πi1 accrues at t = 0 and πi2 at t = tr.
Thus, it is required to discount π12 back to t = 0 to add the two long-term profits. The value of the
long-term profit will therefore depends on the strategies (Ai1,Ai2) chosen in the two regimes for
i ∈ {1,2}. The problem above is a random stopping problem. If f (t) and F(t) are the probability
density and cumulative density functions of the stochastic occurrence process, then the hazard rate
is h(t) = χ,F(t) = 1− e−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds. Therefore, f (t) = χe−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds. The long-term expected profit




e−rsJi1ds+ e−rtrπi2] where i ∈ {1,2}, (2.6)
where the first term under the expectation gives the profit of the pre-crisis period and the second
term gives the profit of the post-crisis regime. Therefore, the sum of the two profits gives the long-
term profit over the planning horizon. Integrating by parts and making algebraic manipulations
(Haurie and Moresino 2006; Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011) the above expression can be trans-






The management of both the firms would like to optimize their long-term profit. Thus, given the
demand dynamics and the state evolution, they would like to choose the advertising efforts which
would maximize the expected profit over the planning horizon. In order to solve the problems for
the manufacturers, we have to start by solving for the value functions of the post-crisis regime first
(Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011; Haurie and Moresino 2006) . The value functions for the M1
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θ̇12(t) = k12A12(t)−δ12θ1(t), θ1(tr+) = (1−η)θ1(tr−),
θ̇22(t) = k22A22(t)−δ22θ2(t), θ2(tr) = θ2tr ,
where θ2tr is the goodwill of firm 2 at time tr . We want to find the feedback strategies for
the firms. Therefore, as a standard solution procedure we start by writing the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equations (Dockner et al. 2000). Subsequently, the first order conditions on the
decision variables will help us in finding the equilibrium strategies from the HJB equations. We
note that the value functions Vi j(θ1,θ2) are concave in Ai j since
∂ 2Vi j
∂A2i j
= −µi < 0. The HJB equa-














































θ̇1(t) = k11A11(t)−δ11θ1(t), ∀t ∈ [0,∞),θ1(0) = θ10,
θ̇2(t) = k21A21(t))−δ21θ2(t), ∀t ∈ [0,∞),θ2(0) = θ20,
where θ10,θ20 are the initial goodwills of firm 1 and firm2.



























2.2.4.2. Hazard Myopic Firms
The marketing literature has stressed the importance of envisioning the impending product recall
while making decisions. However, the assumption that the rival firms would always know and
consider each others hazard rate can be questionable. Then some viable questions can be -
• What is the effect of ignoring crisis probability on the decision and performance of the firms?
• Is there a condition under which a myopic firm has a better performance?
Though the firms overlook the hazard probability at the beginning of the planning horizon,
it is understandable that they will become aware of a recall when it is announced.i.e. they will
notice the change in goodwill as the damage η occurs. Hence, the firms can potentially change the
equilibrium advertising policies to ensure better profits. We assume that both M1 and M2 do not
foresee χ , the hazard rate.
When both M1 and M2 are myopic, the solution procedure starts with solving for the equilib-
rium decisions and value functions for the first regime and then doing the same for the second




















θ̇1(t) = k11A11(t)−δ11θ1(t), ∀t ∈ [0,∞),θ1(0) = θ10,
θ̇2(t) = k21A21(t))−δ21θ2(t), ∀t ∈ [0,∞),θ2(0) = θ20.
The second regime decision problems are same as (2.12) with the exception that the margins
change to m12 and m22 respectively for the focal and the non focal firms, respectively. The state
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θ̇1(t) = k12A12(t)−δ12θ1(t), ∀ t ∈ (tr,∞), θ1(t+r ) = (1−η)θ1(t−r ),
θ̇2(t) = k22A22(t))−δ22θ2(t), ∀t ∈ (tr,∞),θ2(tr) = θtr .
Proceeding similarly as in the far sighted firms’ cases, we can similarly derive the HJB equations
for the myopic firms and solve for the equilibrium feedback strategies.
2.2.5. The Manufacturers’ Decision Problems in presence of two focal firms
In this case, the market consists of two focal manufacturers Mi. Both manufacturers are prone to
recall and each has a specific hazard rate of χi where i ∈ {1,2}. We are assuming that after the
recall both the manufacturers still sell their products in the market or in other words the recalls are
partial. For example, in Feb 2018, Fujitsu Canada, recalled only certain computers with defective
batteries. Other units or models of the same (E-series) were still available in the market after the
recall.
When the firms are farsighted, both the hazard rates are common knowledge. However, at the
beginning of the horizon neither firm knows who will recall first. Consequently, the value function







e−rtΠi1(t)dt + e−rtiVi2(θi,θ j).Φ[ti < tj] (2.14)
+e−rt jV̂i2(θi,θ j).Φ[tj < ti]
)
,
where the operators Φ[ti < tj] and Φ[tj < ti] are defined in the following manner:
Φ[ti < tj] = 1, if ti < t j (2.15)
= 0, otherwise,
Φ[tj < ti] = 1, if t j < ti
= 0 otherwise.
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and the second regime value functions Vi2 are given by





e−(r+χ j)t{Πi2(t)dt +χ jVi3(θi,(1−η j)θ j)}, (2.16)






Here Πi1(t) is the profit of the manufacturer i in the pre-recall regime. Similar formulation of
value function can be found in (Rubel 2018) where one of the firms becomes a monopolist after
the recall as products are taken off the market. We have relaxed this assumption in our model
because recalls can be partial as well. Hence both the firms continue to compete after recall. In
other words, the market remains a duopoly market in all the three decision regimes - the pre-recall
regime, the regime between the first recall and second recall and the post-recall regime for both the
firms. Hence, the horizon now has three decision epochs - the pre-recall epoch, the epoch between
the recalls made by M1 and M2 and the post-recall epoch.
The derivation of the value function for the firm i in regime 1 are based on the premises that
the occurrences of the two recalls are independent of one another. The probability of the random
variable min{ti, t j} can be defined as - Pr(min{ti, t j} > t)=Pr{(ti > t)∩ (t j > t)}=Pr(ti > t).Pr(t j >
t)=e−t(χi+χ j). Thus proceeding in a similar manner as in equations (2.10) and making some alge-
braic manipulations, we get:





e−(r+χi+χ j)t{Πi1(t)dt +χiVi2(θi,θ j) (2.17)
+χ jV̂i2(θi,θ j)}.
Similarly, for the jth firm, the value function in the first regime is given by:





e−(r+χi+χ j)t{Π j1(t)dt +χiVj2(θi,θ j) (2.18)
+χ jV̂j2(θi,θ j)}.
The details of the derivation of the first regime value function is given in the appendix A.
Remark: The recall damages are still captured by the jump states in this case when two focal
firms compete. However, it is only after the first recall , i.e., at tr1 that we know who has recalled
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θ j(t+r2) = (1−η j)θ j(t
−
r2),
capture the jump states and the impacts of the recalls.
2.3. Analytical Results and Discussion
First, we want to reiterate that what our goals are and how the model elements are articulated to
help us reach our goals. Our goals are to find the equilibrium advertising of the manufacturers
in the pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes in the two cases - one focal firm issuing a recall, two
focal firms susceptible to recall. First, we solve the manufacturers’ problems to find equilibrium
advertising strategies. We start with finding the value function for the post-crisis regime using
HJB equations (2.9). Then using equations (2.11) we find the equilibrium advertising for the first
regime. Proofs of all the propositions, unless trivial, are given in the appendix A.
2.3.1. Equilibrium Advertising and Profits - One Focal Firm
We investigate the scenario when one of the competing firms has a probability of recall and both
the firms make their decisions taking into account the hazard rate of the focal firm. In other words,
the hazard rate here is common knowledge for both the players. A∗i j is the equilibrium advertising
effort of manufacturer i in regime j, where i, j ∈ {1,2}.
2.3.1.1. Decisions of the Farsighted Firms
Proposition 1. (a) The post-crisis equilibrium advertising efforts of the manufacturers M1 and

























The above are the feedback advertising strategies of the two manufacturers in the two regimes.
The strategies, in this case, are stationary and hence Markov perfect. In the absence of a crisis,
i.e when the hazard rate, χ = 0 and hence the damage, η = 0, the strategies of both the regimes
are identical. Once a recall has occurred, the firm M1 does not anticipate any more recall during
the planning horizon. This is a primary assumption of our model. Hence, the equilibrium adver-
tisements are free from the hazard rate in the second regime. The equilibrium advertising efforts
in the pre-crisis regime incorporate the hazard rate χ . This emphasizes the foresightedness of the
management of both the focal and non-focal firms as they take the probability of recall into account
when they make their advertising decisions even before the recall occurs. This is consistent with
the previous findings that risk creates impatience. (Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011).
In the following lemmas, we present some properties of the equilibrium advertising policies
with respect to the parameters. Then we perform a comparative analysis of the equilibrium adver-
tising expressions and infer on its variance in the pre and post-crisis regimes.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium advertisements efforts of both the firms in the second regime are:
(a) increasing with respective margins of the firms m12 or m22,
(b) increasing with the sensitivity of demand towards brand difference βi,
(c) decreasing with the absorption δi j and discounting factor r.
Lemma 1 has some significant implications. Higher margins result in higher equilibrium adver-
tising in the second regime for both the manufacturers. If a manufacturer wants a higher margin, it
can either reduce manufacturing costs or increase the prices. We argue that the M1 produces more
thereby benefiting from the economies of scale and lowering the cost. In the post-crisis regime,
this production cost savings can help the manufacturer to nullify the effects of the profit loss by
the recall. Moreover, the resulting excess advertising will help it in gaining more market and pos-
itively impact its own revenue. The argument that the M1 will increase the price after the recall
is quite flimsy on the grounds of its recent goodwill loss. M2 can take advantage of the situation
by increasing its price (thereby increasing margin, advertisement and hence demand) or produce
more at a lower cost as it expects to sale more in the wake of its rival’s crisis.
For a firm with higher goodwill, in general, it can be assumed that brand forgetting δi j will
be lesser than its rival with lower brand equity. We found that the advertising efforts of the firms
are decreasing with δi j. The above finding is counter intuitive as one might expect that a brand
will invest more in advertising if the forgetting is high. However, δi j is only one factor that affects
goodwill. The firm might cut advertising when absorption factor is high and put efforts in other ar-
eas like increasing advertising effectiveness or consumers’ perception of the brand difference. The
22
effort of the firm ensures that it finds a trade-off amongst different parameters affecting advertising
to obtain the equilibrium profit.
For two firms which are symmetric in all parameters except δ1 j and δ2 j, either δ1 j > δ2 j or
δ1 j < δ2 j. If δ1 j > δ2 j, the non-focal firm knows that the rival’s marginal brand image is subject to
heavier erosion than its own. Therefore, it behaves opportunistically by advertising significantly
more than the recalling firm to capitalize on the situation.
Lemma 2. (a) In the pre-crisis regime, for the focal firm M1, the equilibrium advertising is de-
creasing with the hazard rate if:
η > 1− m11(r+δ12)
m12(r+δ11)
. (2.21)
(b) In the pre-crisis regime, for the non-focal firm M2, the equilibrium advertising is always
decreasing with the hazard rate if,
m22(r+δ21)< m21(r+δ22) (2.22)
.
From the above lemma, for a focal firm, the pre-crisis advertising decreases with the likelihood
of crisis if the crisis impact is larger than a certain threshold given by (2.21). If impact is very
low and there is no change in the margins or for absorption δ1 j, then condition (2.21) reduces
to η > 0. Thus for any positive low impact recall the advertising will always decrease with the
likelihood. On the other hand, for a high impact recall for the focal, the variation of advertising
efforts with crisis likelihood will depend on the margins and the absorption δ1 j in the two periods.
This explains that if a high recall probability is anticipated by the recalling firm, it may not put
a lot of efforts in advertising as high advertising may result in high sales and consequently high
recall costs.
If we assume that the absorption δ2 j remains unchanged in the two periods for the rival firm
M2, the advertising efforts of M2 will decrease in the hazard rate only if its second regime unit
profit margin is lower than the first regimes profit margin. This reflects that if M2 reduces profit
margin by strategies like price reduction, it saves on advertising cost for a high hazard rate. A
high likelihood of crisis gives M2 complacency and it expects to gain advantage from the crisis
opportunity.
Lemma 3. The equilibrium advertising effort for the focal firm in pre-crisis regime is decreasing
with the damaging effect, η .
Lemma 3 is consistent with the previous literature, mainly the model of (Rubel, Naik, and
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Srinivasan 2011) based on (Sethi 1983). The damage effect η cannot be estimated ex-ante unless
the recall root causes and affected units are known. A high damage in goodwill means lesser
profit in the post-crisis period. Thus the significance of Lemma 3 is that, if a high damage rate
is anticipated, the management might want to cut off advertisement costs in regime 1 in order to
advertise more in the post-crisis regime thereby maximizing goodwill and sales. In our model, the
damaging effect does not directly impact demand. But the damage rate accounts for the jump in
the state variable θ1 which is the brand image of manufacturer 1. This, in turn, affects the demand
negatively. Therefore, if sales or demand is affected by the damage, either directly or indirectly,
and the management anticipates the recall, it is likely that a high damage expectation will reduce
advertisement spending in the first regime.
2.3.1.2. Is the post-crisis advertising higher than the pre-crisis advertising?
The previous literature found empirical evidence that ad spending increases after the recall. In our
study, we find the conditions under which the post-crisis advertising efforts are more than the pre-
crisis advertising. The mathematical structures of the advertising efforts that we derived, equations
(2.19) and (2.20), reflect that there is no direct answer to the question - should advertising before







22? The obvious answer is that it depends on the parameter values
of our model, most important of which are the (χ,η) pair.
Proposition 2. (a) For the focal firm(M1), the post-crisis advertising effort is more than the pre-














Proposition 2 shows that the focal firm’s equilibrium advertising will be more or less in the
post-crisis period depending on the crisis likelihood χ . However, the threshold for this χ also
depends on the margins. Assuming that the focal firm’s second regime’s margin is affected by the
recall damage η , the advertising efforts in the post and pre-crisis period depends on χ (directly)
and η (indirectly). More about this is discussed under numerical analysis.
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The previous literature (Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011) showed that in a competitive envi-
ronment non-focal firms should increase post-crisis ad spending in order to exploit the situation.
However, our analysis suggests that equilibrium advertising for the non-focal firm should be def-
initely more in the second regime, if the firm’s second regime’s margin is higher or equal to the
margin in the first regime. Otherwise, the crisis likelihood will determine the level of advertising
efforts.
From a strategic point of view, the profit margins can be influenced by pricing decisions. How-
ever, pricing strategies are not in the scope of our paper, albeit our analysis accentuates the impor-
tance of dual decision making with respect to pricing and advertising during a recall as suggested
by some of the existing literature (Cleeren 2015).
2.3.1.3. The effect of recall on the expected profits of M1and M2
The value functions were explicitly derived by the method of comparison of coefficients. These
are the instantaneous profits of the firms under consideration. It is of interest to have a look into the
structure of the value functions as we can possibly find out the influence of the different parameters
on the value functions. This in turn will give us an estimate of how the long-term profit can be
influenced by the parameters.
Proposition 3. (a) The value function for manufacturer M1 in regime 2 is given by:






















(b)) The value function for manufacturer M1 in regime 1 is given by V11 = a11θ1(t)+b11θ2(t)+c11





























From proposition (3 b) we can evaluate the long term profit of the firm M1 by using the initial
values of the state variables θ1(0) and θ2(0) at t = 0. Noting that a11 > 0 and b11 < 0, we infer
that the focal firm’s profit increases with its own goodwill and decreases with the goodwill of
the rival. The expression of c11, the constant term is very complicated and its sign depends on
a complex relationship amongst the model parameters. However, for our set of parameters, we
verified numerically that the constant term is positive.
Proposition 4. (a) The value function for manufacturer M2 in regime 2 is given by:






















(b) The value function for manufacturer 2 in regime 1 is given by V21 = a21θ1(t)+ b21θ2(t)+ c21




























From proposition (4 b) we can evaluate the long term profit of the firm M2, the non-focal firm,
by using the initial values of the state variables θ1(0) and θ2(0) at t = 0. In this case, a21 < 0 and
b21 > 0. Thus, the non-focal firm’s profit increases with its own goodwill and decreases with the
goodwill of the focal firm. The expression of c21, the constant term is as complex as c11. However,
for the non-focal firm also, with our set of parameters values, we have verified numerically that the
constant term is positive. Table 2.3 summarizes the relationship amongst the state variables and







Table 2.3: Value function vs state variables
2.3.1.4. Decisions of Hazard Myopic Firms
The hazard myopia leads to policies where the firms do not anticipate the hazard rate, χ or damage,
η . As a result, unlike the far-sighted case, these factors do not appear in the mathematical expres-
sions of the pre-crisis policies. However, the damage η appears in the expression of the value
functions of the firms. This is because the firms observe the damage caused after the recall. Thus,
myopia might lead to identical policies in the two regimes but affects the firms’ performances as
the firms observe the goodwill erosion.
Proposition 5. In the presence of one focal firm(M1), when both the firms are hazard myopic, the








, for j ∈ {1,2}.
Since we considered the firms to be myopic, the hazard rate χ , does not affect the value function
of the firms (Proposition 5). However, to understand the effect of η , on firm’s profits, we need to
elaborate the procedure of the calculation of value functions for the firms under this scenario.
The procedure to find the value function (expected long-term profit) of the myopic firm is
different from case when the firms are far sighted. The procedure is given below:
1. Using appropriate Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations find the equilibrium policies of the
focal firm.









V12(θ1,θ2) = a12(1−η)θ1(tr)+b12θ2(tr)+ c12.
Similarly, the non focal firm’s value function can also be evaluated. A myopic firm does not
anticipate the recall occurrence or the damage intensity. Thus its problem is deterministic and the
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profit will change for different values of tr. In the numerical experiments section we compare the
myopic and non myopic value functions and discuss more about this.
2.3.2. Equilibrium advertising in presence of two focal firms
When two firms anticipate recall, there are three decision epochs - pre-crisis epoch (1), the epoch
between two recalls (2), post-crisis epoch (3). It is not known in advance who will recall first. The
two recalls are characterized by two different stochastic processes with hazard rates χ1 and χ2 for
M1 and M2 respectively. We first find the equilibrium advertising decisions in the three regimes.
While the decisions at the beginning of epoch 1 and epoch 3 are unambiguously determined, the
decision at the beginning of the second epoch depends on who recalls first.
Proposition 6. The equilibrium advertising of the ith firm in the three epochs are given by:
A∗i1 =
ki1[(βimi1 +χ jâi2 +χiai2]
























Here ai j,bi j,ci j, âi j, b̂i j, ĉi j are the coefficients of the state variables of the value functions in
regimes j. If Mi recalls first, the second regime value function is given by V (θi,θ j) = ai2θi +
bi2θ j + ci2 . If Mi recalls second, the second regime value function is given by V (θi,θ j) = âi2θi +
b̂i2θ j + ĉi2. The expressions of these coefficients are given in the appendix A. We also denote the
second regime margins differently depending on who recalls first. Mi recalls first, the margin is
denoted by mi2 , otherwise it is denoted by m̂i2. The logic behind using different notations for
margin is that, mi2 and m̂i2 are not necessarily same. For example, the profit margin may drop after
a recall, and remain same when the rival recalls. In that case, mi2 = mi1 > m̂i2.
The equilibrium decisions are complex expressions of the model parameters. It is clear that
for the ith firm the first regime advertising is decreasing with ηi. The second regime advertising is
decreasing with ηi if the ith firm recalls second. The variance of the advertising with respect to χi
and χ j depends on certain conditions of our parameters. We present one important proposition.
Proposition 7. (a):The first regime equilibrium advertising efforts A∗i1 of Mi is decreasing with the
damage ηi.
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(b) When Mi recalls first, the second regime advertising A∗i2 of Mi is increasing in χ j (the competi-
tor’s crisis likelihood) if mi3 > mi2, i.e. the third period unit profit margin of Mi is greater than its
second period unit profit margin. Otherwise, A∗i2 is decreasing in χ j.
(c) Is Mi recalls second, it’s second regime equilibrium advertising efforts is decreasing with the
damage ηi.
The finding that the first period advertising is decreasing with ηi is again consistent with case
of one focal firm in our paper and the previous literature. The above result highlights whether pre-
crisis advertising should increase with a firm’s hazard rate depends on whether the competitor’s
hazard rate is sufficiently high or not. Knowing the competitor’s chances of recall therefore gives a
strategic benefit to the rival. By increasing the pre-recall advertising (here recall refers to the recall
by the competitor) the firm accumulates high goodwill which ensures high pre-crisis and post-
crisis profits. If the first recall happens for the rival, the ith firm anticipates only its own possible
future recall. Thus it reduces its advertising if the impact it foresees is high. This is analogous to
the one-focal firm case. The firm can believed to cut advertising costs to optimize profits.
Proposition 8. The long term profit of the firm Mi can be determined from the value function given
by Vi1(θi(t),θ j(t)) = ai1θi(t)+bi1θ j(t)+ ci1 at t = 0, where
ai1 =
(βimi1 +χiai2 +χ jâi2)
(r+χi +χ j +δi)
,
bi1 =
(−βimi1 +χibi2 +χ jb̂i2)
(r+χi +χ j +δ j)
,
ci1 =
(mi1αi−µiA∗i12/2+ kai1A∗i1 + kbi1A∗j1 +χici2 +χ j ˆci2)
(r+χi +χ j)
,
and the initial values θi(0) and θ j(0) are known.
2.4. Numerical Experiments
We have obtained the equilibrium strategies and value functions in closed forms for all scenarios
under consideration. We found some straight forward relationships among the equilibrium adver-
tisement efforts, the value functions and the system parameters. However, our system has many
parameters and we present some numerical experiments to emphasize the efficiencies of our analy-
sis. The numerical results help us draw some insights about the influence of our model parameters
on firm performance. The model parameters are -
αi,βi,ki j,χ,µi,η ,δi j,r,mi j
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We study the impact of hazard probability and damage intensity on
• The equilibrium advertising A∗i j(t)
• State Variables θi(t)
• Firms’ profits Vi j(0)
Since our model is goodwill based, we investigate the effect of recall on a firm with high initial
goodwill as compared to a firm with lower initial goodwill. We have chosen the parameter values
in such a manner that equilibrium advertising efforts, profits, the goodwill, the margins, all remain
within a small range of values and this helps us in scaling our figures properly. The parameter
values also ensure the constraint that θ1(t) ≥ 0 and θ2(t) ≥ 0. Some parameters are fixed for all
the models. These are
αi = 1,ki1 = 1, (2.30)
µ1 = µ2 = 200,
r = .06,δi1 = .03,
βi = .5 where (i ∈ {1,2})
In our analyses, we found that the damage intensity η and hazard rate χ have significant im-
pacts on the firms’ decisions, goodwills and profits. We, therefore, numerically study the effect of
these two parameters on advertising, state variables and the profits. We classify the recalls based
on the (χ,η) pair as -
1. (Low probability, Low impact)=(.05,.05)
2. (High probability, High impact)=(.7,.7)
3. (Low probability, High impact)=(.05,.7)
4. (High probability, Low impact)=(.7,.05)
5. (Benchmark, Benchmark)=(.3,.3)
Previous empirical analysis found that in the automobile industry, both the benchmark recall prob-
ability and damage intensity are approximately 30% (Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011). There-
fore, our benchmark case considers(η ,χ) = (.3, .3). We have not considered any recall costs in
our models. Therefore, we believe our results will provide more accurate insights if we consider
the decrease in margin of the focal firm in the second period as an implicit indicator of potential
recall costs. We have assumed that the first period margin is always 1, i.e. mi1 = 1, i = 1,2. When
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recall impact or damage is low ,i.e. η = .05, second period margin mi2 = 1 implying there is no
loss in margin for the focal firm i. If η = .3,mi2 = .8 signifying a 20% loss in margin for the focal
firm i. If the recall intensity or damage is high, .7, then mi2 = .5 for the focal firm i.
2.4.1. Equilibrium Advertising, Firm Performance, State Trajectories: One Focal Firm
2.4.1.1. Effect of Product Recall on the Pre-crisis and Post-crisis Advertising
We compare the equilibrium advertising for both the firms in the two regimes using the parameter
values as given in the previous section. We precisely depict the curve determined by the (χ,eta)
pairs which dictates the level of advertising in the two regimes. For a given level of impact, the
curve changes as demonstrated in figures (2.3) and (2.4).
Figure 2.3: Low Impact Recall - Pre-crisis and post-crisis Advertising for M1
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Figure 2.4: High Impact Recall - Pre-crisis and post-crisis Advertising for M1
Observation 1: The post-crisis advertising is higher than the pre-crisis advertising when there is
a high probability of a recall capable of causing substantial damage.
This finding comports with the previous literature and explains the fact that the firms would
engage in aggressive advertising after a recall of moderate intensity has been issued. We believe
that the classification of the impact of recall as "low" or "high" will depend on the firm size or the
recall costs incurred by the firm. However, in our theoretical results, we consider η ≤ .05 to be
fairly low impact. Even if we consider .05 to be low intensity if there is a high probability of such
recall, firms post-crisis advertising increases in order to protect its image. Bad news spread fast and
firm’s image may get tarnished even due to a small recall because of brand switching or possible
scepticism about its products that may arise. Sufficient advertising after the recall can prevent the
public perception of potential recall damage to be more than the actual severity of the recall.
We also find that even a very low probability of high-intensity recall results in higher pre-crisis
advertising. The focal firm will fear a slight risk of high-intensity recall because if the recall occurs
it can be devastating for the firm. Thus, there might be a motivation for the firm to have high pre-
crisis advertising in order to make the most profit from the pre-crisis market. Our finding also
supports the empirical analysis of (Gao et al. 2015) who conclude that for a firm, if recall involves
minor hazard, the pre-crisis advertising should be more. This is because more advertising sends a
positive signal to the market about the firm’s confidence in its product.
As figures 2.5 and 2.6 show, for the non-focal firm, pre-crisis and post-crisis advertising efforts
coincide when recall impact is low. This is a direct consequence of the Proposition 1 and the fact
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that the parameter values do not change in the two periods for the firms. When recall impact is
high, we can assume at least the advertising effectiveness of the non-focal firm would increase if
not the margin also. Thus the advertising efforts will increase.
Figure 2.5: Low impact recall- pre-crisis and post-crisis ad variation for M2
Figure 2.6: High impact recall- pre-crisis and post-crisis ad variation for M2
The Role of Profit Margin:
We found that margin plays an important role in determining whether the pre-crisis advertising
is higher. Our numerical experiments show that if the margin in the post-crisis regime is at least
the same as that of the pre-crisis regime, then the post-crisis advertising is higher for almost all
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practical cases for the focal firm. Numerically, there are instances when the post-crisis advertising
may be lower at m11 = m12. However, the value of η is practically negligible for such cases and
hence such cases are excluded from our analysis. From a managerial point of view, our findings
highlight the importance of estimating three things- the recall probability, the recall impact and
the possible loss of margin after the recall.
For the non-focal firm M2, we find that as long as m22 ≥ m21, for all χ > 0, the post-crisis ad-
vertising is always equal to or higher than the pre-crisis advertising. Under the model assumptions
m22 ≥ m21. Thus, we can posit that. in the second regime the non-focal firm will always advertise
at least as much as the first regime. This can be interpreted as the reaction of the non-focal firm
as it adjusts equilibrium advertising to increase its demand when crisis damages its competitor’s
goodwill. It is worth noting that in the previous empirical estimations of recall probability (Rubel,
Naik, and Srinivasan 2011), in the automobile industry, the expected crisis time is 2 to 3 years
and the baseline sales are affected by 35%. This is in agreement with the maximum value of η
(around .32) that we derived using numerical analysis and the analytical condition in proposition
2-(a) (Figure (2.6)). Thus, we can confidently assert that our parameter values are not contrived.
2.4.1.2. Effect of Product Recall on Goodwill
We examine the behavior of the state variables, θ1,θ2 for different values of χ (crisis probability)
and η (damage intensity). We find that the interpretations of the variance of state variables largely
















with initial condition θ2(0) = θ20,
A∗i1 are the equilibrium advertising of the manufacturers in the pre-crisis regimes.








,θ2(tr+) = b = θ2(tr−).
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χ 0.05 0.7 0.05 0.7
η 0.05 0.05 0.7 0.7
Table 2.4: Recall Likelihood and Impact
Figure 2.7: State Trajectories - Similar Firms
Figure 2.7 shows how the firms’ goodwill vary before and after recall for similar firms (same
initial goodwill; same sensitivity to brand difference and same absorption capacity). We believe
that our numbers are sufficiently indicative to illustrate the true effect of recalls on the state vari-
ables.Clearly, a recall of substantial impact has a disastrous effect on the goodwill of the focal
firm and such an effect may go beyond recovery. This is agreement with our model assumptions.
Since advertising effectiveness decreases largely after a crisis, the goodwill suffers. For low im-
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pact however, there is chance of recovery for the focal firm as its post-crisis optimal advertising is
higher.
A product recall is often followed by market overreaction (Govindaraj, Jaggi, and Lin 2004).
Therefore, in case of small impact recalls, the focal firm advertises aggressively so that the stock
of goodwill is high enough to nullify the effects of overreaction. Moreover, from a consumer’s
perspective, high goodwill and high quality are often associated. Consequently, if a brand’s good-
will is high, then despite a recall, customers can be still loyal to the brand diminishing the potential
damage (Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and M. Eilert 2013). Whenever there is a recall, invariably in
each case, the goodwill of M2 rises. This is intuitive because M2 advertises more in the second
period as long as m22 ≥ m21.
Figure 2.8: State Trajectories - Focal Firm Dominant
From Figure 2.8 when the focal firm has sufficiently higher initial goodwill, the initial goodwill
acts as a buffer and the firm continues to dominate the non-focal firm in terms of goodwill even
after a small impact recall. However, in case of a high impact recall, if the crisis likelihood is low,
the firm still attains a high pre-crisis goodwill by elevated levels of advertising. However, post-
crisis goodwill drops and does not recover naturally. On the contrary, for a high likelihood recall
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the pre-crisis decreases with time, has a further post-crisis jump and then recovers marginally.
When a firm advertises more for goodwill before a recall, a positive signal or confidence may
result in increased sales and profit but when the recall actually occurs, it might not be good for the
firm in terms of goodwill. When the recall likelihood is high, the firm takes a cautious approach to
advertising resulting in goodwill drop as compared to the case when the likelihood was low.
2.4.1.3. Effect of Product Recall on Firm Performance
Since, the expressions of the value function are complex, we numerically examine the effect of the
recall likelihood and the intensity of the damage on the profit. The analytic investigation leaves us
with a complex parametric space and it is hard to infer anything insightful from the analysis. We
evaluate the value functions i.e the long-term expected profits, V11(t) and V21(t) at time t=0. This
gives us the long-term expected profit of the manufacturers. An existing high brand equity can
insure a firm against potential damage during crisis (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Cleeren, Dekimpe,
and Helsen 2008). Hence, we consider following three scenarios:
i) M1, the recalling firm and M2 are symmetric implying that they have a similar brand image
initially at t=0
ii) M1 is a bigger brand than M2 before the recall implying θ1(0)> θ2(0)
iii) M2 is bigger brand than M1 before the recall implying θ2(0)> θ1(0)
Using Mathematica software we depict the long-term profits corresponding to the above sce-
narios using the values of Table 2.6 : We compare the long-term profits of the firms for the two
θ1(0) θ2(0) η
Similar Firms 0.1 0.1 0.05(m2=1) 0.7(m2=.5)
Focal firm is
bigger 0.2 0.1 0.05(m2=1) 0.7(m2=.5)
Non focal
firm is bigger 0.1 0.2 0.05(m2=1) 0.7(m2=.5)
Table 2.5: Scenarios - similar firms and dissimilar firms
extreme cases:
1. Damage intensity η is low at 5% and the effect on profit margin is negligible (m11 = m12 = 1),
2. Damage intensity η is high at 70% and there is a high margin erosion (m11 = 1,m12 = .5).
The long-term expected profits vary with the hazard rate (others parameters remaining fixed).
Therefore we express the value function as a function of χ and find the local maximum by using
the first order condition on the value function. The first order conditions yield a polynomial of
degree 5 in χ . We use mathematica software to solve the first order condition and find the real




(a) When recall impact is low, the focal firm’s profit decreases very little with the the hazard
rate. However, a high impact recall is always severely detrimental to the firm’s profit.
(b) A "no-recall" scenario is more profitable for the focal firm.
(c) The non-focal firm has a significantly higher profit when the recall impact is high and its
profit increases with the hazard rate.
(d) For a low impact recall, the non-focal firm’s profit increases with the hazard rate initially
followed by a descending trend.
Figure 2.9 shows that for a high impact recall the expected profit of the focal firm is sharply
decreasing with the crisis likelihood. On the other hand, the non-focal firm’s profit is gradually
increasing with the crisis likelihood. While this variation of the profits are expected, one important
inference (which is not obvious from analytical results) is that the crisis likelihood χ has a lesser
impact on the profit of the non-focal firm. For a low impact recall, the expected profit for the focal
firm initially drops and then increases with the crisis likelihood. Numerically we found that the
cusp beyond which the profit starts increasing for M1 is χ = 0.130841. Consequently, the non-
focal firm’s profit initially increases for a low impact recall and starts declining after the above
threshold value of χ .
A product recall can be categorized as an unsystematic risk and low likelihood of such risks can
positively affect firm performance (Aaker and Jacobson 1987). The focal firm’s profit is monoton-
ically decreasing with the hazard rate for a high impact crisis. This is an expected result because
if the impact is high the advertising will be low, post-recall goodwill erosion will be high and
consequently the profit is low. The non focal firm’s profits are complementary to that of the focal
firm. This follows from our model’s mathematical structure. The managerial implications of the
above observations are significant. When two similar firms compete, a low impact recall can be
beneficial for the firm at fault.
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Figure 2.9: Long-term expected profit for the two firms
2.4.2. Can Hazard Myopia be Profitable?
We ask whether a myopic focal firm or non-focal firm can be better off in terms of profit under any
circumstances during a recall. To compute the profit of the myopic firms we need to assume some
recall time tr as the profit depends on the time of recall. An early recall, tr = 5 or a recall later
in the planning horizon tr = 10 are considered. The farsighted focal firms’ profit will also depend
on χ which the myopic firm never foresees. Moreover, the farsighted firm will be aware of the
impending recall. As a result, the firm will make efforts to minimize post-crisis brand forgetting
i.e. reduction in (δ12) through announcements or campaigns and also strategically manage oper-
ational costs to reduce the loss in unit profit margin. Our numerical analysis incorporates these











firm (tr = 3)
Profit for
myopic
firm (tr = 10)
.05 15.17 15.06 17.53 21.822
.2 13.85 12.48 12.140 16.07
.6 12.35 9.51 9.156 13.01
.7 11.41 7.54 5.132 9.08
Table 2.6: Myopic vs Farsighted Focal Firm Profit
Figure 2.10: Expected profits -hazard myopic vs farsighted firms
Observation 3:
(a) A farsighted focal firm is more profitable than a myopic focal firm if recall is early in the
planning horizon. For a late recall, a myopic focal firm always makes more profit than a
farsighted focal firm except when crisis impact if very high.
(b) The myopic non-focal firm is always better off than the farsighted non-focal firm. The myopic
non-focal firm’s profit decreases with an early recall.
As mentioned above, the myopic focal firm is unprepared for a recall and therefore does not
make any efforts for managing a recall. Therefore, potentially more goodwill absorption in the
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post-crisis period and a bigger loss in unit profit margin caused by potential operational issues lead
to lower profits specially when the recall is early. The myopic firm cannot capitalize on the pre-
crisis market and makes most of the profit from the post-crisis market when its image is already
tarnished. Therefore, it has lower profit than a farsighted firm.
However, for a recall occurring later in the horizon, a myopic firm may be more profitable by
ignoring a potential risk. This might look surprising. In the above case, the firm makes most of
its profit from the favourable market when its image is better. Moreover, as the firm does not see
the recall coming, its time preference remains unchanged. This factor also has an impact on the
profit. However, for a recall of very high impact, the myopic firm can still be less profitable than a
farsighted firm as shown in the Table 2.6 and figure 2.10 above.
From a managerial perspective, the results show that a firm must remain vigilant and estimate
the likelihood of a crisis, possible timing of a crisis and also the potential impact of the crisis.
While taking advertising decisions, a focal firm may ignore low impact future crisis which is
possibly far away in time (as it will make more profit being myopic). However, if a high impact
or highly likely recall is anticipated, it is better to incorporate the hazard rate while making the
equilibrium advertising policy. The non-focal firm’s management, on the other hand, would be
better off ignoring the rival’s hazard rate in their decision. Non-focal firms, mainly belonging
to the same country of origin of the focal firm or selling similar products, are often negatively
affected by a spillover effect of the recall. Consumers get sceptical about the non-focal firm’s
products, consequently decreasing its profit. In such cases, it may be advantageous to consider
the crisis likelihood. Furthermore, if the focal firm’s advertising drops due to high margin loss,
it may decrease advertising, and the non-focal firm’s advertising efforts will be way above those
of the focal firm. Consumers may also perceive the higher advertising by the non-focal firm as
opportunistic behaviour and have formed a negative mindset and might not buy the competitor’s
products (Gao et al. 2015). The examination of the effects of consumer’s negative perception or
spillover is beyond the scope of this study.
2.4.3. Equilibrium advertising and firm performance for two focal firms
The experiments conducted for two focal firms are categorized by two situations - ith firm recalls
first or ith firm recalls second. The most important parameters that we are varying for these exper-
iments are :
χi,χ j,ηi,η j,mi1,mi2,mi3
Advertising for all three regimes are not affected by all the parameters that we are varying for our
experiments. To easily visualize the effect of the above mentioned parameters on the the equilib-
rium advertising, we present the following Table 2.7, where "Yes" corresponding to a parameter
means that the corresponding advertising is a function of the parameter. For example, Ai1 is a
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χi χ j ηi η j mi1 mi2 m̂i2 mi3
1st Period Ad Ai1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Period Ad - i recalls first Ai2 Yes Yes Yes
2ndd Period Ad - i recalls second Âi2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
3rd Period Ad Ai3 Yes
Table 2.7: Parameters Affecting Equilibrium Advertising
We follow some assumptions about the margins in the different periods.
Assumptions about margins
1. If the ith firm recalls first, we consider mi1 > mi2 = mi3
2. If the ith firm recalls second then mi1 = mi2 > mi3
The complexity of the analysis of the equilibrium advertising decisions and the performance of
the two focal firms case is multiplied due to the dimension of the parametric space. We now have
the extra parameters, for hazard rate, damage effect and margins. Our goal is to reduce the ana-
lytical complexity without reducing the dimension of the problem. While many possible cases are
imperative, we have focused on the cases which we believe to be most feasible. The assumptions
about the margins is an example of such feasibility. Similar to the one focal firm case, we consider
the combinations when damage and crisis are high or low and the benchmark case when damage
or crisis equals 0.3. Thus there are four parameters χi,χ j,ηi,η j and these take values high(0.7) or
low (.05). We have thus 24+1(benchmark case) = 17 cases to consider. However, from Table 2.9,
we notice that the goodwill damage of the jth firm, η j, does not affect the advertising decision of
the ith firm. Hence, the number of cases reduce to 23+1=9. We present the most important cases
diagrammatically -
High Impact Recall (ηi = η j = .7);
Low Impact Recall (ηi = η j = .05).
We found that the behaviour of equilibrium advertising for benchmark case and high impact case
are similar. We perform 3D plot in mathematica and vary the equilibrium advertising over all val-
ues of χi and χ j. Therefore, these figures not only cover all the cases in the above mentioned 9
scenarios, but also spans over all likelihood scenarios of both the rivals. This makes our findings
more inclusive and robust.
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Figure 2.11: Equilibrium Advertising in Three Regimes - Two Focal Firms
Noting that the rival’s damage, η j, does not affect the advertising policies of firm Mi, the fol-
lowing cases are equivalent with respect to advertising:
i) ηi = .05;η j = .7 & ηi = .05;η j = .05
ii) ηi = .7;η j = .7 & ηi = .7;η j = .05
Observation 4:
(a) Mi recalls first:
• During a low impact recall, irrespective of the likelihoods of recall of each firm, Mi’s
equilibrium advertising is always higher in the second and third regimes than in the
first regime.
• If recall impact is the benchmark or high, the first period advertising of Mi is higher
than the second or third period advertising for all values of χi if the rival’s crisis
likelihood χ j is low (Figure 2.11).
(b) Mi recalls second:
• The first regime advertising of Mi is always higher than the second regime advertising
irrespective of recall impact or likelihood of each firm.
• For moderate and high likelihood of a crisis, the post-crisis (third regime) advertising
of Mi is higher than it’s pre-crisis advertising.
When Mi recalls first, in the second regime Mi already knows the impact of the recall and
that only its rival has a chance of recall in future. Also, a low impact recall means no or very
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little margin erosion. Therefore, the firm Mi uses higher advertising as a double-edged sword to
overcome any negative effect of its own recall and also to react to the possible higher advertising
by the rival. On the other hand, a moderate or high crisis impact makes Mi more cautious and
its first-period advertising is higher if the rival’s crisis likelihood is low. This is consistent with
Proposition 7. Mi tries to make the most profit out of the market in the first regime when there is
a high impact high likelihood recall possibility. However, if the rival also has a high possibility of
high impact recall, Mi’s advertising level is low in the first period as it can potentially benefit from
the competitor’s misfortune.
If Mi recalls second, it’s second regime advertising level drops. In the second period, Mi’s
rival has already issued a recall and is presumably coping with the negative effects. Moreover, Mi
knows that there is a possibility of a recall that it itself might issue in the future. Therefore, Mi’s
advertising drops in the second period as low advertising can well give Mi the optimal profit while
its rival suffers from a recall and at the same time Mi higher post-crisis advertising (third regime)
helps it to overcome the effects of its own recall.
Observation 5:
(a) Irrespective of all crises likelihoods, the no recall scenario is strictly more profitable for Mi
only when Mi has a very high impact recall and M j has a low impact recall. On the other
hand, irrespective of all crises likelihoods, the no recall scenario is strictly less profitable
for Mi when Mi’s recall impact is low and M j’s recall impact is high (Figures 12 (d) & (e).
(b) When both firms have the same impact of recall:
• In a high impact recall scenario, Mi’s profit is higher than the no recall scenario when
Mi’s crisis likelihood is low.
• Surprisingly, when there is a low impact recall, the firm profit is increasing with its own
hazard rate.
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Figure 2.12: Firm profits in Presence of Two Focal Firms
The results show that during a competition between two focal firms, the no recall scenario may
not always be the maximum profitable. If the expected damage caused by own recall is small, a
firm will have no incentive to avoid a recall as long as the competitor is more risky than the firm
itself. When a firm is at a risk of causing a high damage, it is best to make efforts to avoid the
recall because a no recall scenario is more profitable for it. Consequently, the firm may seek to
invest in quality or strategy in order to avoid a recall. When the expected recall damage is equal
for both the firms, a firm should aim to keep the recall probability low when the damage is high.
On the other hand if expected damage is low for both the firms, a firm has no incentive to reduce
the crisis likelihood as a high likelihood of crisis increases it’s profit. The main takeaway from
our findings is that in the presence of a risky competitor a firm should try to avoid a recall if
the expected damage for itself or both the firms is high and consequently invest in other areas of
quality or possibly supplier management. If the firm’s own risk is low, the firm can invest more in
advertising without making any effort to avoid the recall.
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2.5. Manegerial Implications and Conclusion
The marketing literature has investigated whether advertising should increase after a product re-
call. The findings have revealed conflicting results. While some studies emphasize the need for
increased pre-crisis advertising, others found support for the increased post-crisis advertising. One
common conclusion in the product recall literature highlights the firms loss of goodwill as a result
of the recall (Craig and Thomas 1996; Cleeren, H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013). Hence,
in this study, we built a theoretical model with goodwill based demand function and analyzed
advertising decision models under the lens of differential game theory.
In this study, we make some significant contributions to the existing literature related to product
recall. First, we re-investigated not only the advertising decisions of firms in a competitive market
but also the effect of a product recall on firm profit. We found that whether a firms’ advertising
level will increase after the product recall, depends on the the severity and likelihood of the recall.
This claim is consistent with the empirical findings of (Gao et al. 2015). We also found that
when similar firms compete or the focal firm is bigger, a small crisis likelihood increases the focal
firm’s profit. This is consistent with another study which presents price competition in presence of
product recall (Rubel 2018). Second, we have introduced the concept of "hazard myopia", a firm’s
inability to foresee recall occurrence. This concept differs from the conventional myopia (ignoring
state evolution) in the context of differential games. We showed how to solve a hazard myopic
firm’s decision problem and found an interesting case when hazard myopia can be more profitable
than envisioning a recall. Our study enhances the literature by studying the equilibrium advertising
policies and profits of two farsighted focal firms.
Although price is not a decision variable in our model, the profit margin has a very important
role to play when it comes to advertising decision making. Our analytical and numerical findings
give a number of insights which are important from a managerial point of view. We summarize our
key findings. The investigation results answer our research questions and provide new managerial
insights in addition to verifying previous research results.
Managerial Implications: In a duopoly market with a product recall risk, it is important for
the management of both firms to understand if the rival is risky or not because a firm’s advertis-
ing strategy depends on the rival’s product recall likelihood. By risk we mean the combination
of recall likelihood and intensity of the damage. Thus, a firm should estimate its own and the
rival’s recall likelihood and possible damage caused by any expected recall. The damage should
not only be measured in terms of the goodwill-loss, but also in monetary value. Since we showed
that advertising levels depend on profit margins, the monetary value measure of a recall damage
will enable the firm to evaluate the profit margin and advertise accordingly. It is also important to
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know how much a damage can potentially erode a profit margin. Advertising decisions are seldom
the only decisions made. Product pricing is another important decision. The prevalence of profit
margins of the different regimes in the expressions of our equilibrium advertising decisions shows
that price might also be used as a potent tool for mitigating the effects of a product recall. When
a recall is expected to cause low damage, managers may well ignore the chances of recall and
advertise myopically. Managers know that a low likelihood of recall can increase profit. There-
fore, at the beginning of the planning horizon, if a focal firm’s management knows that the firm’s
crisis likelihood is high, they can put efforts like quality maintenance or inspection to minimize
the chances of a recall and signal these efforts to the market. Consequently, its rival also estimates
a low crisis likelihood for the focal firm. This may soften competition and increase profit. Hazard
myopia might look attractive as it generates high long-term profit, but, it is important for the firm’s
management to estimate the hazard rate rather than ignoring it because a high hazard rate might
be disastrous. When both firms have different likelihoods of product recall, it is important for
the managements of the firms to estimate the likelihoods and the expected damage severity. The
effectiveness of the resulting advertising policies in the three regimes depend on this knowledge
likelihood and expected damage.
Our work can be extended in a number of directions. First, we have not considered the recall
costs as a separate cost in our problem. Instead, we assumed that the margin will drop in the
post-crisis period due to possible recall costs. Modelling recall costs as a function of the recall
damage and the recall time can result in valuable insights. Second, the damage caused by the
recall is assumed to be a constant fraction by which the brand image is eroded. This ensures the
mathematical tractability of our model. However, this damage might not be a constant factor and
can be a decreasing function of time. This is because as the product overcomes the pernicious con-
sequences of the recall, the damaging effect might fade after some time i.e., there can be recovery.
Empirical research shows that as products move further into the life cycle, the chances of recall
decreases (Hora, Bapuji, and Roth 2011). Other distributions with a decreasing hazard rate can be
considered. Third, we have not considered channel leadership in our model. In fact, due to the
structure of our game, the Stackelberg game and the Nash game coincide. The firms’ advertising
strategies and performance can be analyzed for a model where there is a market leader. This will
help in finding if market leadership gives any advantage during a recall. Last, it is challenging




Pricing and Advertising to Mitigate the
Negative Spillover Effect of a Product Recall
3.1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, with the globalization of modern business and complexity of supply
chains, product harm crisis incidents have become very common. When such a crisis, especially
of high impact occurs, the firm at fault is subject to substantial loss of reputation. The news of
a product harm crisis and consequent product recall spreads rapidly as word of mouth or through
online chatter and can cause substantial damage to consumer perception of product quality or
brand (Tirunillai and Tellis 2012; Borah and Tellis 2016). Consequently, the sales of a firm can
dampen considerably (H. Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007; Asur and Huberman 2010;
Dellarocas, X. M. Zhang, and Awad 2007). During such a crisis, when a firm at fault suffers from
the reputation damage and loss of sales, rival firms can behave opportunistically to increase their
sales. For example, rivals can increase advertising or decrease price in order to capture a large
share of the market. However, empirical research has shown that such reputation damage of the
focal firm can extend to the rivals of the firm when the rivals are from the same country or sell the
products of the same category (Borah and Tellis 2016; Roehm and Tybout 2006). In contrast, rival
brands with a different country of origin may benefit from the crisis of the competitor through brand
switching and increase of sales. When a rival firm is adversely affected by its competitor’s product
recall, we call the event a negative spillover. On the other hand, when the rival firm is benefited
from the recalling firm’s crisis, we refer to the event as a positive spillover. The spillover effect
of product recalls can be very complex and intricate depending on how the consumers perceive
about the brand at fault and how well the crisis is managed by the brand using different strategies
like pricing, advertising or quality assurance (Mackalski and Belisle 2015; Borah and Tellis 2016;
Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Dahlen and Lange 2006).
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Pricing and advertising are two potent marketing tools to fight the negative effects of a product
recall. When a product-recall affects the focal firm and its rival, it is interesting to investigate
how the two firms decide on advertising and pricing of the product under recall (for the focal
firm) or a similar product of the competitor. The existence of the focal firm as a market leader
can also significantly affect the firms’ strategies. The existing literature on the spillover effect of
product recall study different aspects of the phenomenon like measuring the extent of spillover,
type of spillover based on size of the firm, location of the firms, effect of apology advertising
and impact of product harm on the effectiveness of advertising and price (Borah and Tellis 2016;
Arnade, Calvin, and Kuchler 2009; Mackalski and Belisle 2015; Roehm and Tybout 2006; H. Van
Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007; GAOH, ZHANG, et al. 2012; Seo et al. 2014). Our study
integrates two steams of research - spillover effect of a product recall and pricing and advertising
strategies during product-recall. We investigate how farsighted firms use equilibrium advertising
and pricing in the pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes to fight the effects of product-recall under a
duopoly competition.
(Dahlen and Lange 2006) analyze how a brand crisis can affect the product category and also
rival brands. Based on two studies, the research shows that consumer perception may change for
the entire brand category and depending on the similarity of the brands, the spillover effect on the
rival firms vary. The authors found that consumers may reconstruct the brand schema after a crisis
and under such circumstances, decreased post-crisis advertising might be a better strategy for the
brand at fault. The authors conclude that as the crisis event reconstructs brand schemas, brand
managers must keep a close eye on the competition and react on their behalf as well. The authors
do not discuss pricing strategies. In our study, goodwill is synonymous to brand value. We re-
validate the authors’ claim about the advertising policies of the firms using equilibrium advertising
policies under competition. Our jump state model captures one aspect of the reconstruction of the
consumer’s brand schema.
(Arnade, Calvin, and Kuchler 2009) studies the impact of the FDA announcement of an E. coli
outbreak linked to spinach using a two-stage AIDS (Almost Ideal Demand System) model which
separated the effect of prices and trends from the impact of the FDA announcement shock. The
article determines the influence of the spinach shock on demand for several related leafy green
products (the spillover effect on similar products). The E-coli outbreak resulted in 204 illness, 104
hospitalizations and three deaths and some other complications in the USA in 2006. The spillover
was positive for different non-spinach salads(rivals or different category) and negative for similar
category or brand. All brands from the USA suffered from negative spillover. Retailers increased
the price of spinach. Rival products showed more price responsiveness. Prices might have induced
brand switching. The article does not discuss advertising strategies.
(Mackalski and Belisle 2015) found that during a butter recall by Land O‘Lakes, the entire
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Land O‘Lakes umbrella family is adversely affected. So negative spillover is prominent across
categories. Moreover, spillover is extremely quick, and promotion and advertising positively af-
fect the sales of the "brand ecosystem" (the brand and its competitor selling a similar product or
category). However, this study did not find significant negative spillover for the competing brands.
The study did not elucidate on pricing strategies.
In a more recent study of recalls in the automobile industry, (Borah and Tellis 2016) find the ev-
idence of extensive "perverse halo spillover" via negative chatter. Moreover, the spillover is more
prominent from a dominant brand to a less dominant brand. Indeed the same country of origin
intensifies the perverse halo. The authors also confirm substantial sales loss due to the spillover
effect. While the article did not discuss pricing strategies, the authors found that apology advertis-
ing can be detrimental to the recalled brand and its rivals because by raising consumer scepticism
about the brands. We extend the literature by introducing the effect of goodwill advertising and
pricing decisions. Our assumptions of the direction of negative and strength of spillover comport
with the above study.
A stream of literature has analyzed the pricing and advertising decisions during the pre-recall
period or the post-recall period. However, the findings of such literature are contradictory. (H.
Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007) found that decreasing price, especially for bigger brands,
can be an effective way of gaining back the lost market after a recall. However, for smaller brands,
price sensitivity of products can remain stable in the pre-crisis period but can increase substantially
after a recall. (Yi Zhao, Ying Zhao, and Helsen 2011) found conflicting results and found that
consumers may become less price-sensitive during a crisis and may hail the quality of a product as
a primary determinant for purchase. (Cleeren, H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013), based on a
sample of 60 product harm cases, investigated these conflicts and found that while price changes
may not serve as a viable weapon to mitigate loss for affected brands, non-affected brands can
reduce prices to gain market share. The authors also found that acknowledging blame can affect
pricing and advertising decisions. (Rubel 2018) analyzed pricing decisions of two firms based on
a Hotelling model of price competition and two regimes - competitive and monopoly. The author
found that market leadership can induce a higher price, but a market leader need not always be
more profitable. Moreover, anticipating a crisis can lead to higher profit for risky products due to
softening of price competition.
The above discussion reveals that scholars hold different opinions about product harm crisis and
pricing decisions. We adopt the assumptions of some of the modelling literature (Rubel, Naik, and
Srinivasan 2011; Rubel 2018) that envisioning product harm can affect the pricing and advertising
decisions and following them model product recall as a random event during a planning horizon.
Based on the assumption, we investigate the pricing decisions during a crisis for the focal firm and
the non-focal firm suffering from spillover. We show how a trade-off between crisis likelihood and
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impact can help us explain some of the conflicting findings.
Several studies analyze the pre and post-crisis advertising decisions (Gao et al. 2015; Cleeren,
H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008; Rubel, Naik, and
Srinivasan 2011; Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and M. Eilert 2013). While some academics argue that
aggressive advertising efforts in the pre-crisis regime can buffer a brand from potential image loss
during the recall, others conclude that post-crisis advertising should raise in order to protect the
brand. Due to the regular occurrence of product recalls in the different industries like automobile,
food, consumer products and healthcare, it is reasonable to believe that the management of firms
in the industries as mentioned earlier should expect recalls to occur. However, depending on the
brand, industry, product, the crisis likelihood and expected impacts may vary. Alike (Rubel, Naik,
and Srinivasan 2011), we examine how forward-looking managers should take advertising and
pricing decisions. However, our model is distinct, and the strategies we obtain gives us feedback
pricing and advertising policies which depend on the firms’ goodwill, the time of the decision,
the impact of the crisis and the likelihood of a crisis. Moreover, we introduce a spillover function
which realistically captures the effect of the negative reputation of a recalling brand to its rival.
Our synthesis of the above literature in the two streams (spillover effect of a product recall
and pricing and advertising strategies during product-recall) shows that there is little consensus
amongst researchers about the true effect of product recall on spillover and how pricing and ad-
vertising can be as instruments of damage control for two rival firms during a product recall. We,
therefore, investigate the following research questions hoping to seek a mechanism of reconcilia-
tion of the above conflicts:
1. When firms are similar in terms of market presence, what are the pre-crisis and post-crisis
equilibrium advertising and pricing policies of the manufacturers?
2. When the focal firm is a leader, what are the pre-crisis and post-crisis equilibrium advertising
and pricing policies of the manufacturers?
3. How do intensity and likelihood of a product recall affect the equilibrium advertising and
pricing decisions of the two firms?
4. What is the impact of the recall on the performance of the competing firms?
5. Is market leadership helpful in overcoming the effects of the recall?
To answer the above questions, we formulate a dynamic model in which during the planning hori-
zon, a non zero crisis likelihood exists. The occurrence of a crisis event that hurts a brand’s
goodwill, advertising effectiveness and consequently erodes the firms’ sales. The occurrence of
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a product recall is at a random time. We consider price and advertising competition in our dy-
namic model. We assume that the forward-looking management of both the firms estimates the
crisis likelihood and impact ex-ante to decide product price and advertising efforts. We also de-
fine a spillover function which mimics the real-world situation - spillover effect is stronger from a
dominant brand to a less dominant brand than vice versa.
The rest of the paper is arranged in the following manner. Section 3.2 describes the model in
details. In section 3.3, we discuss the equilibrium results of the differential game under consid-
eration and provide some insights about the results complementing with numerical analysis. In
section 3.4, we present our concluding remarks along with managerial implications and directions
for future research.
3.2. Model Setup
Two manufacturers selling differentiated products are involved in a duopoly competition concern-
ing advertising and pricing. Our motive is to study the effects of recall on the focal firm and the
recall’s negative spillover effect on the non-focal firm. Hence we consider only one focal firm for
whom product recall can occur with a certain probability. The other firm, possibly having the same
country of origin, suffers from a negative spillover effect of the recall. The firms do not recall all
products and continue to compete after the recall. We analyze the possibilities of both firms having
similar market potential or the focal firm being a market leader. Pricing and advertising decisions
are taken simultaneously in the first case. The focal firm, being a leader announces its decisions
earlier in the second case.
Consumers are sensitive towards the price difference and difference in the advertising efforts
of the firms. Own goodwill positively affects a firm’s demand. On the other hand, price increase
negatively affects the firm’s demand. We adopt dynamic linear demand functions for the two
manufacturers M1 (focal firm responsible for the recall) and M2 (non-focal firm suffering from the
spillover).
Q1 j = α1− p1 j +β1 p2 j +θ1 j− γ1θ2 j (3.1)
Q2 j = α2− p2 j +β2 p1 j +θ1 j− γ2θ1 j
where αi is the market potential for firm i, Qi j is the demand for firm i in regime j ( j is the index
for time) and i, j ∈ {1,2}. Price for firm i in period j is pi j. θi j is the goodwill of manufacturer
i in regime j. Own price sensitivity is normalized to 1. The cross-price sensitivity parameters βi
are assumed to be in the range 0 < βi < 1 where i ∈ {1,2}. Therefore, the sensitivity of a firm’s
demand towards the firm’s price (1 in this case) is greater than that of the competitor. Similarly, the
52
self goodwill sensitivity is normalized to 1 and cross goodwill sensitivities follow 0 < γi < 1 for
i ∈ {1,2}. The solution to our model is complex and to make insightful analysis of our model we
need to have a minimal number of parameters. Therefore, without loss of generality, we normalize
the price and goodwill sensitivity of the firms to 1 in the demand function. This helps us in
reducing the number of parameters. The manufacturers try to maintain a high brand goodwill by
continuous advertising efforts. Brand advertising can have an adverse or complementary effect
on a rival brand’s sales and profits (Dubé and Manchanda 2005; Karray and Martın-Herrán 2009;
Erdem and Sun 2002). Consequently, some scholars have adopted differential game models with
negative effect of competitor’s advertisement while others have also incorporated a positive effect
of advertising on the rival firms sales or profits ((Viscolani and Zaccour 2009; Nair and Narasimhan
2006; Cellini and Lambertini 2003)). We consider a duopoly market where firms compete on price
and goodwill. Following (Erickson 1995), we adopt an approach where the evolution of the stock
of goodwill for a firm is affected by the firm’s own advertising only. However, in our model, the
positive parameter γi in a firm’s demand function guarantees that a rival’s rising goodwill negatively
affects the firm’s demand.
θi j(t) is the goodwill of the manufacturer i, in regime j, where {i, j} ∈ {1,2}. The states evolve
according to the following differential equations:
θ̇i j(t) = ki jai j(t)−δi jθi j(t), ∀t ∈ 0≤ t ≤ ∞,θi j(0) = θ̃i j (3.2)
where i, j ∈ {1,2}. ai j is the advertising effort of Mi in period j and δi j is the decay parameter
(Nerlove & Arrow 1962). Marketing literature has evidence that the advertising effectiveness
decreases after a recall crisis depending on the initial brand goodwill (H. Van Heerde, Helsen, and
Dekimpe 2007; Yi Zhao, Ying Zhao, and Helsen 2011). Therefore, we assume that in general,
ki j, the advertising effectiveness, of the firms (specially the focal firm) may be different in the two
regimes. Specifically, ki1 ≥ ki2. There is also a possibility that brand forgetting will increase in the
post-crisis period. This can be simulated by choosing δi1 ≥ δi2. Following the previous literature
(Karray and Zaccour 2005; Dockner et al. 2000; etc.), we consider the advertising costs to be
quadratic in the efforts. The manufacturer’s advertising costs in the regime j is given by
µia2i j(t)
2
where µi is the proportionality constant.
We consider two cases - (i) There is no market leadership and (ii) The focal firm is the market
leader. One important point to note here is that market leadership will affect the mathematical
expressions of only pricing decisions. Due to the structure of the games, the Nash game and the
Stackelberg game with respect to advertising will be structurally similar. But the value of the
advertising effort will be different in the two games. In the Nash game the manufacturers decide
the price and advertising simultaneously. In the Stackelberg game, the focal firm announces its
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price and advertising first, and the competitor who suffers from spillover effect moves next. We
analyze these two cases separately.
3.2.1. The Occurrence and Effect of Recall
The planning horizon in our study is [0,∞). We also assume that during the planning horizon,
recall occurs only once. Let tr be the random time of the recall. Consider χ ∈ (0,1) to be the
hazard rate. We define the probabilistic switching of the pre-crisis and the post-crisis regime by
means of the stochastic process [R(t) : t ≥ 0] defined below:
lim
dt→0





P[R(t +dt) = 1|R(t) = 2]
dt
= 0. (3.3)
R(t) = 1 signifies the pre-crisis regime and R(t) = 2 signifies the post-crisis regime. Many of the
studies (Boukas, Haurie, and Michel 1990; Haurie and Moresino 2006; Rubel, Naik, and Srini-
vasan 2011) explore decision making under such regime-switching giving rise to piecewise deter-
ministic games. The random timings of a recall essentially split the planning horizon into different
decision epochs or regimes - the pre-crisis regime and the post-crisis regime when spillover effect
is prominent.
The goodwill of the focal firm (the firm issuing the recall) declines immediately after the recall.
Therefore, the impact of recall is captured by the jump in the state variable, goodwill at the instance
tr. For the focal firm, the following equation represents the jump in goodwill:
θ12(t+r ) = (1−η)θ11(t−r )
For the rival, the spillover effect may cause the post-crisis goodwill to rise or fall depending
on the category of the rival. As mentioned earlier, a rival from same geography and selling similar
products may suffer from negative spillover while competitors with foundation at different coun-
tries may benefit from an increase in goodwill or positive spillover. However, the focus of our
study is only negative spillovers.
Spillover Function:
In our model the spillover function is the jump in the state variable θ21(t) at time tr for the non






where ν is interpreted as the sensitivity of the non-focal firm’s customers towards the goodwill
damage η of the focal firm. The spillover function satisfies the following desirable properties:
1. The damage to the goodwill of the non-focal firm, caused by negative spillover is less than
the goodwill damage caused to the focal firm. This is captured by the term νη where η is
the intensity of jump of the focal firm’s goodwill at tr and 0≤ η ≤ 1, 0≤ ν ≤ 1.
2. The spillover is increasing in the focal brand’s initial goodwill θ11(0) and decreasing in the
non focal firm’s goodwill θ21(0).
3. The functional form of spillover ensures that the value of the spillover, φ ∈ (0,1).
4. When recall damage η is high, ν will be high and vice versa.
Thus, for the non focal firm, the following equation represents the jump in goodwill:
θ22(t+r ) = (1−φ)θ21(t−r )
where φ is given in equation (3.4). A spillover effect can be short term, around days to weeks,
however, in many instances, like in the automobile industry or pharmaceutical, concerns arise
consistently over a long period and if not addressed by the manufacturer, can lead to long term
lingering effect of spillover (Borah and Tellis 2016; Mackalski and Belisle 2015). Our study
focuses on this type of spillovers which may be long-lasting.
3.2.2. Long term profit under the impact of product recall
In this section, we show how the expected profits of the two regimes for both the manufacturers can
be transformed into long term expected profit as functions of recall likelihood parameter χ and the
state variables- the goodwill, θ1 and θ2, of the two firms. We follow a similar approach as described
in the existing literature (Haurie and Moresino 2006; Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011). In a
continuous time framework, if tr be the random time of product recall, then it divides the infinite
planning horizon into two decision periods: pre-crisis period [0, tr] and post-crisis period (tr,∞).





). j = 1 implies pre-recall period and j = 2 implies post recall period. The instantaneous
profits of the firms are given by Ji j(t) = Qi j(t)pi j(t)−
µiai j(t)2
2 where Qi j is the demand of the
manufacturer i at jth period, µi
a2i j
2 denotes the quadratic advertising costs of the manufacturer i in
period j. If r be the discount rate over the planing horizon, then the net present value of the profit
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e−rtJi2(θi2,θ(3−i)2, pi2, p(3−i)2,ai2)dt (3.5)
where πi1 represents the total discounted profit of ith manufacturer during the pre-crisis regime
[0, tr] and π12 is the total post-crisis discounted profit of the ith manufacturer at time t = tr. Now
the time to product recall, tr is random and can take any value on the planing horizon [0,∞). tr
being a random variable, the profits in both the period, as functions of tr are random variables.







where the expectation is taken with respect to the stochastic process as described in (3). The
problem above is a random stopping problem. If f (t) and F(t) are the probability density and
cumulative density functions of the stochastic occurrence process, then the hazard rate is h(t) =
χ,F(t) = 1− e−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds. Therefore, f (t) = χe−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds. The long-term expected profit for the
















where the profit of the pre-crisis period is the first term of the expression and the second term gives
the profit of the post-crisis regime. It can be shown that the the sum of the two expected profits










Thus, expression (3.8) give the long term expected profit of any firm. We use this expression to
find the optimal decisions of each of the two manufacturers.
3.2.3. Decision Problems of the Manufacturers
According to the above discussions, we define the decision problems of the competing manufac-
turers in the two regimes, pre-crisis and post-crisis. Thereafter, we can solve the second regime’s
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problem first, followed by the first regime’s problem. We denote the second regime’s value func-
tions of manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2 by V12(θ1 j(t),θ2 j(t)) and V22(θ1 j(t),θ2 j(t)) respec-
tively. The first regime’s value functions are denoted by V11(θ1 j(t),θ2 j(t)) and V21(θ1 j(t),θ2 j(t)).
Both the manufacturers optimize their individual long term profits. The second regime’s deci-






















and with the following initial conditions
θ12(t+r ) = (1−η)θ11(t−r )
θ22(t+r ) = (1−φ)θ22(t−r ) (3.9)
























θ̇11(t) = k11a11(t)−δ11θ11 (3.10)
θ̇21(t) = k21a21(t)−δ21θ21
and with the following initial conditions
θ11(0) = θ10 ≥ 0
θ22(0) = θ20 ≥ 0 (3.11)
We investigate two different games - The Nash Game and the Stackelberg game. Under the Nash
game, the manufacturers are similar in terms of market potential, brand image and market power.
They take simultaneous pricing and advertising decisions and at the times t = 0 and t = tr. Under
the Stackelberg game, the focal firm is the market leader and announces its pricing and advertising
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decisions first. The non-focal firm is the follower and moves second.
3.3. Results and Discussions
The analytical solutions of the model enables us to find the feedback pricing and advertising poli-
cies for the firms. As a standard solution procedure of solving the differential game, we start by
stating the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations (Dockner et al. 2000) for each firm. Subse-
quently, the first order conditions on the decision variables will help us in finding the equilibrium
strategies from the HJB equations. We note that the value functions Vi j are concave in ai j and pi j.

























where Qi js are the demand functions in equation (3.1). Similarly, from equations (3.10) and (3.11)



























To understand the impact of the recall, we use numerical analysis along with our mathematical
analysis. Three parameters of our model, crisis likelihood χ , damage to goodwill η and the
spillover effect φ illustrate the impact of a recall. We consider a crisis of different likelihoods
and damages and show how the pricing strategies and advertising strategies vary for the two firms
in the post and pre-crisis periods. For the computational analysis, we use the following parameter
values-
(i) α1 = 1;α2 = 1; (market size)
α1 = 1.5 when focal firm is Stackelberg leader
(ii) µ1 = 200; µ2 = 200; (proportionality constant for advertising cost)
(iii) δ1 = .06;δ2 = .06; (goodwill forgetting)
(iv) r = .06 discounting
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(v) β1 = .5;β2 = .5; (cross price sensitivity)
(vi) γ1 = .5;γ2 = .5; (cross goodwill sensitivity)
(vii) k11,k12,k21,k22 (advertising effectiveness)
(viii) χ (crisis likelihood)
(ix) η (crisis impact or jump in goodwill after recall)
(x) ν (Spillover sensitivity to recall impact)
The value of the parameters (vii) to (x) depend on the recall impact. For example, for a high
severity recall, advertising effectiveness will reduce considerably while for a low severity recall
the reduction is small. For all cases, where we compare the pre-crisis and post-crisis decisions, we
assume that the time to recall tr = 20. The pre-crisis and post-crisis values of the parameters (Vi)
to (x) are given in the following table.
Likelihood(χ) Impact(η) Spillover Sensitivity (ν) k11 k12 k21 k22
Benchmark Case 0.3 0.3 0.7 1 0.75 1 0.9
Low Likelihood
Low Impact
0.05 0.05 0.5 1 1 1 1
Low Likelihood
High Impact
0.05 0.6 0.9 1 0.5 1 0.7
High Likelihood
Low Impact
0.6 0.05 0.5 1 1 1 1
High Likelihood
High Impact
0.6 0.6 0.9 1 0.5 1 0.7
Table 3.1: Cases for Numerical Analysis
We use the Mathematica 12 software to perform our Numerical Analysis. Proof of all the
Propositions are given in the Appendix.
The value functions have the following form:
Vi j(θ1 j,θ2 j) = Ai jθ1 j(t)2 +Bi jθ2 j(t)2 +Ci jθ1 j(t)θ2 j(t) +Di jθ1 j(t) +Ei jθ2 j(t) +Fi j. We obtain
the coefficients Ai j,Bi j,Ci j,Di j,Ei j and Fi j of the value functions by solving a set of 12 nonlinear
equations. These are given in the appendix.
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3.3.1. Nash Game
When two similar manufacturers compete, we assume that there is no market leader and the rivals
take their advertising and pricing decision simultaneously. The first order conditions of the HJB
equations wih respect to the decision variables, allows us to obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1:Under a Nash game, the equilibrium pre-crisis and post-crisis advertising and pric-
ing decision of the two firms are:
p∗i j(t) =








k2 j(2B2 jθ2 j(t)+C2 jθ1 j(t)+E2 j)
µ2
.
The value functions of the firms are of the form:
V1 j(θ1 j,θ2 j) = A1 jθ1 j(t)2 +B1 jθ2 j(t)2 +C1 jθ1 j(t)θ2 j(t)+D1 jθ1 j(t)+E1 jθ2 j(t)+F1 j
V2 j(θ1 j,θ2 j) = A2 jθ1 j(t)2 +B2 jθ2 j(t)2 +C2 jθ1 j(t)θ2 j(t)+D2 jθ1 j(t)+E2 jθ2 j(t)+F2 j
(3.16)
where the equations for deriving the coefficients Ai j,Bi j,Ci j,Di j,Ei j and Fi j are listed in the Ap-
pendix 2.
Proposition 1 reveals that the feedback pricing strategies are free from the the coefficients of
the state variables in the value function. The advertising strategies depend on the coefficients of
the state variables in the value function. We will show in the Appendix that the solutions to the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is not unique in our model. In fact, the equations give four
solutions to each coefficient of the value function. Hence, we have to select the right combination
to form an admissible solution. We have assumed that the advertising and pricing decisions hold
positive values only. This enables us to find a unique solution which results in positive price and
advertising.
Nash Pricing Decisions: We analyze the effect of a firm’s own goodwill and its competitor’s
goodwill on the pricing decisions. The above proposition shows that the pricing decisions of a
firm is a linear function of the firm’s own and its rival’s goodwill. The following lemma shows the
variation of price of each firm with the rival’s and its own goodwill.
Lemma 1. In the Nash game, for a firm i∈ {1,2}, price pi j is always increasing in its goodwill θi j
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and increases with the rival’s goodwill, θ(3−i) j if βi > 2γi and decreases with the rival’s goodwill
if βi < 2γi .
Proof: The proof follows from the first order condition of the firm price with respect to the good-






















price decided by manufacturer i is increasing in the rival’s goodwill if
βi−2γi
4−β1β2
> 0 i.e. βi > 2γi
and decreasing in the rival’s goodwill if βi < 2γi.
The above findings have some significant insights. This first result highlights that a firm’s
own goodwill has a positive effect on pricing. Thus, a firm with a high goodwill can charge a
higher price as compared to a firm with lower goodwill. However, for goodwill to be high, higher
advertising efforts are needed. Hence, the manufacturer needs to invest more in advertising in
order to charge a higher price. This is consistent with the finding of the previous literature (Lu,
J. Zhang, and Tang 2019; De Giovanni 2019).
The second result about the inter-relationship between the cross price sensitivity and the cross
goodwill(brand) sensitivity shows that a firm’s price can increase with the rival’s goodwill if cross
price sensitivity of the firm if greater than twice the cross goodwill sensitivity. In other words,
cross-price sensitivity has a more pronounced effect on the a firm’s demand and pricing policies
than the cross-brand sensitivity. Previous empirical research has shows that an increase in non-
price advertising leads to lower price sensitivity among consumers (Kaul and Wittink 1995) and
brand credibility decreases price sensitivity (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002). We may hypoth-
esize that goodwill is a measure of brand credibility and hence price sensitivity is reduced by a
higher goodwill. Our findings in this paper comport with the above results.
In addition to the above findings, Figure 3.1 shows how the Nash prices of the two firms vary
with the goodwill of both the firms.
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Figure 3.1: Nash Pricing and Goodwill
Nash Advertising Decisions: A complete analysis of the advertising decisions can be made if
the signs of the coefficients of the state variables are known. Advertising effort, ai j is increasing
in the advertising effectiveness ki j, which shows that firms should invest more in advertising if
effectiveness is high. However, following the empirical evidence, we have assumed that advertising
effectiveness decreases in the post-crisis period. Hence, we may say that the loss of this advertising
effectiveness has the potential to diminish post-crisis advertising. However, the presence of the
coefficients of the value function also influence the advertising efforts. For example, A1 j > 0
(or C1 j > 0 ) would indicate that M1 should increase advertising with its goodwill θ1 j (or its
rival’s goodwill θ2 j) and B2 j > 0 (or C2 j) implies that M2 should increase its advertising efforts
with its own goodwill, θ2 j (or its rival’s goodwill θ1 j). Our computational analysis shows that
the coefficients of value functions Ai j,Bi j,Ci j,Di j,Ei j and Fi j have four possible solutions. In the
feasible solution with positive values of price and advertising, A1 j > 0,B1 j < 0,D1 j > 0 and B2 j >
0,C2 j < 0,E2 j > 0. The above findings highlight that a firm’s advertising increases with its brand
image and plummets when the rival’s brand image rises.
Apparently the expressions of the advertising decisions in the two periods seem similar. How-
ever, this is because we are presenting the advertising efforts in terms of the coefficients of the
value functions. From equations (B.18) and (B.26) in the Appendix B, it is clear that the first
period coefficients of the value functions depend on the second period coefficients as well as χ
(crisis likelihood), η (damage to goodwill due to recall) and spillover φ . Due to the non-linear and
complex nature of the equations in many variables, we solve the equations numerically and obtain
the insights about the influence of model parameters.
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3.3.1.1. Impact of Crisis on Nash Pricing and Advertising Decisions
The impact of crisis is characterized by the parameters χ (Crisis likelihood) and η (damage to
goodwill). We examine five cases - Benchmark likelihood and impact, Low likelihood and low
impact, low likelihood and high impact, high likelihood and low impact, high likelihood and high
impact and find the corresponding pricing policies. We plot the pricing policies of the two similar
firms and show the variation of prices with time. We assume that recall occurs at t = tr. The
regime when t > tr is the spillover (post-crisis) regime. Previous literature has estimated that in
the auto industry the likelihood of crisis is around 30% and the impact is also around 30% (Rubel,
Naik, and Srinivasan 2011). While this may change from industry to industry, there is not enough
empirical research confirming the crisis likelihood across industries. We therefore assume that
(χ = .3,η = .3) is the benchmark case. Such a likelihood and impact might be considered to be
moderate. As mentioned in table 3.1, low impact and high impact correspond to η = .05,η = .6
respectively and low likelihood and high likelihood correspond to χ = .05,χ = .6 respectively.
Immediate Impact of Crisis
Immediately after the crisis, the goodwills of both the firms take a jump. For the manufacturer 1, a
loss of goodwill results in a decline in goodwill and we have
θ12(t+r ) = (1−η)θ11(t−r ). (3.17)







From equations (3.16) and (3.20), we compare the immediate effect of recall on price. The result
is the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. For the focal firm, manufacturer 1, the pre-crisis price at time t−r is higher than the





We have considered that the goodwill θi j for any firm in our model is positive. Therefore, con-
dition (3.19) is trivial when β1 > 2γ1 which also implies that the non-focal firm’s goodwill has a
positive impact on the focal firm’s price (follows from Lemma 1). Thus the focal firm will always
raise post-crisis prices if the non-focal firm’s goodwill positively affects the focal firm’s price. On
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the other hand, if the non-focal firm’s goodwill has a negative impact on the focal firm’s price, then
the focal firm decreases price immediately after the recall if its pre-crisis goodwill is sufficiently
higher than a threshold based on the non-focal firm’s pre-crisis goodwill.
Lemma 3. For the non-focal firm, manufacturer 2, the pre-crisis price at time t−r is higher than





How Do Crisis Likelihood and Intensity Affect Nash Pricing and Advertising Decisions?
We compare the pricing and advertising decisions of both the firms numerically for the different
cases given in Table 3.1. Our numerical analysis provide several novel insights about the effect
of crisis likelihood and intensity on the decision of the firms. As depicted in Figures 3.2 and
3.3, when the recall impact is low, the decisions of the firms do not change much with the crisis
likelihood. Since a low impact recall causes minimal damage to a firm’s reputation, the likelihood
of crisis does not alarm the firms ex-ante. The focal firm maintains a higher pre-crisis price and
price drops marginally after the recall. Moreover, during the pre-crisis period, the focal firm’s
price has a decreasing trend signifying that the firm is trying to capture more market. A steady
drop in the post-crisis price can send a negative signal to consumers about the value of the focal
firm’s brand. Therefore, the focal firm’s post-crisis price, though drops marginally after the recall,
remains relatively constant.
Reacting to the competition, the non-focal firm decreases prices in the pre-crisis period. The
non-focal firm’s price marginally increases immediately after the crisis followed by a decrease
during the spillover period. However, we note that the increased price is still below the price of
the focal firm. The price increase is thus merely an opportunistic behaviour wherein the non-focal
firm believes that due to the recall, consumer perception of the focal brand might have changed.
Consequently, the non-focal firm’s demand can increase even if its price is a bit higher than before.
We also believe that the price increase can potentially convey a positive signal about the goodwill
of the non-focal firm.
The advertising efforts of both the firm increase after the recall. However, the focal firm’s
advertising remains higher than the non-focal firm in both regimes. Few empirical studies (Rubel,
Naik, and Srinivasan 2011; Cleeren, H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013) support the finding that
advertising should increase after a recall.
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Figure 3.2: Nash Pricing Policies for Low Impact (χ = .05,η = .05) Recall
Figure 3.3: Nash Advertising Policies for Low Impact (χ = .05,η = .05) Recall
The result of our analysis in figures 3.4 and 3.5 shows that as crisis impact increases, the non-
focal firm charges prices higher than the focal firm not only in the post-crisis period but also in
the pre-crisis period for a high impact high likelihood recall. Such pricing decisions are again a
manifestation of the non-focal firm’s dual motivation - signal positive and higher product quality
or goodwill to the consumers and make extra profit by increasing price. The focal firm, decreases
price in order to make a profit with an impending decline in post-crisis reputation. Moreover, the
focal firm cuts pre-crisis advertising costs by reducing efforts in the pre-crisis regime.
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Figure 3.4: Nash Pricing Policies- Benchmark Case (χ = .3,η = .3)
On the contrary, the non-focal firm raises pre-crisis advertising efforts. While this enhanced ad-
vertising increases the non-focal firm’s advertising costs, it potentially increases goodwill enough
to buffer against the spillover of a negative reputation in the post-crisis regime. Surprisingly, we
find that the benchmark case necessitates equilibrium advertising of both firms to be lower in the
post-crisis regime. We believe that the non-linearity of the advertising functions of both firms
causes the above variation of advertising. The finding, however, is consistent with some find-
ings which state that whether pre-crisis advertising should be higher depends on the (χ,η) pair
(Mukherjee and Chauhan 2019). Some empirical evidence also suggests that "laying low" might
be a feasible advertising strategy during brand crisis (Dahlen and Lange 2006). While the study
does not emphasize the importance of envisioning the recall, we posit that the prior estimation or
knowledge of (η ,χ) pair dictates the firm’s equilibrium strategies and hence post-crisis advertising
level drops in some cases.
Figure 3.5: Nash Pricing Policies for High Impact (χ = .6,η = .6) Recall
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Figure 3.6: Nash Advertising Policies for High Impact (χ = .6,η = .6) Recall
As an outcome of the numerical analysis and our discussions above, we can propose the equi-
librium advertising policies of either of the firms for a given impact and a likelihood of a product
recall. For ready reference, we summarize the resulting pricing and advertising policies of the focal
firm in the Table 3.2. The strategies correspond to product recalls of different impacts and like-
lihoods. Table 3 summarizes the resulting pricing and advertising policies for the non-focal firm
suffering from a negative spillover effect. The strategies are classified based on the combination of














Maintain a higher pre-crisis and
post-crisis price during spillover
than the non-focal firm. Reduce
price marginally after crisis.
Hold price fairly constant after crisis.
Start with a high pre-crisis ad.
Reduce ad gradually during
pre-crisis regime. Increase and
maintain post-crisis ad.
High Low
Same as Low likelihood low impact
case.
Same as Low likelihood low impact
case.
Low High
Maintain a higher pre-crisis
price than the non-focal firm.
Decrease price immediately
after crisis and maintain a
steady low price during
spillover.
Start with lower pre-crisis ad
than the low impact case. Decrease
pre-crisis more than low impact case.
Increase and maintain post-crisis ad.
High High
Maintain a lower pre-crisis and
post-crisis price during spillover
than the non-focal firm. Reduce
price after crisis. Hold price
fairly constant after crisis during
spillover.
Same as high impact low likelihood
case.














Gradually decrease price in both the regimes.
Keep price lower than the focal firm’s price.
Gradually increase pre-crisis ad.
Increase ad even more after the crisis
during spillover and hold steady.
High Low Same as the low impact low likelihood case. Same as low impact low likelihood case.
Low High
Keep a lower pre-crisis pricing than the focal
firm. Increase price immediately after crisis
and gradually decrease price during the spillover.
Gradually increase pre-crisis ad.
Increase ad substantially after the
crisis and keep high post-crisis advertising.
High High
Maintain a higher pre-crisis price than the
focal firm. Gradually decrease price
during spillover but keep the price
higher than the focal firm.
Same as the low likelihood high impact
case.
Table 3.3: Nash Game - Non- Focal firm’s Pricing and Advertising Policies
3.3.2. Stackelberg Game
A legitimate question in a duopoly competition is whether a market leadership can be advanta-
geous for a focal firm. We presume that the pricing and advertising decisions will change when
the focal firm is a leader and makes its decisions based on the follower’s reaction functions. Our
investigation of the above question leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2:Under a Stackelberg game, with the focal firm as leader, the equilibrium pre-crisis
and post-crisis advertising and pricing decision of the two firms are:
p∗1 j(t) =




(4α2 +2α1β2−α2β1β2 +(2β2 +β1β2γ2−4γ2)θ1 j(t)+(4−β1β2−2β2γ1)θ2 j(t))
4(2−β1β2)
a∗1 j(t) =




k2 j(2B2 jθ2 j(t)+C2 jθ1 j(t)+E2 j)
µ2
.
The value functions of the firms are of the form:
V1 j(θ1 j,θ2 j) = A1 jθ1 j(t)2 +Bi jθ2 j(t)2 +C1 jθ1 j(t)θ2 j(t)+D1 jθ1 j(t)+E1 jθ2 j(t)+F1 j
V2 j(θ1 j,θ2 j) = A2 jθ1 j(t)2 +B2 jθ2 j(t)2 +C2 jθ1 j(t)θ2 j(t)+D2 jθ1 j(t)+E2 jθ2 j(t)+F2 j
(3.23)
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where the equations for deriving the coefficients Ai j,Bi j,Ci j,Di j,Ei j and Fi j are listed in the Ap-
pendix 2.
The pricing strategies for a Stackelberg game are significantly different from the Nash pricing
strategies. However, the advertising strategies are structurally identical in both the games. How-
ever, the solution of the coefficient of value functions will differ in the two games as the price is
different and the parameter values different. For example, in the Stackelberg game, initial goodwill
θ)1(0) can be greater than θ2(0) or the market potential of the leader is greater than the follower
α1 > α2. Therefore, though the advertising policies in the Nash and the Stackleberg game looks
similar, they are indeed different when evaluated. Thus, the value function and hence the long term
expected profits of the firms will also be different.
Stackelberg Pricing Decisions: We analyze the effect of a firm’s own goodwill and its competi-
tor’s goodwill on the pricing decisions. Proposition 2 shows that the Stackelberg pricing decision
of a firm is a linear function of the firm’s and its rival’s goodwill. Unlike the Nash game, in the
Stackelberg game, the mathematical structures of the two firms’ prices are different. Therefore, we
analyze the effect of the model parameters on the prices of the two firms separately. We have the
following lemma for the leader.
Lemma 4. In the Stackelberg game, the Leader’s price p1 j is always increasing in its goodwill
θ1 j and increases with the follower’s goodwill, θ2 j if β1 > 2γ1 and decreases with the follower’s
goodwill if β1 < 2γ1 .













> 0 if β1 > 2γ1. Thus the leader’s price increases with the
rival’s goodwill if the cross-price sensitivity of the leader is greater than twice the cross goodwill
sensitivity.
The conditions obtained for the leader are similar to the conditions in the Nash game. Hence,
the insights obtained are same as in the Nash game. We have the following lemma for the non-focal
firm.
Lemma 5. In the Stackelberg game, the follower’s price p2 j is increasing in its goodwill, θ2J
and decreasing with the leader’s goodwill, θ1 j if β2 <
4γ2
(2+β1γ2)
and increasing with the leader’s











> 0 since both the numerator and denominators are greater than zero from the








. Clearly, the denominator is positive. The sign of
the expression therefore depends on the sign of the numerator. The numerator’s negativity (or





Figure 3.7: Stackelberg Price and Goodwill
Stackelberg Advertising: The focal firm as a market leader announces its pricing decisions and
advertising decisions first. We have seen that contrary to the pricing decisions, the structural form
of the advertising decision do not change in the two games - Nash and Stackelberg. However,
as discussed earlier the solutions of value function coefficients are different in the Stackleberg
game. Similar to the Nash game, in the feasible solution which gives positive values of price and
advertising, A1 j > 0,B1 j < 0,D1 j > 0 and B2 j > 0,C2 j < 0,E2 j > 0. Therefore, like the Nash
game a firm’s advertising increases with its brand image and plummets when the rival’s brand
image rises.
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Lemma 6. In both the pre-crisis and post-crisis regime, the focal firm as a market leader would
charge higher prices than in the Nash game if,
(i) β1 > 2γ1 and






where the Nash and Stackelberg goodwills are θ Ni j (t) and θ
S
i j(t) respectively.
Proof: For the proof of this lemma, in order to avoid confusion with notations, we denote the Nash
prices by pNi j(t) and the Stackelberg prices by p
S
i j(t). The Nash and Stackelberg brand images are
θ Ni j (t) and θ
S
i j(t) respectively. For brevity we drop the time variable t from the functions.
Comparing the two prices from equations (3.21) and (3.14), the Stackelberg price is higher if,
pSi j− pNi j =
(2α1 +α2β1 +(2−β1γ2)θ S1 j +(β1−2γ1)θ S2 j
2(2−β1β2)
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The above lemma signifies that the Stackelberg pricing is guaranteed to be higher than the Nash
pricing for the focal firm if its cross-price sensitivity is considerably bigger than the cross goodwill
sensitivity and the Stackelberg goodwill of each firm is greater than the Nash goodwill.
As a special case, if we consider the brand goodwills to be identical in the two games, then






where Γ = (2α1 +
α2β1+(2−β1γ2)θ1 j(t)+(β1−2γ1)θ2 j(t)). Simplification gives the condition, β1β2 > 0 which is
always true since 0 < βi < 1 by our model assumptions.
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Lemma 7. In both the pre-crisis and post-crisis regime, the non-focal firm M2 would charge higher
prices than in the Nash game if,
(i) β2 > 2γ2
















Proof: The prrof of the above lemma is similar to the proof of lemma 6.
3.3.2.1. The Impact of Crisis on Price and Advertising in the Stackelberg Game
We analyze the impact of recall on pricing and advertising policies in the Stackelberg leadership
game under different levels of impact and likelihood - benchmark(medium), low and high. The
value function coefficients play a critical role in the following analysis. Therefore, we present a
table which compares the value of coefficients in the Nash and Stackelberg games.












How Do Crisis Likelihood and Intensity Affect Stackelberg Pricing and Advertising Decisions?
Previous research shows that a Stackelberg leader can charge higher prices during a product re-
call (Rubel 2018). We compare the pricing and advertising decisions of both the firms numerically
for the different cases given in Table 3.1. Figures 3.8-3.12 depict the numerical findings and Table
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3.5 (for the focal firm) and Table 3.6 (for the non-focal firm) prescribe the equilibrium advertising
and pricing policies for the Stackelberg game.
Our findings reveal that some of the Stackelberg equilibrium policies are significantly different
from the Nash policies. Firstly, we note that the prices of products for both the firms are always
higher in the Stackelberg game than in the Nash game. In the Stackelberg game, for a low damage
crisis, the decisions of the firms do not change much with the likelihood. The focal firm, by the
privilege of leadership, can also increase pricing slowly during the post-crisis period though the
price drops marginally after the recall. The non-focal firm decreases prices in the pre-crisis period,
presumably trying to increase the demand for its product. The immediate post-crisis price of the
non-focal firm raises slightly and then decreases with time. Advertising for both the firms remains
steady in both the periods with marginal increase after the recall. The elevated advertising is again
to protect the goodwill of the firms. For a low impact recall, the damage is not severe enough to
tarnish the image of the leader. Therefore, the advertising efforts of the firms remain low. The
leader is not seriously concerned with the minor goodwill loss, and the follower is neither alarmed
by the insignificant effect of the spillover sensitivity, ν . Moreover, the follower knows that the low
damage is not severe enough to perhaps change consumer perceptions of the leading brand. Hence
increased advertising will enhance the follower’s costs without having much positive influence on
its demand.
Figure 3.8: Stackelberg Pricing Policies- Low Impact
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Figure 3.9: Stackelberg Advertising Policies- Low Impact
Starting with a high price is a strategic decision of the leader. When the impact of the recall
is severe, the leader drops the price considerably, even though starting with a higher price. Such
a decision insulates against the losses caused by the loss in demand. Since, at the beginning
of the planning horizon, the firm envisions a possibly severe recall, the prices are set high so
that the post-crisis price drop minimizes the loss of profit. Moreover, the leader cuts down on
the advertising costs by reducing its advertising efforts. During a high impact recall, excessive
advertising can backfire, especially when a market leader does so. Consumers might perceive the
excess advertising as a signal of covering up the damage and hence respond negatively. (Gao et al.
2015) found that for existing products a firm might reduce marketing expenditures by decreasing
advertising after a recall without significantly affecting the stock value. We augment the above
finding by illustrating that the firm can also decide to decrease post-crisis advertising when recall
impact is high. We argue that the follower here resorts to opportunistic behaviour and tries to
capture as much market as she can by indulging in higher pre-crisis and post-crisis advertising
than the leader. Consequently, the leader responds to the competition by adjusting its advertising.
Moreover, under the Stackelberg game, the leader’s higher price may hurt its sales. Therefore, the
leader reduces advertising costs to maintain profits.
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Figure 3.10: Stackelberg Pricing and Advertising Policies- Benchmark Case
Figure 3.11: Stackelberg Pricing Policies- High Impact
Figure 3.12: Stackelberg Pricing Policies- High Impact
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In the Stackelberg game, the above discussions of the numerical analysis of firm strategies lead
us to several policies for both the firm given an impact and a likelihood of product recall. For the
Stackelberg game, we summarize the resulting pricing and advertising policies of the leader (focal
firm) in Table 3.4. The strategies correspond to product recalls of different impacts and likelihoods.
Table 5 summarizes the resulting pricing and advertising policies of the follower (non-focal firm)
suffering from a negative spillover effect. The strategies are classified based on likelihood and












Low Low Maintain a steady pre-crisis
price with very little or no
decrease. Marginally drop
post-crisis price. Gradually
increase price during post-
crisis regime.
Maintain steady pre-crisis advertising efforts.
Boost ad after the crisis and
maintain the higher advertising efforts during
post-crisis regime.
High Low
The strategy is similar to Low
likelihood low impact case.
However, overall advertising
efforts are higher when likelihood
is high.
Low High
Start with a higher price
than low impact recall.
Decrease price during
pre-crisis period. Drop
price after recall. Keep
post-crisis price steady.
Decrease pre-crisis ad gradually.
Drop post-crisis ad.
High High
Start with a high price.
Substantially decrease
pre-criss price. Drop post-
crisis price and maintain.
Decrease pre-crisis advertising gradually.
Drop post-crisis advertising Further
lower than the low likelihood
high impact case.














Gradually decrease price in both the regimes.
Slow down rate of post-crisis price decrease.
Keep price lower than the focal firm’s price.
Maintain steady pre-crisis ad.
Increase ad and maintain the same
after the crisis during spillover.
High Low Same as the low impact low likelihood case.
Same as low impact low likelihod case.
Level of advertising can be slightly higher
than low likelihood case.
Low High
Keep a lower pre-crisis pricing than the focal
firm. Increase price immediately after crisis
and gradually decrease price during the spillover.
Maintain higher pre-crisis advertising
than the rival leader. Gradually increase
pre-crisis ad. Decrease post-crisis ad.
High High Same as high impact low likelihood case.
Same as the low likelihood high impact
case.
Table 3.6: Stackelberg Game - Non- Focal firm’s Pricing and Advertising Policies
3.3.3. The Impact of Recall on Long Term Expected Profit
Recall that the value function, Vi j(θ1 j,θ2 j) of the firm i in regime j is given by the following
equation:
Vi j(θ1 j,θ2 j) = Ai jθ1 j(t)2 +Bi jθ2 j(t)2 +Ci jθ1 j(t)θ2 j(t)+Di jθ1 j(t)+Ei jθ2 j(t)+Fi j.
The value functions of the firms at time t = 0( and j = 1) give the long term expected profits of the
firms. However, it is interesting to analyze the effects of the state variables on the instantaneous
profits. First, we note that the value functions have quadratic terms of the goodwills of both the
firms, a multiplicative association of the two goodwills and linear goodwill terms apart from the
constant terms. As discussed earlier, the HJB equation in our case has only one admissible solution
irrespective of the likelihood and impact of the recall. For that solution, the signs of the coefficients
of the value functions are:
Aij > 0,Bij > 0: This implies that the quadratic presence of the state variable benefits each firm,
Cij < 0: The multiplicative association of the goodwills has a negative effect on firm profit. The
significance of this term is that, if a firms goodwill is high, it would want the other firm’s goodwill
to below in order to have a minimum value of Ci jθ1 j(t)θ2 j(t).
D1j > 0,D2j < 0,E1j < 0,E2j > 0: This relation signifies that the rivals firm’s high goodwill can
dampen a firm’s profit and vice versa.
Fij > 0: The constant terms always has a positive effect on the firms’ profits.
From the above discussion on the variation of signs of the value function coefficients for the
equilibrium solutions, we see that the presence of the rivals firm’s goodwill in a firm’s value func-
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tion has a dual effect of increasing firm profit (by quadratic presence) and also decreasing it (mul-
tiplicative association and linear presence).
The two most important parameters of our study are the crisis likelihood and the impact. The
spillover effect, as described in table (3.1) will depend on the impact of the recall. In the following
section, we present how firm profit if affected by crisis likelihood χ and impact η .
Profit under Nash Game - Similar firms compete: For a low impact recall, the profit of the focal
firm increases with crisis likelihood. The above finding might be surprising. The presence of χ
in a nonlinear form in the value functions of the two firms brings in two opposing tendencies of
lowering the function or increasing it. When the crisis-impact η is small, we find that the "ben-
eficial force" of χ is more prominent for the focal firm. On the other hand, the non-focal firm’s
profit is always increasing in the crisis likelihood. Note that both price and advertising of the focal
firm remains much higher than the non-focal firm for a low impact crisis. Thus, the focal firm is
more profitable than the rival suffering from a spillover effect. The trade-off of advertising costs
(quadratic in advertising efforts), cost of lost sales due to loss in demand by recall impact and the
increment of the price works in favour of the focal firm resulting in better profits than the rival.
As the recall impact increases, the focal firm’s profit decreases with an increase in recall like-
lihood. Thus for high impact recall, the detrimental effect of χ is more prominent. Therefore, we
find that as impact increases, the profit for the focal firm drops. For similar firms, with identical
parameter values, the focal firm’s profit drops below the non-focal firm’s profit for a high likeli-
hood of recall. Figure 3.11 shows the profit variations with different levels of impact. Figure 3.12
shows the threshold curve of the (χ,η) pairs beyond which the profits for the two firms increase
(or decrease).
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Figure 3.13: Nash - Profit vs Crisis Likelihood
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Figure 3.14: Nash Profit Variation with Likelihood and Impact
Profit Under Stackelberg Game- Focal Firm is the Market Leader: In general, for a low impact
recall or a high impact recall, the Stackelberg game generates more profit for both the focal and the
non-focal firms than their profits in the Nash game. The overall behaviour of profit with respect to
crisis likelihood and impact remains more or less the same in the Stackelberg game. However, there
are some exceptions. For example, for a high impact recall, the focal firm can be more profitable
than the non-focal firm until a higher crisis likelihood as compared to the Nash game. The above
behaviour of profit is under the focal firm’s power of leadership. Under a medium impact recall,
the focal firm may not always be better off in the Stackelberg game than the Nash game. We found
that for a higher likelihood of a crisis, (χ ≥ .4), the focal firm’s profit in the Nash game can be
higher than its profit in the Stackelberg game.
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Figure 3.15: Stackelberg Game - Profit vs Crisis Likelihood
Is Leadership Always Profitable?
In the Stackelberg game, the non-focal firm yields better profits than in the Nash game under
any impact of the recall, low, medium or high. On the other hand, the focal firm has higher profit
than the Nash game when the impact is low or high. For a medium impact (η = .3), the focal firm’s
profit is lower in the Stackelberg game when the likelihood of crisis is high (χ > 0.3). Thus for the
focal firm, we cannot always say that market leadership can be beneficial, and the benefits depend
on the crisis impact and likelihood. Figure 3.13 illustrates the profits in the Stackelberg game for
both the firms and the variations of profits with the crisis likelihood and impact.
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Figure 3.16: Nash Pricing Policies- Benchmark Case
3.4. Conclusions
Product recalls of different magnitudes impact firms and their rivals in various ways. In this paper,
we studied the equilibrium pricing and advertising decisions of two competing firms under the neg-
ative impact of product recalls when both the firms envision the recall. In particular, we illustrate
the different pricing and advertising policies of the firms - a focal firm and its rival suffering from
spillover effect under crises of different levels (low, medium and high). We found that the policies
differ with the impact of the recall, likelihood of the recall and the market leadership of the focal
firm.
Managerial Implications: We obtained several insights. Firms undergoing a crisis need to con-
sider goodwill advertising and pricing strategies depending on the estimated likelihood and impact
of a recall. In general, our study underscores the importance of envisioning the crisis impact as the
likelihood and impact of crisis change the firms’ pricing and advertising policies and such deci-
sions can affect firms profits. The above implications comport with the previous literature (Rubel
2018; Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011; Mukherjee and Chauhan 2019).
Our study focuses on negative spillover. Empirical literature shows that negative spillover
happens to similar firms from the same country (Borah and Tellis 2016). We examined the cases
when the focal firm is similar to the rival, and the focal firm is a market leader and found that the
pricing and advertising policies for both the firms differ in the two cases. Therefore, rival firms
should be aware of recall events of competitors from the same country and also the size of the
competitor.
We have considered a dynamic and evolving brand image for both the firms over the plan-
ning horizon. The feedback pricing and advertising strategies and their variation with the brand
goodwill or parameters necessitate that the management of both the firms constantly monitors the
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factors that may affect brand goodwill and model parameters like cross-price sensitivity and cross
goodwill sensitivity. A thorough introspection and elimination of the above determinants ensure
that the results of our analysis do not change by the mediation of other factors.
Future Research: Our study has some limitations, and future research can extend the same.
Spillover effect, in some cases, can be short-term. Our model does not cover this possibility be-
cause of the with the present model it might have been very challenging or impossible to analyze
the feedback strategies. Consequently we might not have any analytical results if such a finite
horizon problem was considered. However, a modified model may be used for future research to
incorporate short-term spillover effects.
The empirical literature suggests that rival firms from different countries of origin can under
positive spillover effect during product recalls. We have not examined this case in our model. The
above is a viable case of interest, and our model can be easily extended in that direction.
Price sensitivity and goodwill sensitivity of firms may change in the post-crisis period. Our
model can be extended by assuming different values of β1 and γi in the two periods. These variables
can be considered to be state variables. However, in such a case makes the solution of the game
more difficult due to the dimensional issue.
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Chapter 4
Quality Cost-sharing Contracts to Manage
Collateral Damage by Product Recalls
4.1. Introduction
In recent times product recalls have become increasingly common. Frequently enough, the cause
for a product-harm crisis and a consequent recall issued by a manufacturer is the faulty or inade-
quate quality parts provided by the suppliers. For example, GM recalled more than 2.7 million ve-
hicles in 2014. The reason for the recall was faulty ignition switches supplied by Delphi (Lawrence
2017). In another incident, U.S. firm CTS Corp. supplied poor quality accelerator pedals to Toy-
ota. As a result, Toyota had to recall 2.3 million vehicles (Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura 2010). The
Ford SUV recalls due to faulty tire and treads separation problems of Bridgestone tires brought an
end to a very long-lasting buyer-supplier partnership (Gifford 2015). Similarly, Samsung recalled
the Samsung-Note mobile phones wiping off much of Samsung’s market share. In this case, the
battery suppliers of Samsung were at fault (Tilley 2017). The above recalls were due to supplier’s
quality failures, and the product harms have even resulted in multiple deaths. The instances of
such product harm spread across industries. Companies often outsource raw materials or parts of
products and manufacturing activities to other members of the supply chain. When a manufacturer
has less visibility or control over the supply chain or when there are multiple members of the up-
stream supply chain (for example many suppliers), there is an element of increased risk as far as
the quality of the final product is concerned (Foster Jr 2008; Robinson and Malhotra 2005). If the
quality of a supplier’s product is compromised, the quality of the finished good may suffer. Such
quality failures can lead to product recalls causing severe damage to a firm’s reputation along with
other indirect external failure costs which include costs of warranty, return, rework or lawsuits by
a customer and regulatory bodies (ref1).
High product quality can boost a firm’s goodwill and therefore, sales. Therefore, in order to
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ensure the quality of their products, manufacturers often want to have better visibility of supplier
risks and closely track the supplier’s quality performance. Consequently, manufacturers form con-
tractual relationships with suppliers to have better visibility and control over the supplier’s product
quality. The supply chain literature has examined cost-sharing contracts formed to incentivize the
suppliers by sharing their quality costs. However, the viability of such contracts is questionable
when suppliers are prone to quality risks, and such risks can potentially result in product recalls. A
manufacturer’s intention behind a cost-sharing contract is motivating the supplier to render high-
quality products which in turn increases the manufacturer’s reputation and sales. Product recall
due to a supplier’s fault may signify an apparent failure of conformance to minimal quality stan-
dards on the supplier’s side. External failure costs and cost of lost goodwill are added adverse
effects following a recall (Gao et al. 2015; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008; Cleeren, H. J.
Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011; Lawrence 2017; Chao, Ira-
vani, and Savaskan 2009). However, even if a manufacturer knows that a supplier is risky, it may
share quality costs with the supplier because supplier switching might be very costly and cost-
sharing might mean that the risky supplier will adhere to high standards of quality improvement
and conformance, thereby avoid a major costly recall. Based on a single manufacturer, single
supplier scenario, a study analyzes recall cost-sharing to induce supplier’s quality improvement
(Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan 2009) when there is a product recall.
The main motivation of our paper comes from the different types of cost-sharing contracts that
are offered to suppliers by manufacturers, who are the Stackelberg leaders. In the Supply Chain
literature, many papers consider cost-sharing mechanisms where the manufacturer typically offers
a fixed cost-sharing (Reyniers and Tapiero 1995b; Reyniers and Tapiero 1995a; Baiman, Netessine,
and Kunreuther 2004; Baiman, Fischer, and Rajan 2000; El Ouardighi and B. Kim 2010). When
a manufacturer offers such a contract two significant questions are imminent - (i) Which costs
should be shared? (ii) What proportion of costs should be shared? Cost-sharing mechanisms could
be partial, which focuses on sharing only quality improvement costs; or full, which are designed
to share the full costs of quality improvement and quality failure.
A product recall is often anticipated. For example, in the case of Delphi’s ignition switches,
the GM officials were aware of the lacking quality (Harrison 2014) In other words, the officials
were aware of a possible crisis due to the supplier’s fault. Such quality flaws can remain latent,
resulting in a recall after customers suffer product harm and can result in huge external failure
costs. In the case of GM, the recall costs were close to $ 1.3 Billion. While there is no guarantee
that sharing quality costs (like quality improvement, conformance) can completely avoid a product
recall, nonetheless this can reduce the chance or intensity of a recall. Moreover, the suppliers
and manufacturers can adjust their quality decisions or cost-sharing contracts to maximize the
long term profit if a recall occurs. Such managerial decisions can be executed efficiently if the
86
recall likelihood, associated lack of quality and loss of brand goodwill can be estimated ex-ante at
the beginning of the planning horizon. Envisioning a recall can affect decisions like advertising,
quality and pricing (Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011; Rubel 2018; Mackalski and Belisle 2015).
In this article, we investigate a scenario where a manufacturer and its two suppliers are aware
of a potential recall due to the failure of one of the suppliers quality. At the beginning of the
planning horizon, the unreliable supplier also knows that its increasing quality efforts can increase
the quality level of the product and possibly lower the crisis impact. Due to the unreliable supplier’s
quality failure, the manufacturer and the second supplier suffers from "collateral damage" through
the loss of after-recall sales.
Goodwill advertising is another potential weapon to mitigate the negative effects of a product
recall by raising goodwill. Knowing that a recall can occur, a manufacturer thus often faces mul-
tiple decision-making problems -(i) How much effort in advertising should be made before and
after a possible recall? (ii) What proportion of quality cost should be shared with a supplier before
and after a possible recall? The available literature finds that advertising efforts to protect a brand
image may increase after a recall (Cleeren, H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Rubel, Naik,
and Srinivasan 2011; Gao et al. 2015). However, to the best of our knowledge, the joint effect of
advertising and quality cost-sharing decisions have not been researched in the context of product
recalls. Our study addresses this gap with a simple supply chain structure and linear-quadratic
differential game which enables tractability and analysis of the equilibrium decisions.
We consider two types of quality cost-sharing contracts offered by the manufacturer to both
the suppliers who provide different parts necessary to assemble a finished product. The contracts
are (i) Quality Improvement Cost-sharing Contract (QICS) and (ii) Comprehensive Quality Cost-
sharing Contract (CQCS). On the one hand, the unreliable supplier incurs three types of quality
costs - quality improvement costs, conformation costs and external failure costs. On the other hand,
the reliable supplier fully conforms and is not accountable for any product recall. Thus it has to
contend with only quality improvement costs. Consequently, the two contracts are similar for the
reliable supplier, but the presence of the unreliable supplier may affect the cost-sharing decision of
the manufacturer. Given a crisis likelihood and recall impact, our main research questions are:
1. What are the equilibrium quality efforts of the two suppliers before and after the recall? How
are the equilibrium quality decisions affected by crisis likelihood and intensity?
2. What are the equilibrium advertising policies and cost-sharing decisions of the manufacturer
before product recall and after product recall? What is the effect of crisis likelihood and
intensity on the manufacturer’s equilibrium decisions?
3. What is the impact of the recall on the long term expected profit of the firms?
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4. Which cost-sharing contract is suitable or sustainable for the firms under different crisis
likelihood and intensity?
Our research contributes incrementally to the literature mentioned above. We introduce two
contracts which are motivated from partial and full cost-sharing agreements between manufac-
turers and suppliers. In contrast to the closely related papers like (Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan
2009) which discuss static models, we have developed a dynamic model which is close to reality,
tractable and touches a few streams of literature related to cost-sharing contracts, quality efforts
and advertising. The empirical research literature considers many aftermaths of a product recall
which we have captured in our model. These attributes are the reduced advertising effectiveness
and sales after recall (H. Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007; Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan
2011; Yi Zhao, Ying Zhao, and Helsen 2011), quality efforts depending on recall impact and crisis
likelihood, learning after a recall (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011) and the dependency of the negative
effect of recall on the initial goodwill of the firm (Cleeren, H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013;
H. Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). We articulate the critical empirical findings in one
model and believe that the insights and results of our research are novel.
Secondly, we introduce two contracts - QICS (quality improvement Cost-sharing) and CQCS
(Comprehensive Quality Cost-sharing) contracts and analyze which contract is suitable for the
players who envision an impending product recall. While doing so, unlike most of the literature,
we allow the cost-sharing proportion to be a decision variable of the manufacturer. Considering
share of costs as a decision variable enables the manufacturer to react to a product recall and
modify its cost-sharing decision at a random time when the recall occurs.
Third, while most of the previous modelling literature analyzing cost-sharing or quality de-
cisions consider two-player buyer-supplier games (Reyniers and Tapiero 1995b; Reyniers and
Tapiero 1995a; Zhu, R. Q. Zhang, and Tsung 2007; Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan 2009; Baiman,
Fischer, and Rajan 2000), we consider three players, two of whom are victims of "collateral dam-
age". Contractual agreements in the presence of collateral damage is an essential but overlooked
topic in the literature that integrates product recall and operations management. In our study, we
examine the reaction of the firms who are not at fault but have to suffer due to the quality failure
of the other member of the supply chain.
Fourth, our model captures the effect of quality efforts on a firm’s goodwill and also incorpo-
rates the relationship between the firm’s goodwill erosion and drop in quality level after a recall.
Empirical work (Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008; Cleeren, H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe
2013; Yi Zhao, Ying Zhao, and Helsen 2011) has verified that consumers may react differently
towards a recall depending on the goodwill of the firm. We believe our model is one of the first to
capture this in a simple form.
We also introduce the marginal quality level as a function of crisis likelihood and capture
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the unreliable supplier’s negligence of likelihood in the model. Most significantly, the feedback
strategies that we derive provide the opportunity for adjustment of quality decisions of the suppliers
and advertising and cost-sharing decisions of the manufacturers before and after the recall.
The rest of the paper is arranged in the following manner. Section 4.2 describes the model
in details. In section 4.3, we discuss the equilibria of the differential game under consideration
and provide some insights about the results. In section 4.4, computational analysis is presented to
strengthen our insights. We conclude the paper in section 4.5 with some managerial implications
and directions for future research.
4.2. The Model
We consider a supply chain consisting of three decision-makers, two suppliers S1, S2 and a man-
ufacturer, M. The manufacturer assembles a final product using the distinctive components from
these suppliers. The consumer demand for the final product depends on the manufacturer’s good-
will and product quality. We adopt a linear dynamic demand function. Similar demand functions
have been frequently adopted in the literature (G. Liu, J. Zhang, and Tang 2015; De Giovanni
2011).
D(G(t),Q(t)) = α +βG(t)+ γQ(t) (4.1)
β ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 are the consumers’ sensitivity towards the manufacturer’s goodwill G(t) and
the Quality level Q(t) at any time t in the infinite planning horizon [0,∞). Goodwill G(t) and
quality level Q(t) are the state variables of our model. In the context of our paper, quality level
Q(t) refers to design quality, fitness for use or utility for the consumers (El Ouardighi and B.
Kim 2010; G. Liu, J. Zhang, and Tang 2015), and in our study, both suppliers are responsible
for implementing quality efforts under the basic scenario. The manufacturer shares these quality
efforts with the suppliers under cost-sharing contract scenarios. A product recall would mean
that the goodwill and the quality levels have undergone some deterioration. We will illustrate in a
subsequent paragraph that there if a company anticipates a product recall, there will be two decision
regimes (pre-recall and post-recall). Therefore, we use two indices- i as the index for the supplier
and j as the regime index. Goodwill is influenced by the manufacturer’s advertising decision A j(t)
as well as the suppliers’ quality efforts qi j(t). Besides, the manufacturer also decides on what
fraction of quality costs it should share with the suppliers under cost-sharing contract scenarios.
The cost-sharing variables are φ j(t) (proportion of quality-related costs shared with S1) and σ j(t)
(proportion of quality costs shared with S2). The three players in the market make the decisions
to maximize their long term expected profits. The degree of risk or reliability of the suppliers and
manufacturer are common knowledge. The manufacturer shares the quality cost with the suppliers
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from the beginning of the planning horizon. Therefore, the manufacturer expects a commitment to
quality efforts by the suppliers. Knowing that the manufacturer will share the costs, the suppliers
announce their quality efforts. Thus, in our game model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg
leader and offers a cost-sharing contract to the suppliers. The market leadership assumption of the
manufacturer is consistent with the previous literature (Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan 2009).
Figure 4.1: The Supply chain
Figure 4.2: Decision Sequence
A product recall affects goodwill G(t) and quality level Q(t). Therefore, before defining the
evolution of the states, we describe the occurrence process of the recall. Between the two suppliers,
supplier 1 is a risky supplier with a likelihood (χ) of product failure and subsequent product recall.
A recall can occur at a random time tr in the planning horizon [0,∞). Let χ be the hazard rate. We
define the probabilistic switching of the pre-crisis and the post-crisis period using the stochastic
process [R(t) : t ≥ 0]. The occurrence of a recall, therefore, means that there are two regimes -
pre-crisis regime and the post-crisis regime where the players make the quality, advertising and
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cost-sharing decisions. The pre-crisis regime is defined by [R(t) = 1] and [R(t) = 2] represents the
post-crisis regime. Similar definitions are found in (Boukas, Haurie, and Michel 1990; Haurie and









P[R(t +dt) = 1|R(t) = 2]
dt
= 0 (4.2)
The supplier 2 is perfectly reliable and its products are not prone to recall. If the manufacturer
issues a recall due to the compromised quality of supplier 1, the demand for the manufacturer’s
product is affected by a loss of goodwill and quality. Also, the manufacturer has to share recall
costs. Supplier1 and the manufacturer bear the costs of the recall.Supplier 2 does not incur any
loss/cost for the items sold in the first period. However, Supplier 2 suffers due to post-crisis demand
loss. The situation is that of collateral damage caused by the fault of Supplier 1.
Table 4.1 below enlists the model parameters.
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Model Parameters Description
G(t) Goodwill of the manufacturer. G(t) ∈ [0,∞)
Q(t) Quality level of the product. Q(t) ∈ [0,∞)
A j(t) Advertising effort (monetary value, say in dollars) of the manufacturer in period j
qi j(t) Quality effort (monetary value) of supplier i in regime j
α Demand in absence of goodwill and quality. α ∈ [0,∞)
β Consumer sensitivity towards goodwill. β ∈ [0,∞)
γ Consumer sensitivity towards Quality. γ ∈ [0,∞)
δ j Goodwill decay. δ j ∈ [0,1]
r Discounting factor. r ∈ [0,1]
kg j Advertising effectiveness
ki j Consumer’s confidence or trust on the supplier i’s quality effort in period j
χ Hazard rate
ω Proportionality constant for quality conformance cost
θ Proportionality constant for external quality failure cost
µs1 Proportionality constant for quality improvement cost of Supplier S1
µs2 Proportionality constant for quality conformance cost improvement cost of Supplier S2
µm Proportionality constant for advertising cost of manufacturer M
Vi(G,Q) Value Function of player i at t = 0
M̂i, i ∈ {m,s1,s2} Unit profit margins for manufacturer(i = m) or the supplier(i = s1,s2) in the first regime
Mi, i ∈ {m,s1,s2} Unit profit margins for manufacturer(i = m) or the supplier(i = s1,s2) in the second regime
D(G(t),Q(t)) Product demand at the manufacturer’s end
Table 4.1: Model Parameters
Manufacturer’s Goodwill
At any time t during the planning horizon, goodwill is influenced by the manufacturer’s ad-
vertising efforts A j(t) and the suppliers’ quality efforts qi j(t) where i, j ∈ {1,2}. We assume that
goodwill evolves according to the modified Nerlove-Arrow dynamics (equation 4.2). (Nerlove and
Arrow 1962; Dockner et al. 2000). Ideally, the state variables G(t) and Q(t) should have the regime
index j. However, for brevity, we drop the index.
Ġ(t) = kg jA j(t)+ k1 jq1 j(t)+ k2 jq2 j(t)−δiG(t) (4.3)
Extant literature shows that the advertising effectiveness decreases after a recall crisis depending
on the initial brand goodwill (H. Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007; Yi Zhao, Ying Zhao,
and Helsen 2011). Therefore, we assume that in general, kg j, the advertising effectiveness may
be different in the two regimes. Specifically, kg1 ≥ kg2. Moreover, the consumers’ trust in quality
can reduce after the crisis (Yi Zhao, Ying Zhao, and Helsen 2011). We interpret the parameters
ki j for {i, j} ∈ {1,2} as the consumers trust or confidence in the product quality efforts of the sup-
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pliers. Therefore, a lack of confidence in the post-crisis period can be captured by the relationship
ki1 ≥ ki2. There is also a possibility that brand forgetting will increase in the post-crisis period.
This can be simulated by choosing δ1 ≥ δ2. Following the previous literature (Karray and Zaccour
2005; Dockner et al. 2000), we consider the advertising costs to be quadratic in the efforts. The
manufacturer’s advertising costs in the regime j is given by
µmA2j(t)
2
where µm is the proportion-
ality constant.
Quality of Suppliers
Quality is a multidimensional concept. In the context of our paper, we assume that the quality
efforts of each supplier are channelized to multiple directions like quality improvement, appraisal
costs, enhancing fitness for use, improving consumer utility, improving perceived quality, con-
forming to manufacturer’s quality standards and investing in external quality failure mitigation
procedures. A supplier’s continuous quality improvement efforts may prevent product failures and
thereby minimize the chances of a product recall. The quality of the manufacturer’s finished prod-
uct depends on the quality of the supplier’s parts, and a product recall can occur due to the faulty
parts provided by the supplier. The supplier i decides on the quality efforts qi j(t) at time t. Thus, in
general, as the supplier increases the efforts qi j(t), a quality level Q(t) improves. However, if there
is a high hazard rate, the quality efforts of the suppliers need to be higher to maintain the same
level of quality than when the hazard rate is low. Accordingly, we have the following equation,
which gives the evolution of quality level Q(t).
Q̇(t) = l1 jq1 j(t)e−λ χ + l2 jq2 j(t)
and χ > 0 for 0≤ t ≤ tr
χ = 0 for tr < t < ∞. (4.4)
In equation (4.4), li j are the effectiveness of the quality efforts of the suppliers. Higher the
effectiveness, higher will the product quality level be. Moreover, effectiveness of such quality
eff forts can vary before and after recall. Recall experience can lead to improved learning and a
consequent enhancement in product quality (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). If there is learning as a
consequence of a recall, li2 > li1.
λ ≥ 0 represents the unreliable supplier’s negligence of the crisis likelihood. A firm may avoid
or overlook the importance of crisis likelihood and avoid the immediate costs of quality (A. X.
Liu, Yong Liu, and Luo 2016). Alternatively, a firm can be proactive and try to enhance the quality
level by increasing efforts. The marginal quality level becomes lower if λ is higher (since χ ≥ 0).
λ = 0 signifies that the supplier 1 is most proactive and sensitive towards the hazard rate. The
multiplicative association, λ χ signifies that higher likelihood coupled with higher negligence (or
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less proactivity) results in a slower evolution of quality.
Our focus is to study the loss in quality due to the unreliable supplier 1 and the subsequent
collateral damage. Therefore, like some existing works (El Ouardighi and B. Kim 2010; G. Liu,
J. Zhang, and Tang 2015) we do not consider any natural loss of quality under the purview of
this paper. Since the quality level Q(t) of the supplier positively influences the consumer demand,
the manufacturer will have incentives to improve quality at the supplier’s end. Therefore, the
manufacturer shares a part of the supplier’s quality cost after the supplier commits quality efforts.
The unreliable supplier, S1 and the manufacturer M may jointly bear the burden of two quality costs




conformance costs given by
(1−χ)ωq211
2
where µs1 and ω are the proportionality constants of
the cost parameters. The cost of conformance is decreasing with the hazard rate. Therefore, the
supplier’s conformance cost is maximum when χ = 0 and minimum when he does not spend on
quality conformance (χ = 1).
In the post-crisis regime, there is an additional cost of a recall or the external failure cost for S1,
which may or may not be shared by the manufacturer. We hypothesize that this cost is proportional
to the drop in of the quality level, ξ . Thus this cost is given by
ξ θq212(t)
2
. Both goodwill loss
and quality loss capture the damage caused by a recall. Since we have assumed that η , the loss in
goodwill, is a function of ξ , considering the external failure cost to be a function of ξ is sufficient.
We assume only one recall over the planning horizon. This means that the post-recall confor-
mance cost of the supplier is at the maximum i.e.
ωq212(t)
2
since χ = 0.
The reliable supplier S2 and the manufacturer M bear the cost
µs2q22 j(t)
2
in the two periods and
mus2 is the proportionality constant.
The Impact of the Recall
The jumps in the state variables, goodwill and quality level, capture the impact of the recall.
Our model also considers external failure costs proportional to the drop in quality level. These
costs include costs of repair, warranty,re-manufacturing, and improving perceived quality, liability
claims and lawsuits. We capture this by considering the post-crisis profit margin of the firms to
be less than the pre-crisis profit margin. A substantial economic impact on the firm due to the
recall can raise the operational cost to the extent where profit margin will suffer. Higher the loss
of goodwill and quality level, higher the loss in profit margin. However, we have assumed that
the firms do not get bankrupt or affected to the extent that they completely withdraw all units of
the products from the market. In other words, the recall is partial. Very severe impact recalls can
cause a firm to become bankrupt. For example, Takata corporation files bankruptcy in 2017 after
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the airbags recall (Reuters 2016). Such cases are beyond the scope of our model.
When a recall occurs at a random time tr, due to quality failure, the goodwill of the manufac-
turer suffers. The jump states capture quality deficiency and goodwill loss:
G(t+r ) = (1−η)G(t−r )
Q(t+r ) = (1−ξ )Q(t−r )
t+r is the time just after the recall, and t
−
r is the time just before the recall. For tractability of our
analysis, we assume that a firm issues recall as soon as it becomes aware of quality failure and the
goodwill drop results simultaneously. These assumptions are not far from reality. As the previ-
ous literature highlights, the negative effects of a recall can spread fast (Tirunillai and Tellis 2014;
Borah and Tellis 2016), and as such any time lag between issuing a recall and drop in goodwill
or quality level may be ignored. Although the quality level might have been dropping from some
time before the recall, the issue becomes noticeable to the public only after the recall. Therefore,
the costs related to product recall occur only in the post-crisis period.
Relationship Between Goodwill Damage and Drop in Quality Level
An important question to ask is whether there is a relationship between the damage to goodwill
and the drop in in quality that has necessitated a product recall. The goodwill damage is a result of
the product recall, and the quality deterioration has lead to a product recall. When an initial brand
image is high, a drop in quality will have a smaller impact on the manufacturer’s goodwill than
in the case where initial goodwill is low (Yi Zhao, Ying Zhao, and Helsen 2011). For our study,
especially the numerical analysis, we have considered G(0)=.15 as high goodwill and G(0)=.1
as low goodwill. Hence, we propose that if G(0) = .15, i.e, the initial goodwill is high, then
η = aξ 2, a≤ 1 signifying a slower loss in goodwill damage for a specific drop in in quality level.
When G(0) = .1, i.e, the initial brand image is low η = bξ , b ≤ 1 signifying that the drop in
goodwill is higher. The conditions a≤ 1 and b≤ 1 are necessary to ensure that η ≤ 1. Moreover,
a≤ b so that the linear relation always means higher loss in goodwill for a given loss in quality. In
both cases, 0≤ {η ,ξ} ≤ 1 is satisfied and importantly, ξ = 0 =⇒ η = 0 and ξ = 1 =⇒ η = 1.
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Figure 4.3: Relationship between η and ξ
4.2.1. Cost-sharing Contracts
From the above discussion, we see that a variety of costs are associated with quality. In the con-
text of our paper, the costs borne by the different players differ in the two regimes. Moreover,
the costs depend on the type of contract. Cost-sharing in a supply chain can undergo different
contractual agreements. We propose two different cost-sharing contracts, a) Quality Improvement
Cost-sharing Contract(QICS) and b) Comprehensive Quality Cost-sharing Contract (CQCS).
4.2.1.1. Quality Improvement Cost-sharing (QICS) Contract
In this section, we discuss the different costs borne by the different players and the mechanism
of Cost-sharing. Under the QICS contract, we assume that the manufacturer shares only the cost
of quality improvement with both the suppliers. Details of the costs for the different players are
discussed below.
i) The Manufacturer M: The manufacturer bears the advertising costs and the costs of quality




Cost shared with S1 =
φ j(t)µs1q21 j(t)
2




ii) The Supplier S1: The unreliable supplier bears its share of the quality improvement costs and
the full cost of its unreliability/non- conformance in the pre-crisis regime. There is an added cost
of quality loss in the post-crisis period. This cost, interpreted as a cost of external quality failure,
is assumed to be linearly increasing with the drop in quality ξ . Besides, we assumed that a crisis
occurs only once. Therefore χ = 0 in the second regime and hence the quality conformance cost
is maximum. Thus the costs of S1 in regime j are:
Cost shared with M =
(1−φ j)µs1q21 j(t)
2
Cost of conformance =
(1−χ)ωq21 j(t)
2
Cost of external failure =
τ jξ θq21 j(t)
2
where τ j = 0 for j = 1
τ j = 1 for j = 2
χ = 0 for j = 2.
iii) The Supplier S2: The only cost of the reliable supplier is its share of quality improvement cost
in regime j.
Cost shared with M =
(1−σ j)µs2q22 j(t)
2
4.2.1.2. Comprehensive Quality Cost-sharing (CQCS) Contract
Under the CQCS contract, the manufacturer shares all the quality improvement, quality confor-
mance or quality failure costs of the unreliable supplier S1 and the quality improvement costs of
the reliable supplier S2. Hence the name - Comprehensive Quality Cost-sharing. Thus the mem-
bers of the supply chain bear the different costs in the following manner.
i) The Manufacturer M: The manufacturer bears the advertising costs and the costs of quality
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Cost shared with S1 =
φ j(t)
(




where τ j = 0 for j = 1
τ j = 1 for j = 2
χ = 0 for j = 2
Cost shared with S2 =
σ j(t)µs2q22 j(t)
2
ii) The Supplier S1: The unreliable supplier bears its share (1− φ) of all the costs of quality -
improvement, conformance and failure costs. Thus the costs of S1 in regime j are:
Cost shared with M =
(1−φ j(t))
(




where τ j = 0 for j = 1
τ j = 1 for j = 2
χ = 0 for j = 2
iii) The Supplier S2: The only cost of the reliable supplier is its own share of quality improvement
cost in regime j.
Cost shared with M = (1−σ j)µs2q22 j(t)/2
Apparently in both the contracts the reliable supplier S2’s costs remain the same. However, the
costs of quality are differently shared for S1 and M in the two contracts.
4.2.2. The Manufacturer’s and supplier’s decision problems
The manufacturer and the suppliers individually try to maximize their individual profits. We first
show how, in general, the long term expected profit can be calculated for any firm. The same
method can be used to calculate the profit of the manufacturer and the two suppliers.
If the product recall occurs at a random time tr there will be two decision regimes - the pre-
crisis regime, [0, tr] and the post-crisis regime, (tr,∞). The profits for any firm i ∈M,S1,S2, in the
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where Di j is the demand of firm i in period j, mi j is the profit margin of firm i in period j and Ci j
is the cost incurred by firm i in period j. Since, tr, the time of recall, is a random time which is not
known in advance, the profits in the two periods are random variables. So the long-term expected
profit is given by, Πi = E[πi1 + e−rtrπi2] where the expectation E[.] is taken with respect to the
crisis occurrence process. The discount factor e−rtr appears because πi1 accrues at t = 0 and πi2 at
t = tr. Thus, it is required to discount πi2 back to t = 0 to add the two long-term profits.
Let (τ1 j,τ2 j, ...,τk j) be the generic set of k strategies for the firm i in the regime j ∈ {1,2}. Then
the value of the long-term profit will depend on the strategies (τ11,τ21, ...,τk1) and (τ12,τ22, ...,τk2).
The problem above is a random stopping problem. If f (t) and F(t) are the probability density and
cumulative density functions of the stochastic occurrence process, then the hazard rate is h(t) =
χ,F(t) = 1− e−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds. Therefore, f (t) = χe−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds. The long-term expected profit for the
manufacturer i can be written as:




where the first term under the expectation gives the profit of the pre-crisis period and the second
term gives the profit of the post-crisis regime. Therefore, the sum of the two profits gives the
long-term profit over the planning horizon. Integrating by parts and making algebraic manipula-
tions (Haurie and Moresino 2006; Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011) the above expression can be
transformed into the following equation (see appendix C):





In our case the strategies Si j refer to the quality efforts in case of the suppliers and to the advertising
effort and quality cost-sharing proportion for the manufacturer.
The decision problems of the players will vary depending on which contract we are considering.
We present the decision problems under the two contracts.
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4.2.2.1. Decision Problems Under Quality Improvement Cost-sharing (QICS) Contract
The discussion in the above section implies that we need to define the decision problems of the
manufacturer and the suppliers in the two regimes, pre-crisis and post-crisis. Thereafter, we can
solve the second regime’s problem first, followed the first regime’s problem. Accordingly, we
denote the second regime’s value functions of the supplier 1, supplier 2 and the manufacturer by
Vs1(G(t),Q(t)), Vs2(G(t),Q(t)) and Vm(G(t),Q(t)) respectively. The first regime’s value functions
are denoted by V̂s1(G(t),Q(t)), V̂s2(G(t),Q(t)) and V̂m(G(t),Q(t)).
The second regime’s decision problems of the suppliers and the manufacturer under this QICS









































Ġ(t) = kg2A2(t)+ k12q12(t)+ k22q22(t)−δ2G(t)
Q̇(t) = l12q12(t)+ l22q22(t) (4.9)
and with initial conditions
G(t+r ) = (1−η)G(t−r )
Q(t+r ) = (1−ξ )Q(t−r ) (4.10)
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Ġ(t) = kg1A1(t)+ k11q11(t)+ k21q21(t)−δ1G(t)
Q̇(t) = l11q11(t)e−λ χ + l21q21(t)
and with initial conditions
G(0) = G0 ≥ 0
Q(0) = Q0 ≥ 0 (4.12)
101
4.2.2.2. Decision Problems Under Comprehensive Quality Cost-sharing (CQCS) Contract
The second regime’s decision problems of the suppliers and the manufacturer under this CQCS













































Ġ(t) = kg2A2(t)+ k12q12(t)+ k22q22(t)−δ2G(t)
Q̇(t) = l12q12(t)+ l22q22(t) (4.14)
and with initial conditions
G(t+r ) = (1−η)G(t−r )
Q(t+r ) = (1−ξ )Q(t−r ) (4.15)
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Ġ(t) = kg1A1(t)+ k11q11(t)+ k21q21(t)−δ1G(t) (4.17)
Q̇(t) = l11q11(t)e−λ χ + l21q21(t)
G(0) = G0 ≥ 0
Q(0) = Q0 ≥ 0 (4.18)
Our model includes a number of parameters. For the convenience of the reader, a summary of
all the model assumptions are given below.
Assumption 1: The three players, two suppliers and a manufacturer know the consumer demand
at the manufacturer’s end. The demand is sensitive to goodwill and quality level of the product.
Assumption 2: S1 is unreliable, i.e prone to recall with a hazard rate of χ whereas the S2 and M
are reliable and free from recall risk. The hazard rate is common knowledge.
Assumption 3: The players continue to exist in the market after the recall, implying that the recall
is partial.
Assumption 4: The evolution of quality level is decreasing with the hazard rate of S1 in the first
period. Crisis can occur only once in the planning horizon because S1(or S1 and M) ensure hazard
free quality at an extra cost in the post crisis period.
Assumption 5: The profit margins of S1 and M are lower in the second period when a recall of
medium or high impact occurs. This assumption is supported by the fact that S1 and M may have
to involve in recall management efforts and costs like reverse logistics, insurance claims, compen-
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sating the supplier S2 suffering from collateral damage etc..However, when the recall impact is
low (about 5% loss of goodwill), we assume that no change in post-crisis profit margin occurs).
Assumptions About the Variations in Model Parameters:
• kg1≥ kg2 because advertising effectiveness may reduce after a recall (H. Van Heerde, Helsen,
and Dekimpe 2007).
• k11 ≥ k12 as the faulty supplier’s quality efforts may lose credibility after the recall and the
sensitivity of the goodwill evolution towards the efforts may reduce.
• δ1 ≥ δ2 as natural brand absorption may increase after the recall.
• l11 ≤ l12 because previous recall experience can lead to improved learning and a consequent
enhancement in product quality (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). This parameter indicates that
due to a potential learning improvement, the evolution of product quality can raise with the
quality efforts of supplier 1.
• For supplier 2, k21 = k22 and l12 = l22 and M̂s2 = Ms2.
• As recall may reduce profit margin for supplier 1 and the manufacturer, M̂s1 ≥ Ms1 and
M̂m ≥Mm.
4.3. Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we provide an analysis of the equilibrium decisions of the different players and
the impact of the important system parameters on the decisions. We want to investigate the feed-
back strategies for the firms. Therefore, as a standard solution procedure we start by writing the
Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equations (Dockner et al. 2000). Subsequently, the first order
conditions on the decision variables will help us in finding the equilibrium strategies from the HJB
equations. We note that the value functions V̂s1,V̂s2,V̂m,Vs1,Vs2 and Vm are individually concave in
A j,qi j,φ j and σ j. The HJB equations for the manufacturer and the suppliers will vary depending
on the contract as the cost-sharing mechanisms in the two different contracts vary. To save space
and avoid repetition we illustrate the generalized HJB by denoting the costs of the Manufacturer
and the suppliers by CM,Cs1 and Cs2. It is understood that when QICS contract is being considered,
the costs will assume values given in the section 4.2.1.1 and when CQCS contract is considered,
the costs will assume values from discussions in section 4.2.1.2. Thus, from equation (4.8) (for
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QICS) or equation (4.13) (for CQCS), the HJB equations for the second regime are given by:
rVM(G,Q) = Max
A2,φ2,σ2


























Similarly, from equations (4.11) (for QICS) and (4.16) (for CQCS) the first period HJB equations
of the players are given by:
(r+χ)V̂M(G,Q) = Max
A1,φ1,σ1





























In this section we present the results for the two cost-sharing contracts and the benchmark case
of no cost-sharing amongst the manufacturer and the suppliers. The value functions are linear in the
state variables (see Proposition 6). The value functions are of the form V̂i(G(t),Q(t)) = X̂iG(t)+
ŶiQ(t)+ Ẑi where i ∈ {M,s1,s2}. For clarity and ready reference we present the expressions of the
coefficients in Table 4.2. The value functions are given in propositions 9.
Coefficient of G(t) Coefficient of Q(t)




































Table 4.2: Value Function Coefficients for Pre-crisis Regime
We solve the HJB equations for the manufacturer and the suppliers 1 and 2 and get some
insightful analytical results which underscore the relationships amongst the model parameters and
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the equilibrium decisions of the different players.
4.3.1. Quality decisions of the suppliers
We investigate the suppliers’ quality decisions under the two cost-sharing contracts and also in the
no cost-sharing scenario. The benchmark case is that of the no cost-sharing (NCS).
Proposition 1. Under both the QICS and CQCS contracts, the equilibrium quality effort levels for














(2Mm +Ms1)(k12rβ + l12γ(r+δ2))
2r(r+δ2)(µs1 +θξ +ω)
.
Proposition 1 has an interesting revelation. The equilibrium quality efforts of the supplier 1
remain same irrespective of the contract chosen. However, the supplier’s quality efforts differ in





k11X̂s1 + l11Ŷs1e−λ χ
µs1(1−φ QICS∗1 )+ω(1−χ)
,




k11X̂s1 + l11Ŷs1e−λ χ
(1−φCQCS∗1 )(µs1 +(1−χ)ω)
.
The above finding underscores the first mover or leadership advantage of the manufacturer.
The manufacturer adjusts its cost-sharing decision based on the committed quality efforts (reac-
tion function) of the suppliers. Hence the cost-sharing decisions vary depending on the contract.
Intuitively. the manufacturer shares a lesser proportion of cost in the comprehensive quality cost
sharing contract.
Lemma 1. (a) In both the pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes, the equilibrium quality efforts of
supplier 1 increase with β , the consumer’s sensitivity towards goodwill and γ , the consumer’s
sensitivity towards quality level.
(b) The quality effort of supplier 1 in the pre-crisis regime is decreasing with the goodwill damage
η and quality loss ξ .
(c) The quality effort of supplier 1 in both the regimes are increasing with the unit profit margins
of both the supplier and the manufacturer.
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Proof: (a) The proof of the above lemma follows from the sign of the first derivative of q∗12(t) with




























The proofs of parts (b) and (c) are trivial and similarly follow from the sign of the first derivative
of the quality decisions with respect to the parameters in question.
The profits of the suppliers as well as the manufacturer increase with the demand. In both the
regimes, pre-crisis and post-crisis, the consumer demand is increasing linearly with goodwill and
quality level as well the consumer sensitivity towards these factors. Therefore, the best interest of
the supplier 1 is to put more efforts on the quality level if consumer sensitivity towards Goodwill
and quality level are high.
Quality Fade Effect: Quality fade refers to the action of reducing product quality to reduce cost
and make more profit (Midler 2007). In the pre-crisis regime, the decrease in quality effort with in-
creasing anticipated loss of Goodwill or quality can be attributed towards the "quality fade" effect.
This act of cost reduction need not always be intentional but can also have unintended sources like
complacency, lack of proper standardization of quality etc. (Whipple and Roh 2010). Apart from
the quality fade possibility, we believe that when the supplier 1 anticipates a recall with a certain
impact,it might reduce quality cost so that the post-crisis costs related to quality or other external
failure costs can be paid off. A higher profit margin will allow the supplier 1 to have more budget
to invest in quality and thereby improve profitability, competitive advantage etc. Moreover, the
manufacturer’s high margin would imply that the manufacturer can share a higher proportion of
the quality costs. Therefore, the quality efforts of the supplier 1 are increasing with the manufac-
turer’s profit margin as well.
Quality Decision and Crisis Likelihood: Apart from the above implications of the system pa-
rameters and quality decisions of supplier 1, another important topic for discussion is the influence
of crisis likelihood on the suppliers’ quality decisions. In the absence of crisis (i.e. χ = 0,ξ =
0, l11 = l12,k11 = k12), we have q∗11(t) = q
∗
12(t) as it should be. When there is a positive likeli-
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hood of a crisis, we search for the condition when the pre-crisis quality decision off the supplier
1 increase with the likelihood of a crisis. Analytically, the derivative of q11(t) with respect to χ
is complex polynomial in χ and the first-order condition doesn’t provide us with any fruitful in-
sights. Therefore, we investigate this effect of χ on the quality level using numerical experiments
in section 4.4.
Proposition 2. Under both QICS and CQCS contracts, the equilibrium quality effort levels for




























(2Mm +Ms2)(k22rβ + l22γ(r+δ2))
2r(r+δ2)µs2
.
Lemma 2. (a) In both the pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes, the equilibrium quality efforts of
the reliable supplier increase with β , the consumer’s sensitivity towards goodwill and γ , the con-
sumer’s sensitivity towards quality level.
(b) The quality effort of supplier 2 in the pre-crisis regime is decreasing in the goodwill damage η
and quality loss ξ .
(c) The quality effort of supplier 2 in both the regimes are increasing in the unit profit margins of
both supplier 2 and the manufacturer.
The proof of Lemma 2 is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. The equilibrium quality efforts of
the reliable and the unreliable supplier are structurally similar with respect to the model parameters
but are not identical. However, we find that the model parameters have same effect effect on the
two suppliers quality efforts in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. However, in general we have
assumed that the post-crisis margin of supplier 2 will be higher than the post-crisis margin of the
supplier 1 even if the suppliers are similar. This is because the supplier 2 will not bear any recall
costs and is only affected by the loss of sales due to recall. Therefore, the post-crisis quality levels
of the two suppliers are definitely not equal. From equations (4.21) and (4.22), the pre-crisis quality
expressions for both the suppliers are different and hence the efforts are different.
We consider the case of identical suppliers for whom Ms2 = Ms1,µs1 = µs2 and k1 = k2. The
following Lemma holds for identical suppliers. For similar suppliers we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For two identical suppliers, quality effort of the reliable supplier, is always higher than
that of the unreliable supplier in the second regime.
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This might be surprising at a first observation. However, the supplier 1 has to account for the
external failure costs of quality as well as full conformance costs. This can make the quality effort
level of supplier 1 less than that of the supplier 2.
No Cost-Sharing: A no coast sharing scenario is a benchmark scenario against which any con-
tract’s usefulness can be evaluated. In other words, if a contracting agreement results in more
profit than a no cost-sharing scenario, then contracting is indeed desirable. Therefore, we present
the equilibrium quality decisions of the suppliers under no cost sharing. The decision of the man-
ufacturer are the advertising efforts. The advertising decisions are not affected by the quality
cost-sharing. Hence, the manufacturer’s equilibrium advertising efforts are same when there is no
cost-sharing or when a contract is adopted.
Proposition 3. Under no cost-sharing, the equilibrium quality effort levels for the unreliable sup-























As compared to the QICS and CQCS cost-sharing quality efforts, the quality efforts of the
suppliers under no cost-sharing is not affected by the manufacturers unit profit margin. In section
(4.3.2) we show that for cost-sharing to be possible in our model, a condition is 2Mm > Ms1.
An important question is where cost-sharing is an option, can no-cost sharing ever lead to higher
supplier product quality? We answer this question in section (4.3.2).
4.3.2. Manufacturer’s cost-sharing and advertising decisions
We consider a dynamic game, but the linear quadratic structure of the game enables us to find
decisions which are stationary in the pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes. This means the contract
need not be changed very often. Frequent negotiations of a contract is indeed undesirable. In our
case, the contracts are revised only at the beginning of the planning horizon and when a product is
recalled. This assures the sub-game perfectness of the contracts in all sub-games in regime 1 and
regime 2. We have incorporated the effect of quality efforts in the firm’s goodwill.
Proposition 4. Under the Quality Improvement Cost-sharing (QICS) contract, the manufacturer’s
equilibrium pre-crisis share φ1(t) and post-crisis share φ2(t) of the quality improvement cost of the
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For equations (4.24) to be meaningful, we must have 0 ≤ φ∗i (t) ≤ 1. Using this constraint on
φ∗2 (t), we get the upper and lower bounds of Mm given by
Ms1






equilibrium decision of the manufacturer is to share no cost of quality if Ms12 = Mm. On the other




























ζ < 1. Thus we note that when there is a recall certainty, i.e. χ = 1, the upper bound of 1 for φ1(t)




=⇒ ω < µs1(1−ζ )
(1−χ)ζ
.
We recall that ω and µs1 are the proportionality constants for quality conformance cost and quality
improvement cost. The above condition gives us a necessary relationship between conformance
costs and quality improvement costs for the Quality improvement cost-sharing contract to be mean-
ingful.
The above analysis shows that the unreliable supplier has a motivation to reduce its unit profit
margins in both the regimes in order to force the manufacturer to share the cost of quality. By
reducing profit margin the supplier can ensure that Ms12 ≤Mm. In the pre-crisis regime, the supplier
cannot make the manufacturer share the full cost of quality until and unless Ms1 = M̂s1 = 0 and
χ = 1. Noting the expressions of X̂s1 and Ŷs1 from Table 4.2, we can conclude that the upper
bound 1 of cost-sharing is attained only if Ms1 = M̂s1 = 0. In the context of our study maintaining
no profit margin might be irrational for the supplier. However, we believe that this scenario is
explainable from a strategic point of view. The supplier knows that it is a risky supplier and might
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want to maintain future contracts with the manufacturer in the case a recall occurs. Therefore, at
the beginning of the planning horizon S1 is motivated to reduce its margin to 0 (offer a minimal
price) and thereby allow the manufacturer enough affordability to sponsor the full cost of quality
and repeat the cost-sharing contractual agreement in the second period provided the supplier bears
the external failure costs. Pricing decisions are out of the scope of this study but the relationships
between the supplier’s and manufacturer’s profit margins emphasizes the importance of pricing
decisions.
Proposition 5. Under the Comprehensive Quality Cost-sharing (CQCS) contract, the manufac-
turer’s equilibrium pre-crisis share φ1(t) and post-crisis share φ2(t) of the quality improvement




























Since all the model parameters are positive and from the Table 4.2, X̂m, X̂s1,Ŷm and Ŷs1 are
positive, the inequality φ∗1 (t)≤ 1 always holds true.
Lemma 4. (i) The manufacturer’s share of the quality cost to be shared with the unreliable sup-
plier, is increasing with the quality drop ξ in the second period.
(ii)In the pre-crisis regime, the manufacturer prefers to a share a higher proportion of quality
improvement costs than the comprehensive quality costs with the unreliable supplier.
Proof:(i) The first order condition of φ∗2 (t), with respect to ξ gives,
∂φ∗2
∂ξ
= θ(2Mm−Ms1)(2Mm+Ms1)µs1 . Clearly,
the manufacturer’s equilibrium quality cost shared with the unreliable supplier is increasing with
the drop in quality, ξ if (2Mm−Ms1)> 0. But for the share φ2(t) to be positive we have to impose
the condition (2Mm−Ms1)> 0.












2 (t) = φ
CQCS∗
2 (t)
(µs1 +ω +θξ )
µs1
.




Similarly, (µs1 +ω +θξ )≥ µs1, ensures that φ QICS∗2 (t)≥ φ
CQCS∗
2 (t).
Under the QICS contract, the manufacturer has to share only the quality improvement costs and
hence can afford to share a higher proportion of the quality improvement costs.
Lemma 5. Whenever cost-sharing is possible, no cost-sharing leads to lower post-crisis supplier
quality.
The comparison of qi2 from equations (4.21), (4.22) and (4.23) shows that quality effort of any
supplier is more during no cost-sharing only if 2Mm < Ms1 or 2Mm < Ms1 , i.e. when cost-sharing
is not possible. Thus, whenever cost-sharing is possible, a supplier’s post-crisis quality is always
better under quality cost-sharing contract.
Supplier’s negligence: An unreliable supplier may neglect crisis likelihood for several reasons
- ignorance, incompetency or avoiding immediate possible costs. Most powerful manufacturers
scrutinize their suppliers’ performance. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the manufacturer
will become aware of such negligence. Consequently, the manufacturer may reduce the share of
quality costs. This is evident from the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Supplier’s negligence of crisis likelihood lowers the manufacturer’s pre-crisis cost-
sharing proportions.























































< 0. The coefficients of the value functions, i.e X̂i and Ŷi for i∈
{s1,m} are free of λ . Therefore, we do not reduce to the above expressions of φi any further. We










Hence, unreliable supplier’s negligence of crisis likelihood lowers the manufacturer’s pre-crisis
cost-sharing proportions.
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The above result is intuitive. Since the supplier’s negligence negatively affects the quality level
and in turn the manufacturer’s demand, a manufacturer who expects quality level commitments
from a supplier would negotiate a contract where it would share lesser proportion of the quality
costs.
Proposition 7. Under both the QICS and CQCS contracts, the manufacturer’s pre-crisis and


























The type of the contract does not change the manufacturer’s share of the reliable supplier’s
costs. This is obvious as the cost-sharing mechanism varies depending on how the manufacturer
shares the cost with the reliable supplier. But, the cost-sharing decisions of the manufacturer can
change the profit of the reliable supplier depending upon the contract.
4.3.3. Manufacturer’s Advertising Decisions









Like the quality and cost-sharing decisions, the above equilibrium advertising decisions are
influenced by the parameters χ and η . Clearly, if χ = 0, the advertising efforts of the two periods
coincide. We discuss some important properties of the advertising in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. (i) The pre-crisis advertising is always decreasing with the damage rate η .
(ii) The pre-crisis advertising is decreasing with the crisis likelihood, χ if, η > 1− M̂m(r+δ2)
Mm(r+δ1)
.






< 0 since all the parameters in the fraction are positive.
For part (ii), proceeding similarly and simplifying the first order conditions of A∗1(t) with respect
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The above expression is negative if M̂m(r + δ2)−Mm(r + δ1)(1−η) > 0. Simplification gives,
η > 1− M̂m(r+δ2)
Mm(r+δ1)
.
The finding, advertising of the manufacturer is decreasing in the damage rate η , is consistent
with the previous literature (Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011; Mukherjee and Chauhan 2019). In
our model, demand is directly affected by goodwill and goodwill is positively affected by advertis-
ing. Therefore, by a transitive relation, a higher advertising investment results in high demand. By
reducing the pre-crisis advertising, the management of the recalling firm can serve a dual purpose -
plan to invest more in advertising in the post-crisis period thereby reducing the effect on goodwill
damage and invest more in supplier quality which is also an integral part of our investigation.
Our model considers goodwill advertising. The manufacturer’s advertising is decreasing with
the crisis likelihood if the ratio of the margin of the first period to that of the second period is higher
than 1−η . If the two-period margins are equal or M̂m > Mm, the advertising is always decreasing
in the crisis likelihood because 1−η ≤ 0. Thus the only instance when the advertising can be
increasing in the likelihood of crisis is when the post-crisis regime’s unit profit margin is higher
than the first regime’s unit profit margin.
4.3.4. Equilibrium Profits of the Suppliers and the Manufacturer
In this section, we analyze the long term expected profit of the suppliers and the manufacturer.
The value function at time t gives the expected profit at time t. Therefore, we need to find the
expression of the value function and evaluate it at t = 0 to find the long term expected profit.
Under both the QICS and CQCS contracts, the value functions of the firms have the same co-
efficients for the state variables goodwill G(t) and quality level Q(t). However, depending on the
contract we choose, the constant term in the value functions will vary. We summarize the findings
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 9. The long term expected profit of the player i is given by the value function:
114

















i (for the QICS contract) = ∆
CQCS
i (for the CQCS contract),
where M̂i is the player, i’s pre-crisis unit profit margin and Mi is the player i’s post-crisis unit profit
margin. ∆i is the constant term of the value function, and its expression is given in the appendix.
i ∈ {M,S1,S2}, where S1 is supplier 1, S2 is supplier 2 and M is manufacturer.
The coefficients of goodwill and quality level are positive. Since the goodwill and quality levels
are also positive, the coefficients have a positive impact on the firms’ profit. Clearly, the unit profit
margins of the firms also have positive impact on the profit. However, the recall impact dampens
profits. The presence of the crisis likelihood in each of the coefficients has two opposing effects.
It appears in the numerator,thereby increasing the profit and again appears in the denominator,
thereby decreasing the profit. In fact, χ also appears in ∆i. Thus it is hard to analytically infer the
effect of χ . The constant term ∆i has a very complex structure and is evaluated numerically later
on.
4.4. Numerical Experiments
In this section, we complement our analytical results by numerical experiments. Considering the
large parametric space that we have, the numerical analysis allows us to investigate the effect of a
product recall on the firm decisions and profits and find out which contract is more efficient and
when. Due to the complex mathematical interrelationship of the decision variables and the profit
functions, especially with the crisis likelihood variable χ , it is infeasible to analytically get some
insights about the effect of χ on the decision variables and the firm profit. We investigate this
numerically.
A firm’s initial goodwill and the intensity or likelihood of a recall can affect its decisions,
and its long term expected profit. The previous literature supports this fact (Rubel, Naik, and
Srinivasan 2011; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008; Gao et al. 2015). Figure 4.4, underpinned
to the above findings in the literature, shows a hierarchical structure of the different scenarios that
we have considered for analysis under the two cost-sharing contracts in questions. Besides, we also
considered the benchmark case of "no cost-sharingg" and compare the profits with the cost-sharing
cases.
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A high initial goodwill scenario is represented by G(0) = .15 and Q(0) = .1 is characterized as
high goodwill and a low initial goodwill scenario is characterized by G(0) = .1 and Q(0) = .1.
Figure 4.4: Possible Cases
The parameters of the numerical analysis which remain unchanged in the two regimes are:
α = 1;β = .5;γ = .03;δ = .06;r = .06; l = 1;λ = 1;
M̂m = 1;M̂s1 = .7;M̂s2 = .7;
µs1 = 100; µm = 100;θ = 150; µs2 = 100;ω = 10
kg1 = k11 = k21 = l11 = l21 = k22 = 1;
The literature shows that typically external failure costs are much higher than the conformance
costs and quality improvement costs. To mimic this we assume ω < µs1 = µs2 = µm < θ . The
parameters which may change depending on the impact of the recall are:
kg2,k12, l12,Mm,Ms1,Ms2.
For a low impact recall, when η = .05,
kg2 = k12 = k22 = l12 = l22 = 1;Mm = 1;Ms1 = Ms2 = .7.
For a high impact recall, when η = .7,
kg2 = k12 = k12 = .5; l12 = 1.2;Mm = .5;Ms1 = .35;Ms2 = .7.
4.4.1. Quality Decisions
The following figures 5, 6 depict the variation of quality efforts of the two suppliers with the crisis
likelihood χ . Here qi j[Low] means the quality effort of supplier i in regime j when impact of the
recall is low i.e ξ = .05 and qi j[High] denotes quality efforts when the recall impact is high ξ = .7.
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(a) Supplier 1’s quality decisions (b) Supplier 2’s quality decisions
Figure 4.5: Quality Decisions in pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes under QICS Contract
(a) Supplier 1’s quality decisions (b) Supplier 2’s quality decisions
Figure 4.6: Quality decisions in pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes under CQCS Contract
Claim 1:Under both QICS and CQCS contracts,
a)In the pre-crisis regime, quality efforts of both the suppliers decrease as crisis likelihood in-
creases,
b)the post-crisis quality efforts of the suppliers are higher than pre-crisis quality efforts for high
crisis likelihood.
At first glance, the result may seem surprising. Ideally, suppliers should invest more in quality
if there is a considerable risk of crisis. However, a high likelihood of crisis means that there is a
high chance of incurring external failure costs and high conformance costs in the post-crisis period.
Therefore, we believe that the suppliers reduce pre-crisis quality efforts with a high likelihood to
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be able to bear the additional post-crisis costs. The post-crisis quality efforts do not depend on the
likelihood of recall (Figures 4.5, a, b; Figures 4.6, a, b).
For the computational analysis, we have considered the suppliers to be symmetric, i.e. they
have identical parameter values). We note that the supplier 2 typically puts in more quality efforts
than the unreliable supplier. This finding is consistent with our assumption that the supplier 1 is
risky. In other words, the unreliable supplier, by putting in little efforts, pose a risk of recall to the
entire supply chain, thereby causing collateral damage.
The collateral damage (profit loss) for the reliable supplier during the low impact recall is
negligible compared to high impact recall. Consequently, a low impact recall does not motivate
the reliable supplier to invest significantly higher in the post-crisis quality efforts. The post-crisis
quality effort of the reliable supplier is always higher than pre-crisis efforts for a high-impact high-
likelihood recall. The higher effort helps in mitigating the losses related to both goodwill and
quality.
Claim 2: Supplier’s pre-crisis quality efforts increase with the manufacturer’s share of costs.
From section 4.3.1, we recall that the quality effort of unreliable supplier can be presented as
a function of the manufacturer’s share of cost share φ1(t). This functional form varies from the










k11X̂s1 + l11Ŷs1e−λ χ
(1−φ∗1 )(µs1 +(1−χ)ω)
.
We examine the variations of the supplier’s quality efforts when crisis likelihood χ and the man-
ufacturer’s share of cost, φ1(t) jointly vary in pre-crisis period. We ask if higher cost-sharing can
lead to higher quality efforts. Assuming a recall of benchmark impact, ξ = .3, we find that the
pre-crisis quality efforts of Supplier 1 indeed increase with the manufacturer’s cost-sharing pro-
portion (Figure 4.7). Thus the manufacturer’s cost-sharing intentions even with a risky supplier is
justifiable.
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Figure 4.7: Supplier 1- Quality Effort variance with χ and φ1(t)
Figure 4.8: Supplier 2- Quality Effort variance with χ and σ1(t)
The reliable supplier also increases the optimal pre-crisis quality efforts when share of the
manufacturer’s cost is high. Since the reliable supplier fully conforms and does not have any other
quality costs, its efforts for quality are typically higher than the unreliable supplier for a given
share of the manufacturer’s.
4.4.2. Cost-sharing Decisions
In this section, we present an analysis of the equilibrium cost-sharing decisions of the manu-
facturer. Cost-sharing decisions depend on multiple parameters. We examine how the decision
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changes with crisis likelihood χ , the damage intensities η and ξ and the level of initial goodwill
G(0). In our study, a high initial goodwill (G(0) = 0.15) would mean η = ξ 2 and a low initial
goodwill (G(0) = 0.10) would mean η = ξ .
Figures 5,6,7 and 8 show the variation of the equilibrium cost-sharing decisions of the manu-
facturer with the crisis likelihood χ under the two contracts. Since our model assumes only one
recall during the planning horizon, the second-period cost-sharing decisions of the manufacturer
do not depend on the crisis likelihood but change with the crisis intensity and initial goodwill of
the firms. The pre-crisis decisions, however, vary with χ . For a convenient interpretation of the
figures below, we reiterate the following:
φ1 = Manufacturer’s pre-crisis cost-sharing proportion with S1
φ2 = Manufacturer’s post-crisis cost-sharing proportion with S1
σ1 = Manufacturer’s pre-crisis cost-sharing with S2
σ2 = Manufacturer’s post-crisis cost-sharing with S2
In the figures below φ and σ are the equilibrium proportions.
QICS Cost Sharing
(a) High Initial Goodwill (b) Low Initial Goodwill
Figure 4.9: Variation of cost-sharing proportions with χ under QICS Contract -low impact recall
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(a) High Initial Goodwill (b) Low Initial Goodwill
Figure 4.10: Variation of cost-sharing proportions with χ under QICS Contract - high impact recall
Claim 3:Under QICS contract for both low impact and high impact recall scenarios,
i) the manufacturer’s post-crisis cost-sharing proportion with the risky supplier 1 is higher than
the pre-crisis proportion,
ii) the manufacturer’s post-crisis cost-sharing proportion with the reliable supplier 2 is lower than
the pre-crisis proportion.
The above claim comports with the inference that the manufacturer balances its optimal cost-
sharing efforts with the two suppliers. To nullify the adverse effects of recall and increased cost-
sharing with supplier 1, the manufacturer reduces the optimal cost-sharing proportion of supplier
2, who is already a reliable supplier. Moreover, since supplier quality will affect the goodwill
(recall that Ġ(t) = kg ja(t)+ k1 jq1 j(t)+ k2q2 j(t)− δ jG(t)), the manufacturer, to whom brand im-
age is a primary source of competitive advantage, engages in aggressive post-recall cost-sharing.
Moreover, the intensity of the impact of recall plays a vital role in determining the equilibrium
cost-sharing decision. Clearly, during a high impact recall, a manufacturer with high initial good-
will shares more than 80 % of the post-crisis quality improvement costs and during the low impact
recall the proportion is around 58%. When the level of initial goodwill is low, the high impact
recall can induce more efforts in post-crisis cost-sharing from the manufacturer.
Claim 4:The manufacturer takes judicial quality cost-sharing decisions to control collateral dam-
age caused by the supplier 1.
A noticeable feature of the manufacturer behaviour is its intention of quality improvement
when crisis impact and likelihood are low. On such occasions, the manufacturer decides to increase
its share of quality costs. However, after a certain threshold of χ , the share drops signifying the
manufacturer is now expecting an impending recall. Consequently, the manufacture is provisioning
financial resources to manage the post-crisis costs of potential future contingencies (Figures 4.9, a,
b). When the impact of the recall is high, the manufacturer shows a more lenient behaviour towards
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the risky supplier. The change in the manufacturer’s share of cost is not very prominent as the
crisis likelihood increases. This is consistent with the explanation that a high impact recall might
generate considerable post-crisis cost. So the manufacturer makes an effort to avoid the recall at a
higher cost and uplift the supplier’s quality by increasing its share of cost in the pre-crisis period.
The above behavioural decisions of the manufacturer are poised to manage the collateral damage
caused by the risky supplier’s products in case a recall is issued (Figures 4.10, a, b).
Irrespective of the impact, low or high, the manufacturer’s share of cost with the reliable sup-
plier 2 increases with the crisis likelihood. This is again a strategic decision because the manufac-
turer realizes that the post-crisis optimal decision will reduce the share of the reliable supplier’s
cost. The pre-crisis share σ1, therefore, increases with χ to make sure that the pre-crisis quality
efforts of supplier 2 are high enough to increase both quality level and goodwill. High pre-crisis
goodwill and quality act as a buffer to nullify the effects of the product recall and higher pre-crisis
quality efforts might guarantee post-crisis reliability and consumer confidence (Cleeren, H. J. Van
Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and M. Eilert 2013; H. Van Heerde, Helsen,
and Dekimpe 2007; Yi Zhao, Ying Zhao, and Helsen 2011).
CQCS Cost Sharing
(a) High Initial Goodwill (b) Low Initial Goodwill
Figure 4.11: Variation of the cost-sharing proportions with χ under CQCS Contract with low
impact recall
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(a) High Initial Goodwill (b) Low Initial Goodwill
Figure 4.12: Variation of the cost-sharing proportions with χ under CQCS Contract with high
impact recall
Claim 5:Under CCS contract,
i) the manufacturer’s post-crisis cost-sharing proportions with both the suppliers are always lesser
than the pre-crisis proportions, i.e., φ2(·)< φ1(·) and σ2(·)< σ1(·);
ii) for a low impact recall with no unit margin loss for the manufacturer and supplier 1, post-
crisis shares of the manufacturer with the both suppliers are the same, i.e., σ2(t) = φ2(t) (since we
assumed symmetric suppliers with Ms1 = Ms2);
iii) for a high impact recall, the manufacturer’s post-crisis cost-sharing proportion, σ2(t) with the
reliable supplier 2, is lower than the post-crisis cost-sharing φ2(t) with supplier 1, i.e., σ2(t) <
φ2(t).
Under CQCS contract, the manufacturer bears more costs in both the regimes. We notice that










If Ms1 = Ms2, clearly proportions are equal. Hence under the low impact recall with no margin
loss, the two shares coincide in Figure 4.10. Again, both the proportions are decreasing with Ms1
or Ms2. Since a high impact recalls implies, Ms1 ≤Ms2, hence φ2(t) ≥ σ2(t). The manufacturer’s
pre-crisis cost-sharing behaviour remains similar to the case of QICS contract, but the proportions
of the cost-shared with the suppliers are slightly lower than the QICS contract. The manufacturer
has a higher burden of costs of share. Hence the proportion decreases slightly in the pre-crisis
period. Moreover, the manufacturer bears a proportion of the recall costs in the post-crisis regime.
Hence, the manufacturer adopts a more cautious approach of sharing a lesser proportion of the
costs in the pre-crisis regime.
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4.4.3. Advertising
As the previous literature suggests, the pre-crisis and post-crisis advertising decisions vary, and
typically post-crisis ad spending increases (Gao et al. 2015; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008;
Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011). We find that advertising decisions depend on crisis likelihood
and impact. The following Figure 4.11 demonstrates the variations in advertisement efforts in the
two regimes when recall likelihood and impact vary. We find that for a low impact recall, post-
crisis advertising is higher than the pre-crisis advertising efforts (Figure 4.12, a). On the other
hand, as crisis impact increases, the choice of advertising efforts depends on the crisis likelihood.
For example, when ξ = .3, the likelihood of χ = .3 would mean pre-crisis advertising is higher
than the post-crisis advertising (Figure 4.12, b). Whereas, when recall impact is very high, ξ = .7,
a likelihood of χ = .6 means a higher pre-crisis ad will yield better profits. Whereas, if χ = .9, then
post-crisis advertising is higher than pre-crisis advertising (Figure 4.12, c). The decision dilemma
of choosing an appropriate advertising level in the two regimes is thus determined by the crisis
likelihood, given a specific anticipated impact. As the impact increases, the manufacturer takes
a cautious approach. Therefore, when the likelihood of crisis is low, the manufacturer invests in
pre-crisis advertising to raise the brand image. Secondly, the manufacturer might invest more in
quality costs
(a) Low Impact Recall (b) Medium Impact Recall
(c) High Impact Recall
Figure 4.13: Variation of Advertising Efforts with Crisis Impact and Likelihood
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4.4.4. Goodwill and Quality Level













Q(t) = e−λ χ
(
Q0eλ χ + l21q21teλ χ + l11q11t
)
for 0≤ t ≤ tr (4.32)
Q(t) = Qtr + l12q12t + l22q22t for tr < t < ∞ (4.33)
The time index is j ∈ {1,2}. For the pre-crisis period G̃=G0 =G(0) and for the post-crisis period,
G̃ = Gtr = G(t
+
r ) = (1−η)G(t−r ) are the required initial values of the goodwill required to obtain
the solution of the above equations. Similarly, Q(0) = Q0 and Qtr = Q(t+r ) = (1− ξ )Q(t−r ). For
the numerical analysis we solve the state differential equations to find the state trajectories for four
cases - High impact High Likelihood Recall (η = ξ = .8,χ = .8), High Impact Low Likelihood
Recall (η = ξ = .8,χ = .05), Low Impact High Likelihood Recall (η = ξ = .05,χ = .8) and
Low Impact Low Likelihood Recall (η = ξ = .05,χ = .05). We have assumed the initial values
G(0) = .Q(0) = .1 to numerically solve the differential state equations.
According to Figures 14 and 15 (where we compare the goodwill and quality levels of the
players under a high impact recall) a low likelihood of a high impact recall can enhance pre-crisis
goodwill and quality when compared to the high likelihood high impact crisis. A low likelihood
crisis can possibly bring complacency and doubts about whether a recall will occur at all. In such
cases, advertising and quality efforts of the firms are high, and consequently the state trajectories
reach a higher level (recall that goodwill is affected by quality decisions as well).
On the other hand, Figures 16 and 17 shows that when recall probability is high, the suppliers
and the manufacturer exhibit a cautious approach, possibly anticipating the post-recall quality
improvement costs, and hence put lesser efforts during the pre-crisis period. Consequently the
state trajectories and goodwill reach a lower level. The cautious approach however acts as a double
edged sword - it takes the quality and goodwill to a lower level and as a consequence, the state jump
due to recall brings the quality level and goodwill further down if the recall happens. Thus it will
take longer for the firms to recover from crisis when the recall likelihood is higher and the recall
actually occurs.
125
(a) High Impact High Probability Recall- Goodwill (b) High Impact High Probability Recall - Quality
Figure 4.14: Goodwill and Quality for High Impact High Likelihood Recall
(a) High Impact Low Probability Recall- Goodwill (b) High Impact Low Probability Recall - Quality
Figure 4.15: Goodwill and Quality for High Impact Low Likelihood Recall
When impact of the crisis is low, intuitively, the goodwill and quality levels attain a high value.
The contrasts of quality levels are quite staggeringly different than the high impact case. In fact
for our parameter values, the quality level for the low impact case, in the post-crisis period is
almost three times the quality level in the high impact case. This underscores the importance of
a recall impact. Even when a firm recovers from a high impact recall, recovery can be delayed
and attaining the desired quality level may be difficult due to the losses already borne and the lack
of sufficient budget to invest in quality. The above is also supported by the fact that the suppliers
typically invest more in post-crisis quality for a low impact recall (Figure 4.5 and 4.6).
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(a) Low Impact High Probability Recall- Goodwill (b) Low Impact High Probability Recall - Quality
Figure 4.16: Goodwill and Quality for Low Impact High Likelihood Recall
(a) Low Impact Low Probability Recall- Goodwill (b) Low Impact Low Probability Recall - Quality
Figure 4.17: Goodwill and Quality for Low Impact Low Likelihood Recall
4.4.5. Supplier’s Negligence and Collateral Damage
Claim 5:Higher negligence of crisis likelihood by the risky supplier results in greater collateral
damage.
In our study, we represent the risky supplier’s degree of negligence of crisis by the parameter λ . We
have shown that the risky supplier’s degree of negligence can compel the manufacturer to change
the cost-sharing decision. Another important question is to ask how negligence impacts the firm
profits. We find that if supplier 1, the risky supplier, avoids quality investments or efforts and is
not sensitive towards the crisis likelihood, the long term expected profit could indeed be impacted
negatively.
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Figure 4.18: Negligence of unreliable supplier vs profit
Figure 4.17 shows the variation of the long term expected profits, Vm, Vs1 and Vs2 of the
manufacturer, supplier 1 and the supplier 2, respectively with respect to the negligence of the
supplier 1. The presence of collateral damage is very prominent. As negligence increases, the profit
of each firm decreases. The experiment was conducted using a benchmark crisis likelihood of 30%
(χ = .3), margin loss of about 20% for supplier 1 and the manufacturer (M̂s1 = .7,Ms1 = .56,M̂m =
1,Mm = .8) , 20% loss of advertising effectiveness (kg1 = 1,kg2 = .8), no change in learning for
supplier 1 (l11 = l12 = 1) and 20% decline is post-crisis consumer confidence in supplier 1’s quality
efforts (k11 = 1,k12 = .8).
4.4.6. Effect of Product Recall on Individual Firm’s Profits
The value functions evaluated at time t = 0 gives the long term expected profit of the firms. How-
ever, due to the complexity of our parameter space, it is hard to find substantial analytical insights
from the closed-form solutions of the value functions. To support our analysis, we further evaluate
the value functions at t = 0 and assume different values of the initial goodwill G(0) and initial
quality level Q(0). We find the profits for low impact and high impact recalls with different crisis
likelihoods. Under three scenarios, QICS contract, CQCS contract and no cost-sharing (NCS), we
consider the following cases under both high initial goodwill and low initial goodwill :
• χ = .05,η = .05,ξ = .05 (low likelihood low impact recall)
• χ = .3,η = .05,ξ = .05 (benchmark likelihood low impact recall)
• χ = .7,η = .05,ξ = .05 (high likelihood low impact recall)
• χ = .05,η = .7,ξ = .7 (low likelihood high impact recall )
• χ = .3,η = .7,ξ = .7 (benchmark likelihood high impact recall)
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• χ = .7,η = .7,ξ = .7 (high likelihood high impact recall)
Figure 4.19: Profit Comparison
We observe that under any contract or even NCS scenario, higher initial goodwill can produce
more long term expected profit for the manufacturer. The above finding is consistent with the
previous research, which predicts the reduced effect of product harm crisis on brand goodwill
loss for firms which have a high brand image. (Yi Zhao, Ying Zhao, and Helsen 2011; H. Van
Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007; Cleeren, H. J. Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013). However,
the suppliers may not always observe a higher profit when the initial goodwill is high because the
manufacturer is the market leader and adjusts the share of quality costs based on the contract. The
suppliers’ profits are dependent on this cost-sharing proportion and hence may not always be high
with high initial goodwill.
When the crisis likelihood is low or benchmark, the QICS contract is the best option for all the
three players and therefore coordinates the chain as it produces better results for all the channel
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members as compared to no cost-sharing contract (NCS) scenario, provided crisis impact is low.
The supplier 2 is indifferent between the QICS and CQCS contracts under low impact crisis, but
will not prefer NCS contract. Thus, the Cost-sharing mechanism with the faulty supplier controls
the "collateral damage" caused to the manufacturer as well as the reliable supplier.
High crisis likelihood may fail to coordinate the supply chain as the manufacturer’s best interest
is to opt for the no Cost-sharing option as opposed to the best interests of supplier 1 and supplier
2, who would prefer a CQCS contract. However, our model assumes that the manufacturer needs
the two suppliers, raw materials or products. Hence, if supplier 1 is reluctant to accept the NCS
scenario either because he produces specialized parts or has some market power, supplier switching
is an option. However, supplier switching might be costly and in some cases, beget more risks
resulting in the buyer becoming inert to such switching decisions (Wagner and Friedl 2007). In
such cases, depending on the power of the suppliers, the manufacturer may still offer a CQCS or
QICS contract. The details of such discussion are out of the purview of our model. Alternatively,
at the beginning of the planning horizon, the manufacturer may not even choose the supplier who
is very risky and poses a threat of very high chance of recall.
4.4.7. Effect of Product Recall on Supply Chain Profit:
In the above discussions, we found that the manufacturer may be reluctant to offer a quality cost-
sharing contract under a product recall risk, especially if the risk is high. We ask what happens to
the supply chain profit under the different cost-sharing contracts and the NCS scenario. Tables 5
and 6 demonstrate the chain profits. We find that compared to an NCS scenario, the chain profit
is always higher when the players adopt a cost-sharing contract. The enhanced profit with cost-
sharing is another motivation for adopting a cost-sharing contract. Irrespective of the impact of the
recall, the QICS contract seems better suited for the chain as it brings in more profit. Of course, a
high impact recall results in much lesser profit. Like in our other cases of numerical analysis, we
investigate three instances of recall likelihood,low (.05), benchmark (.3) and high (.7) and recall
impact either low or high. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show that no cost-sharing is detrimental to chain
profit when QICS contract is available.
Low impact recall- chain profit
Crisis Likelihood (χ) QICS CQCS NCS
0.05 190.0954 183.1066 161.3526
0.3 188.2022 181.8044 180.4693
0.7 188.8215 183.2706 185.6084
Table 4.3: Chain Profit for Low Impact Recall
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High impact recall- chain profit
Crisis Likelihood (χ) QICS CQCS NCS
0.05 99.2869 93.4773 83.4466
0.3 70.0033 67.181 68.7171
0.7 69.0765 66.5301 68.9245
Table 4.4: Chain Profit for High Impact Recall
Previous research (Rubel 2018; Mukherjee and Chauhan 2019) has found that under advertising
competition, the profit of competing firms increase with a low crisis likelihood and decreases for
high likelihood.
4.5. Conclusion and Managerial Implications
Cost-sharing in supply chains have evolved to be profitable and fruitful strategies for manufactur-
ers and suppliers alike. In this paper, we have investigated two cost-sharing contracts - Quality
Improvement Cost-sharing Contract and Comprehensive Quality Cost-sharing Contract offered by
a manufacturer in the presence of a risky supplier, susceptible to recall a product. We emphasized
the fact that a recall is sometimes unavoidable even if the manufacturer and supplier are aware of
the possibility of a recall. Under such circumstances, we examine how the quality efforts of the
suppliers, advertising effort of the manufacturer and the cost-sharing decisions of the manufacturer
influence the equilibrium performance of the firms. We also draw insights on how the impact and
likelihood of a recall influence the equilibrium decisions.
Our research highlights that during an impending product-recall, envisioned by supply chain
partners, a cost-sharing contract can motivate the suppliers to increase quality effort in the pre-
crisis regime and thereby lower the effect of the recall on goodwill, quality and consequently profit.
Therefore, management of manufacturing firms might be interested in forming quality cost-sharing
contracts even with risky suppliers.
However, for risky suppliers, a manufacturer should try to negotiate partial quality cost-sharing
agreement instead of full quality cost-sharing as the former is more profitable for all players. A
supplier’s negligence of crisis should be proactively managed by all the chain members as the
negligence results in "collateral damage" and is very detrimental to the profit of all players. If a
supplier is prone to high impact recall, a manufacturer may not enter into a cost-sharing agreement
with it. However, in presence of other contractual relationships which share chain profits, the
manufacturer might enter into a cost-sharing contract because no cost sharing always result in
worst chain profit irrespective of the magnitude of recall.
This research has some limitations and can be extended in several directions. We have not con-
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sidered competition in our model. It will be interesting to test if the results of our research change
in the presence of chain to chain competition or competition amongst multiple manufacturers with
common suppliers. We have not assumed any decay for quality in our model. Such an assumption
of quality decay may change some results of our study. It is also interesting to incorporate the effect
of pricing decision along with quality cost-sharing in a model. The goodwill can also be affected
by price (e.g.(Buratto, Cesaretto, and De Giovanni 2019)), and such a study would be very fruitful
to provide insights on multiple decision making during a product recall. Since we found that even
during product recalls, chain profit is significantly higher for cost-sharing contracts, investigating
a cooperative game involving profit sharing might be an interesting research direction.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Research
This dissertation investigates several important decision-making problems in the areas of advertis-
ing, pricing and quality investments when a product recall is envisioned by a firm, its competitors
or other supply chain partners. We examined three key issues :
• Advertising in a duopoly setting during a product recall.
• Joint pricing and advertising to counter the spillover effect due to a product recall.
• Join collaboration on quality and its impact on the product recall.
Under differential game-theoretic framework, we proposed different models which augment the
extant literature by validating the previous findings ((Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011; Borah and
Tellis 2016; Gao et al. 2015; Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan 2009)) or proposed some new novel
insights and results.
Our findings from the first essay mainly highlight that advertising effectiveness, crisis likeli-
hood, crisis impact, brand forgetting, goodwill sensitivity of the consumers and competition are
some of the critical factors determining the equilibrium advertising and pricing strategies of the
firms competing during a product recall. The anticipation of a product recall and estimation of its
impact are of utmost importance to a firm as well as its rival. Therefore, firms should try to collect
information about the factors that affect recall chances for itself and the competitors alike. Our
results establish a few key deciding factors and threshold values of crisis impact and likelihood-
based on which competing firms can adjust pre-crisis and post-crisis advertising. We show how
profits grow or decline under product recalls of different intensities.
Our model can be extended in several ways. First, recovery can be considered in the model
where a firm recovers from the lost image after a short while instead of having a lingering neg-
ative effect. Second, a hazard rate following Weibull distribution with suitable parameters may
be considered to incorporate that as time passes the chance of a recall decreases. Such a hazard
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distribution can potentially change our findings. Third, one may consider the diminishing effect of
advertising returns. It will be an interesting exercise to verify if returns on advertising reduce with
time, how the firms would adjust their level of advertising in the two regimes. Lastly, cross-firm
effects of advertising can also be considered in the model to verify the findings of the previous
literature.
In the second essay, we have considered two competing firms, one of which is the focal firm
issuing a recall, and its competitor is the non-focal firm suffering from a negative spillover effect.
We investigated the impact of the recall on the pricing and advertising decisions and the profit of
the firms. We found that the immediate decrease or increase in pricing and advertising by the firms
depends on the firms’ goodwill just before the recall. We also showed how the equilibrium policies
vary with time and state variables (goodwill of the firms) in the pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes.
Our recommended policies depend on the likelihood and impact of the recall. We observed that
the policies vary significantly in the two cases - (i) focal firm is a Stackelberg leader, (ii) two firms
take simultaneous decisions under a Nash game.
The direct extension of our model is the examination of the positive spillover effect of a prod-
uct recall which can potentially benefit a rival non-focal firm from a different country of origin.
Moreover, a study can incorporate a short-lived spillover and three regimes of analysis - pre-crisis,
spillover and post-crisis in a suitable model. However, in such case, it will be challenging to derive
the feedback strategies given the random duration of the three epochs of the models.
The third essay is different from the first two, primarily because the unit of analyses are vertical
members of a supply chain. We consider advertising and quality cost-sharing as the decisions of
the manufacturer and quality efforts as the decision of the suppliers. In the presence of a risky
supplier, who can trigger a product recall by supplying faulty parts, we found that a partial cost-
sharing mechanism works better for the firms’ profit most of the times. We also recommended
various cost-sharing and quality effort policies for recalls of different likelihood and impact. A
no cost-sharing may be a profitable option for a manufacturer when a risky supplier is present;
however, a contractual agreement always enhances the chain profit.
Our work can be extended in several directions. One obvious extension is the inclusion of
other contracts. A cooperative profit-sharing game would also be interesting because it would
provide a mechanism of splitting the chain profit into fair shares in the presence of risky firms.
Other extensions include the introduction of chain to competition or the presence of competing
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DERIVATION OF EQUATION (1).





e−rsπ(s)ds+ e−rtπi2(t)] where i ∈ {1,2}






This has been proved in (Rubel, Naik, and Srinivasan 2011) and hence we omit the proof. Euqtion
(16) comes from using the same logic or derivation as above.







e−rtΠi1(t)dt + e−rtiVi2(θi,θ j).Φ[ti < tj]
+e−rt jV̂i2(θi,θ j).Φ[tj < ti]
)





e−(r+χi+χ j)t{Πi1(t)dt +χiVi2((1−ηi)θi,θ j)
+χ jVi2(θi,(1−η j)θ j)}
Let z = Min{ti, t j}. Since the occurrence of the two recalls are assumed to be independent expo-
nential stochastic processes,
f (ti,χi) = χie−χit & f (t j,χ j) = χ je−χ jt
=⇒ Pr(min{ti, t j}> t) = Pr(ti > t)Pr(t j > t)
=⇒ Pr(min{ti, t j}> t = e−t(χi+χ j)
Using this result (A.5), equation (16) and after some algebraic manipulations, equation (A.3) re-
duces to equation (A.4). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. We proof the proposition by solving the problem for post-crisis
regime first and then for pre-crisis regime by using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations.
(a) Using equation (13), the HJB equations for manufacturers M1 and M2 in the second regime
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For maximization, differentiating the right side of (A.1) with respect to (w.r.t.) A12 and equating















We make an informed guess that the value function of the ith manufacturer in the jth regime is
linear in the state variables θi and is of the form (method of undeterrmined coefficients):
Vi j(θ1(t),θ2(t)(t)) = ai jθ1(t)+bi jθ2(t)+ ci j (A.3)
Thus, ∂Vi j
∂θ1
= ai j and
∂Vi j
∂θ2









Substituting (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) in equations (A.1) and (A.2), we do some algebraic manipula-
tions and compare the coefficients of the state variables to find the values of the coefficients. This



























Substituting a12 and b22 from (A.6) and (A.7) into in (A.4) and (A.5), respectively, we get the









This completes the proof of Proposition 1 (a).







































Using (A.3), equations (A.9) and (A.10) can be rewritten as :




























Comparing the coefficients of the state variables θi and ρ of the equation (A.13) and (A.14), we
have six equations:
(r+χ)a11 = β1m11−δ11a11 +χ(1−η)a12,











(r+χ)a21 = −β1m21−δ11a21 +χ(1−η)a22,



























Hence, the Proposition 1 (b). This completes the proof of Proposition 1. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. The expressions (A.8) of Proposition 1 give the equilibrium advertising
efforts of both manufacturers in post-crisis period. To establish this lemma, the first order condition
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Therefore, Ai2 is decreasing with r and δi and increasing with the other parameters. This completes
the proof of Lemma 1. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.






















> 0. After algebraic manipulations this
gives,
η > 1− m11(r+δ12)
m12(r+δ11)










The expression is surely negative if m22(r+δ21)< m21(r+δ22). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. The first expression of (A.16) in Proposition 1 gives the equilibrium
advertising effort A∗11 for the focal firm in pre-crisis regime. Similar to Lemma 1, the first order







(since all the parameters in the expression are positive). Thus, the equilibrium advertising effort of
the focal firm in the pre-crisis regime is decreasing with the damaging effect η . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. (a) From Proposition 1, the equilibrium advertising efforts of
the focal firm M1 for the post-crisis and pre-crisis regimes are A∗12 and A
∗
11 as given by (19) and











> 0 if k12m12 >
k11(m11(r+δ12)+m12(1−η)χ)
(r+χ +δ11)





This establishes the first part of Proposition 2.
(b) In a similar way, if we define Γ2 = A∗22−A∗21, where A∗22 and A∗21 are the equilibrium advertising











=⇒ χ > k21m21(r+δ22)− k22m22(r+δ21)
m22(k21− k22)
. (A.18)
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. To establish the results of Proposition 3 we use the results which
we derived in Proof of Proposition 1. The value function of manufacturer M1 in the post-crisis
(2nd regime) and pre-crisis (1st regime) periods can be expressed as given by the expression (A.3)
and is V1 j = a1 jθ1(t)+ b1 jθ2(t)+ c1 j for j = 1,2, where Vi j satisfies the HJB equations as given
by (A.1) and (A.9). Hence, comparing the corresponding coefficients of the state variables of the
HJB equations (A.1) and (A.9) we obtain the relations as given in (A.6), (A.7) and (A.15)for man-
ufacturer M1 for post-crisis and pre-crisis regime, respectively. After algebraic manipulations, we
get the solutions to a1 j,b1 j,c1 j for j ∈ {1,2} as given in (21) and (22).
We show the algebraic manipulation to obtain a12. The other coefficients can be similarly obtained.




















PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. Proof of Proposition 4 is similar to the proof of Proposition
3. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.
The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. The only difference is that in
each period the firm visualizes an infinite horizon decision problem without considering the crisis
likelihood. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.
The proof of proposition 6 is tedious. The proof follows from the derivation of the HJB equa-
tions for Mi in the 3 regimes - regime before any firm recalls, regime between the two recalls and
regime after the second recall. We proof the proposition in the following steps:
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1. Find the HJB equations of the firms Mi,M j in the third period.
2. From the first order conditions of the HJB equations with respect to the advertising decisions,
find the equilibrium policy.
3. By inspection guess a linear value function structure.
4. Plug in the optimal policies in the firms’ respective value functions and compare coefficients
with the guessed linear value function.
5. Repeat the above steps 1-4 for HJB equations in Regime 2 when Mi recalls first.
6. Repeat the above steps 1-4 for HJB equations in Regime 2 when Mi recalls second.
7. Repeat the above steps 1-4 for HJB equations in Regime 1.
The above steps will give us the value functions and hence by finding the coefficients of the
value functions we can determine the optimal advertising policies which depend on these coeffi-
cients.
Remark:Here, to prove the propositions we need to solve for the first order condition with respect
to advertising for both the firms Mi and M j. However, for brevity we show only the calculations
for Mi. The calculations for M j are similar.
The third regime HJB equations are identical to the second regime HJB equations in the case
of one focal firm and the proof is therefore similar to the proof of proposition 1.
The HJB equation for Mi & M j are given by :

















rVj3(θi,θ j) = Max
A j3
[(














We assume the following form of the value functions:
We assume that the value functions are linear:
Vi3(θi,θ j) = ai3θi +bi3θ j + ci3,
Vj3(θi,θ j) = a j3θi +b j3θ j + c j3.
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Taking the first order condition of the HJB equations with respect to the advertising decisions, we










We solve for the coefficients of the value functions. After algebraic manipulations and comparing






















For the second period the HJB equations will depend on who recalls first. At the beginning of the
second period one of the recalls become a certainty and both firms know who has recalled. If Mi
recalls first, the HJB equations of the two firms in the second regime are given by:















+χ jVi3(θi,(1−η j)θ j)
]
,
(r+χ j)Vj2(θi,θ j) = Max
A j2
[(
















Proceeding similarly as the proofs above we let:
Vi2(θi,θ j) = ai2θi +bi2θ j + ci2,
Vj2(θi,θ j) = a j2θi +b j2θ j + c j2.









































If Mi recalls second, the HJB equations of the two firms in the second regime are given by:














θ̇ j +χ jVi3((1−ηi)θi,θ j)
]
,
(r+χi)V̂j2(θi,θ j) = Max
A j2
[(











θ̇ j +χ jVj3((1−ηi)θi,θ j)
]
.
Proceeding similarly as the proofs above we let:
V̂i2(θi,θ j) = âi2θi + b̂i2θ j + ĉi2,
V̂j2(θi,θ j) = â j2θi + b̂ j2θ j + ĉ j2.
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[βim̂i2 +χi(1−ηi)ai3] if manufacturer i recalls second
From equations (17) and (18), the first period HJB equations of the two firms are:















+χiVi2(θi,θ j)+ χ jV̂i2(θi,θ j)
]
,
(r+χi +χ j)Vj1(θi,θ j) = Max
A j1
[(












+χiVj2(θi,θ j)+ χ jV̂j2(θi,θ j)
]
.
Assuming the following form of the value functions,
Vi1(θi,θ j) = ai1θi +bi1θ j + ci1,
Vj1(θi,θ j) = a j1θi +b j1θ j + c j1,
and proceeding in the standard way we get:
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ci1 =




(βimi1 +χiai2 +χ jâi2)
(r+χi +χ j +δi)
,
bi1 =
(−mi1 +χibi2 +χ jb̂i2)
(r+χi +χ j +δ j)
,





ki1(βimi1 +χiai2 +χ jâi2)
µi(r+χi +χ j +δi1)
.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7.




(βimi1 +χ jâi2 +χiai2
]
µi(r+χi +χ j +δi1)





(r+δi3)µi(r+ δ̂i2 +χi)(r+δi1 +χi +χ j)
< 0
Hence the first regime advertising is decreasing in ηi.











µi (δi3 + r)
(









δi2 +χ j + r
)
2
> 0 if mi2 < mi3 (on simplification) .






Therefore, if Mi recalls second, the second regime advertisement is decreasing with the damage ηi.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8.
The proof of Proposition 8 follows from the proof of proposition 6. From equations (A.21), we
have the coefficients of the value functions in the first period. Therefore, putting t = 0 and assum-
ing the initial values of θi(0),θ j(0), we can find the long term expected profit of the firm.
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B. Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. We prove the proposition by solving the problem for post-crisis
regime first and then for pre-crisis regime by using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations.
Using equation (19), the HJB equations for supplier 1 and supplier 2 in the second regime

























where Qi js are the demand functions in equation (3.1). Similarly, from equations (16) and (17)



























The solution procedure is to start solving the second period HJB equations.
Recall that
Q1 j = α1− p1 j +β1 p2 j +θ1 j− γ1θ2 j (B.3)
Q2 j = α2− p2 j +β2 p1 j +θ1 j− γ2θ1 j
and
θ̇i j(t) = ki jai j(t)−δi jθi j(t), ∀t ∈ 0≤ t ≤ ∞,θi j(0) = θ̃i j (B.4)



























The first order conditions of the right hand sides of (B.6) with respect to the decision variables a12
and p12 and the first order conditions of the right hand sides of (B.7) with respect to the decision
variables a22 and p22 give:

































We have assumed that the value functions are given by the following equations:
V12(θ12,θ22) = A12θ12(t)2 +Bi2θ22(t)2 +C12θ12(t)θ22(t)+D12θ12(t)+E12θ22(t)+F12

















For the derivation of the value functions we substitute the decision variables from (B.12),(B.17)
and (B.18) in the equations (B.6) and (B.7). Then we compare and equate the coefficients of the
state variables or their associations i.e the coefficients of θi,θ 2i ,θiθ(3−i), i ∈ {1,2} and the constant
terms which give us the following twelve equation needed to be solved simultaneously to get the

























































































































































− rF22 = 0
(B.18)
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The solutions of the above 12 simultaneous non linear equations give us the coefficients of the value
functions. Due to the obvious complexity of the set of linear equations, we derive the solutions
numerically.
Proceeding similarly as in the second regime’s derivation of the equilibrium value of the deci-






















We have assumed that the value functions are given by the following equations:
V11(θ11,θ21) = A11θ11(t)2 +B11θ21(t)2 +C11θ11(t)θ21(t)+D11θ11(t)+E11θ21(t)+F11

















Again plugging in the values of the decision variables in the HJB equations of the first period and
then comparing the coefficients of the state variables we get the following set of 12 non linear
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+F22χ− (r+χ)F21 = 0
(B.26)
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Due to the complexity of the non linear system of equations, we solve the equations numerically.
The above concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. We prove the proposition by solving the problem for post-crisis
regime first and then for pre-crisis regime by using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations.
In the Stackelberg game, the leader focal firm, moves first and announce its price and advertising.
Leader observes the reaction function of the follower and uses the same to find the equilibrium
decisions.
The solution procedure is same as the Nash game in the sense that we have to take the first order
condition of the HJB equations to find the equilibrium decisions. Therefore, proceeding as in the
Nash game, taking the first order condition of (B.6) with respect to p22, we get,
α2−2p22 +β2 p12 +θ12− γ2θ12 = 0
=⇒ p22 =
α2 +β2 p12 +θ12− γ2θ12
2
. (B.27)




























Putting the value of p12 from (B.29) in (B.27) and simplifying we get,
p∗22(t) =
(4α2 +2α1β2−α2β1β2 +(2β2 +β1β2γ2−4γ2)θ12(t)+(4−β1β2−2β2γ1)θ22(t))
4(2−β1β2)
(B.30)
The first regimes pricing decisions can similarly be derived by replacing the regime index 2 by 1
in the above procedure. Technically, the advertising decisions at equilibrium needs no different
treatment for the Stackelberg game because of the mathematical structure of our game. In the
Stackelberg game, the advertising efforts have same expressions in terms of the state variables and
can be derived in the same manner in the Nash game. However, as mentioned earlier, the value
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function coefficients will be different in the two games and hence the advertising efforts will also
vary. We assume the value functions have the following structure
V1 j(θ1 j,θ2 j) = A1 jθ1 j(t)2 +Bi jθ2 j(t)2 +C1 jθ1 j(t)θ2 j(t)+D1 jθ1 j(t)+E1 jθ2 j(t)+F1 j
V2 j(θ1 j,θ2 j) = A2 jθ1 j(t)2 +B2 jθ2 j(t)2 +C2 jθ1 j(t)θ2 j(t)+D2 jθ1 j(t)+E2 jθ2 j(t)+F2 j
(B.31)
and present the set of equations for the two periods which give the solutions to the value function
coefficients.
Proceeding similarly as in the case of Nash games, we compare the coefficients of state vari-
ables of the value functions with coefficients in the right hand side of the HJB equations after
substituting the decisions variables with the solutions we obatined. Comparison yields the follow-





































β 21 γ2 +4γ1−2β1 (γ1γ2 +2β2C12 (δ12 +δ22)+1)+8C12 (δ12 +δ22)
4β1β2−8










































































16(γ2 +2C22 (δ12 +δ22))−8β2 (γ1γ2 +β1 (γ2 +4C22 (δ12 +δ22))+1)
8(β1β2−2)2
−
β 22 (4γ1 +β1 (2γ1γ2 +β1 (γ2 +8C22 (δ12 +δ22))+2))
8(β1β2−2)2
−rC22 = 0














− rD22 = 0























− rF22 = 0
(B.32)
Clearly, the equations (B.32) are different from the set of equations (B.18). Hence these give us
a different solution for the Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg game’s first period equations for


































β 21 γ2−2β1 (γ1γ2 +2β2C11 (δ11 +δ21)+1)+4(γ1 +2C11 (δ11 +δ21))
4β1β2−8
+



































































− (r+χ)B21 = 0
C22(η−1)χ(φ −1)−
































+D22(χ−ηχ)− (r+χ)D21 = 0

























− (r+χ)F21 = 0
(B.33)
Equations (B.33) give the solution of the first period coefficients of the value functions. Again
clearly, the equations and hence the coefficients in general will be different from the Nash game.
This concludes the proof of proposition 2.
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C. Appendix
We have first assumed that the value functions are linear in the state variables G(t) and Q(t) and
have later verified our claim. For the post-crisis period the value functions are assumed to take the
form,
Vi(G(t),Q(t)) = XiG(t)+YiQ(t)+Zi (C.1)
in the post-crisis period
V̂i(G(t),Q(t)) = X̂iG(t)+ ŶiQ(t)+ Ẑi
in the pre-crisis period.
where i ∈ {s1,s2,m}
The proofs of the Propositions 1,2,3 are similar. Also, we need to find the value functions in the
two periods in order to solve for the equilibrium decisions of the players.
PROOF OF THE PROPOSITIONS. The proof of the Propositions 1,2,4,5,7,8,9 needs cross
references as the decision variables are inter-related. We prove the propositions by solving the
problems for each firm in the post-crisis regime first and then for pre-crisis regime by using
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations.



















































for the QICS contract
Cs1 =
(1−φ2)(µs1 +ω +ξ θ)q212(t)
2
(C.4)






For maximization of the value function, under the QICS contract differentiating the right side of



















((1−φ2)µs1 +ω +ξ θ
) (C.6)
We get (C.6) substituting the value of Vs1 from (C.1) . For maximization of the value function,
under the CQCS contract differentiating the right side of (C.2) with respect to (w.r.t.) q12, using












(1−φ2)(µs1 +ω +ξ θ
) (C.7)
Proceeding similarly as in then case of finding q∗12(t) we use the maximizing technique and take
the derivative of the HJB equation of Supplier 2 with respect to q∗22(t). Simplifying and equating












The HJB equation for manufacturer in the second regime (post-crisis period), is be given by :
rVm(G,Q) = Max
A2,φ2,σ2












































for the CQCS contract
For the manufacturer, we need to find the equilibrium advertising A∗2(t) and the cost-sharing





= ai j and
∂Vi j
∂θ2
= bi j. Therefore, differentiating the HJB
equation of the manufacturer with respect to A2(t), and equating to zero we get ,





To find the equilibrium φ2(t), under the QICS contract we use the equations (C.6) and (C.8) to
input the values of the reaction functions of Supplier 1 and supplier 2, i.e qi2(t), i ∈ {1,2} in terms
of φ2(t) and σ2(t) in the HJB equation (C.9) of the manufacturer. Substituting the values of q∗i2(t)







Λ1 = (θξ +(1−φ2)µs1 +ω)(2k12Xm +2l12Ym)





(θξ +µs1 +ω)(k12(2Xm−Xs1)+ l12(2Ym−Ys1))
µs1(k12(2Xm +Xs1)+ l12(2Ym +Ys1))
(C.15)
Similarly, taking the derivative of the HJB equations (C.9) with respect to σ2 and equating to 0





µs1(k22(2Xm +Xs2)+ l22(2Ym +Ys2))
(C.16)
We can reduce the equilibrium policies of the players in terms of the system parameters on simpli-
fication. However, to do so we need the coefficients Xi,Yi and Zi where i ∈ {s1,s2,m}. We show
hoe to derive the same for the manufacturer. The suppliers’ value functions’ coefficients can be
similarly derived.





















Therefore the coefficients Xm,Ym and Zm can be derived by putting in the equilibrium solutions of
the decision variables in the value function of the manufacturer we get:























Clearly, from equations (C.6), (C.7), (C.12), (C.15) and (C.16), the decision variables are expres-
sions in terms of system parameters and the coefficients of value functions. Therefore, the state
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variables are not present directly in the expressions. Therefore, assuming the linear form of the
value function, noting that ∂Vm
∂G = Xm and
∂Vm
∂Q =Ym, comparison of the the coefficients of G(t) and






















Putting (C.15) in (C.6) and (C.16) in (C.8) and substituting the values of Xm and Ym from (C.19)
we get the following solutions on simplification:
q∗12(t) =
(2Mm +Ms1)(k12rβ + l12γ(r+δ2))
2r(r+δ2)(µs1 +θξ +ω)
q∗22(t) =





















The above concludes the proof for the quality decisions of the suppliers in the second regime. The
170
HJB equations of the three players in the pre-crisis regime are:
(r+χ)V̂s1(G,Q) = Max
q11






























































(e−λ χ l11q11(t)+ l21q21(t))]
+χVm((1−η)G,(1−ξ )Q)]












































We proceed exactly in the similar manner as in the case of second regime and take the first order
optimality condition for decision variables -
q11(t) for supplier 1, q21(t) for supplier 2 and A1(t),φ1(t),σ1(t) for the manufacturer. Proceeding
as in the case of (C.6) we get
q∗11(t) =
X̂s1k11 + Ŷs1l11e−λ χ
((1−φ1)µs1 +(1−χ)ω
) ( for the QICS contract), (C.26)
q∗11(t) =












































































At this stage we note that the simultaneous equations which will give us the solutions of the coef-
ficients of the value function (determined the method of comparison of coefficients from equations
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(C.22)) are:
(r+χ)X̂s1 = βM̂s1−δ1X̂s1 +χ(1−η)Xs1 (C.33)
(r+χ)Ŷs1 = γM̂s1 +χ(1−ξ )Ys1 (C.34)
(r+χ)Ẑs1 = ∆s1 (C.35)
(r+χ)X̂s2 = βM̂s2−δ1X̂s2 +χ(1−η)Xs2 (C.36)
(r+χ)Ŷs2 = γM̂s2 +χ(1−ξ )Ys2 (C.37)
(r+χ)Ẑs2 = ∆s2 (C.38)
(r+χ)X̂m = βM̂m−δ1X̂m +χ(1−η)Xm (C.39)
(r+χ)Ŷm = γM̂m +χ(1−ξ )Ym (C.40)
(r+χ)Ẑm = ∆m (C.41)
∆i is the constant term which we do not use for any derivation. However, we use the constant
term only during the numerical analysis.Due to the size of the expression of the constant term, and
because it is not used to prove any of our proposition, we omit the expression from this appendix.
From the above equations, substituting the values of φ1 and σ1 from (C.29), (C.30) and (C.31) into







































The Proof of PROPOSITION 1 follows from the derivations of (C.21) and (C.42). 
The proof of PROPOSITION 2 follows from the derivations of (C.21) and (C.43). 
The proof of Proposition 3 can be obtained by putting φ j = σ j = 0 and just finding the equilibrium
values of decision variables - qi j(t). 
The Proof of Proposition 4 follows from the derivations of (C.21) and (C.29). 
The proof of Proposition 5 follows from the derivations of (C.21) and (C.30). 
The Proof of Proposition 7 follows from from the derivations of (C.21) and (C.31). 
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The proof of Proposition 8 follows from from the derivations of (C.21) and (C.44). 
The Proof of Proposition 9 follows from the solutions of the equations (C.33)-(C.41). 
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